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FOREWORD
This is the Final S_mmary Report of the "Shuttle EVA/IVA Support Requirements
Study". This effort was conducted by Hamilton Standard under NASA Contract
NAS 9-12506 for the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center of the National Aeronautics
& Space Administration from March 14, 1972 to April 30, 1973. The principal
contributors to this effort are listed in alphabetical order below:
John C. Beggs
Brian L. Birch
Robert W. Blaser
Miner C. Friend
Fred H. Goodwin
Philip F. Heimlich
Kerry C. Jones
Howard E. Lowitt
James G. Sutton
Richard E. Wilde
Edwin L. Young
Special thanks are due to the Technical Contract Monitor, Mr. Donald L. Boydston,
Crew _qvstems 13_r_.q_nn nf t.h_ I_TA.qAT._r_Rr,_ _. T,_1_o_,_ a .... o_-_ for _"
advice and guidance.
w_nis total report is contained in two (2) volumes as listed below:
Volume I
Volume II
Final Summary Report
Appendix
ilii
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of the Space Shuttle Program is to provide a new
space transportation capability _hat will reduce substantially the
cost of space operations, and provide a future capability designed to
support a wide range of scientific, defense and commercial uses. An
integral part of this future capability is man. Manned participation
will certainly add new dimensions to the useful applications of space
technology. The Space Shuttle will be capable of transporting safely
and comfortably up to ten (lO) scientists, technicians and astronauts
into orbit while delivering payloads. This permits the direct parti-
cipation in space experiments and observations by men and women who
are leaders in their respective fields and no longer limits space
flight to intensively trained astronauts.
The crew and passengers will be directly involved in three (3) new,
important and different types of activities: (1) on-orbit placement
satellites; and (3) operation of Shuttle-borne laboratories. In the
first type of activity, manned on-tobit checkout and activation of
delivered satellites will assure effective systems are placed in
orbit, and manned on-orbit command and control will enable capture
and return of payloads to earth for reuse. Manned service and
maintenance of satellites on-orbit will significantly increase the
return of information and extend the useful life of the systems. In
addition, replacements of satellite equipment that updates instrumenta-
tion, replaces degraded or failed parts, or provides additional
materials consumed in operation will also significantly increase the
utility of satellite developments.
Lastly, manned operation of Shuttle-borne laboratories will provide
an entirely new capability for investigation, development, evaluation,
and application of space techniques and equipment. Discipline
oriented nonastronautpersonnel can utilize their laboratory skills in
monitoring, control, calibration and repair of equipment, thus re-
ducing complexity and cost of experimental development.
EVA/IVA operations are a key element of manned participation in the
Shuttle program. The primaryobjectives of the Shuttle EVA/IVA
Support Requirements Study are to establish a baseline EVA/IVA
approach for Space Shuttle operations and to prepare specific system
requirements for the EVA/IVA equipment required to support these
operations.
This volume presents the Final Summary Report. General conclusions
and recommendations resulting from this effort arepresented in Section
2.0. A description of the study methodology utilized in the conduct
of this program is found in Section 3.0. Section 4.0 contains the
results of the EVA/IVA taskidentification and analysis effort, while
the study guidelines and constraints are listed in Section 5.0. The
suit pressure level determination is described in Section 6.0.
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1.0 (Continued)
Sections 7.0 through 12.0 present the results of our EVA equipment
requirements definition efforts and include the Primary Life Support
System (PLSS), Emergency Life Support System (EI_S), Pressure Suit
Assemblies, Restraints, Translation Aids, and Worksite Provisions,
respectively. Emergency IVand development flights requirements are
discussed in Sections 13.0 and 14.0. Vehicle interfaces are presented
in Section 15.0.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
General conclusions emanating from the Shuttle EVA/IVA Support Require-
ments Studyeffort are:
a. EVA/IVA Task Identification - The past history of the Gemini
and ApolloEVA missionshas demonstrated that EVA can be
safely used for productive tasks. Based on this demonstrated
capability and an evaluation of the Shuttle missions, their
payloads, and the potential need for EVA/IVA, the following
specific conclusions were drawn:
i. EVA/IVA may be required for on-orbit checkout prior to
final deployment of a payload.
a
.
EVA/IVA operations are required for planned conduction
of certain experiments.
EVA/IVA enhances overall Shuttle flexibility and capa-
bility for ser¢icing payloads by providing the ability
to conduct total maintenance.
42 EVA/IVA capability is required forunscheduled and con-
tingency operations to prevent mission aborts and
ensure crew safety.
be EVA/IVA Task Analysis - Based on the results of the EVA/IVA
task analysis effort, the following specific conclusions
were drawn:
i. EVA mission duration required is four (4) hours.
. The Shuttle Orbiter shall have the capability to support
a maximum of six (6) dual EVA missions and 32 manhours of
EVA.
. Most planned and unscheduled EVA/IVA tasks require two
(2) crewmen.
4. Emergency duration required is fifteen (15) minutes.
Go The manipulator assisted mode of translation is the
selected mode for sixty-two (62) percent of the planned
tasks; the manual mode of translation is the selected
mode for eighty-three (83) percent of the unscheduled
tasks.
. The 8.0 psi Orbital EVA Space Suit Assembly RFP design
goals are adequate for the Shuttle EVA missions.
2-I
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2.1 (Continued)
7.
.
c,
d,
Required w0rksite restraints are foot, waist and hand
restraints, in various different combinations.
For flights carrying contamination sensitive payloads,
the payload instrumentation shields must be closed
during EVA operations. If this procedure is followed,
an Apollo-type EVA system utilizing water as a thermal
control evaporant and having a suit gaseous leakage
rate of 100 scc/min is a useable system for performing
Shuttle EVA missions.
Suit Pressure Level Determination - Optimum suit operating
pressure level is 8 psia.
EVA Equipment -
i. The Primary Life Support System (PLSS) is a closed loop,
self-contained system with the capability for liquid
loop umbilical operation.
2. The Emergency Life Support System (ELSS) is an open
loop, self-contained system.
5.
The PLSS and ELSS should be structurally integrated to
minimize weight and volume and to eliminate functional
interfaces, and thus reduce the operational time re-
quired to stow, don/doff and recharge the equipment.
The Apollo ILC ATLB Suit is not adequate to meet the
Shuttle EVA/IVA mobility requirements. Utilization
of advanced state-of-the-art suit joints offer
significant improvements in mobility and are less
expensive to produce than the equivalent Apollo ILC
ATLB suit Joints.
It is possible to develop a suit sizing schedule such
that selected off-the-shelf components could be
assembled into one (1) unit for a particular crewman
and thus provide the maximum possible mobility and
comfort. It is expected that the number of sizes
of each component can be reduced to a maximum of
three (B) with the exception of the gloves which re-
quire six (6) sizes.
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2.1 (Continued)
6.
f.
A work platform located at the end of the Shuttle
manipulator boom is a viable candidate to provide
crewman translation and to permit the EVA crewman to
service, maintain or repair payloads, and to assist
in the conduct of experiments.
1. Lightweight, quick donningpressure suits are required
for each of the crewmen for immediate donning in the
event of loss of cabin pressure.
. Portable one (1) hour rechargeable breathing systems
are required for each of the crewmen for immediate
donning in the event of a contaminated cabin.
. 0n-board survival provisions should support the crew
for up to ten (10) hours for mission aborts and for
ninety-six (96) hours for completion of Shuttle,to-
Shuttlerescue.
Me The capability for EVA transfer of the crew to a rescue
Shuttle is required. A PLSS is used to support each
crewman during the transfer. Additional PLSS's should
be carried by the rescue Shuttle as required for each
crewman.
Vehicle Interfaces -
1. EVA equipment should be stowed, donned/doffed and re-
charged in the lower crew compartment.
2. A suit ventilator is required during suit donning to
provide crewmanVentilationand cooling.
. An RF hardline in the airlock is required to provide an
RF link between the EVA crewman and the vehicle
communications system while the crewman is in the
airlock.
A vehicle liquid cooling system is recommended during
the pressure integrity check and remains in use until
activation of the PLSS thermal control subsystem.
. The vehicle is required to provide PLSS recharge cap-
ability for water, oxygen and the battery, and for
disposal of Condensed water.
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2.2 Recommendations
a.
b.
The baseline North American Rockwell breathingsystem,
which is carried on board for each crewman, is an open
loop system of ten (lO) minutes duration. It is recom-
mended that this system be modified to provide one (1)
hour closed loop operation and be rechargeable.
_Arther study effort is required to evaluate candidate life
support equipment concepts to provide emergency IV life
support for on-board survival durations up to ninety-six
(96) hours.
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3.0 STUDY METHODOLOGY
The primary objectives of the Space Shuttle EVA/IVA Support
Equipment Requirements Study were to establish a baseline
EVA/IVA approach for Space Shuttle operations and to prepare
specific system requirements. The general study approach
consisted of:
a) Identification and analysis of representative Shuttle
EVA/IVA tasks.
b) Establishment of study guidelines and constraints.
c) Determination of suit pressure level.
e) Establishment of life support systems requirements,
f) Establishment of translation requirements.
g) Establishment of restraint requirements.
h) Establishment of worksite provisions requirements.
i) Identification and analysis of emergency IV modes and
establishment of emergency IV support requirements.
j) Establishment of Shuttle development flights support
equipment requirements.
k) Establishment of vehicle support provisions requirements.
l) Preparation of the final report.
The study logic flow diagra m is presented in Figure 3-1 to
illustrate the approach utilized to achieve the objectives
of this study program. The remainder of this volume presents
the results of this study, in sequence, in accordance with the
study logic flow diagram.
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4.0
4.1
4.i.i
EVA/IVA TASK IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS
EVA/IVA Task Identification
General
In order to establish a baseline EVA/IVA approach to Space
Shuttle operations, it was first necessary to identify the
Space Shuttle EVA/IVA tasks. Utilizing the NASA/DOD Earth
Orbit _huttle Traffic Model (_ASA MSC Internal Note Number
72-FM-71, March 21, 1972) as a basis, potential Shuttle
EVA/IVA tasks were identified and evaluated. As depicted
in Figure 4-1, Hamilton Standard was supported in this
effort by three of the four potential Shuttle Orbiter Prime
Contractors (NR, GAC and MDAC), numerous NASA personnel at
both the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Marshall Space
Flight Center, and the results of studies such as the GD/
Convair Research and Applications Modules (RAM) study, and
the NR Orbital Operations Study (OOS). In addition, the
NASA Blue Book (reference Earth Orbital Research and Appli-
cations Investigations, NHB 7150.1, Volumes 1-8, January 15,
1971) was utilized to provide experiment descriptions and
procedures.
FIGURE 4--1. EVA/IVA TASK IDENTIFICATION
Each Shuttle payload on each Shuttle flight in the 1979 -
1990 time period was evaluated and the potential need for
EVA/IVA support was determined. The results of this effort
are presented in detail in Sections 1.O, 2.0 and 3.0 of
Appendix A, Volume II of this report. Section 4.0 of Appen-
dix A discusses how the Shuttle might be utilized to service
or retrieve satellites which are presently operating in
orbit or have been deactivated. The Shuttle EVA/IVA tasks
identified as a result of this effort were classified into the
following three (3) categories and are summarily described in
the remainder Of this section.
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4.1.2
h.l.2.1
General - Continued
a. Planned
b. Unscheduled
c. Contingency
Planned Tasks
Planned tasks are defined as those tasks that are performed as
the primary means of accomplishing Shuttle mission objectives.
The general philosophy is that EVA/IVA shall be utilized for
planned Shuttle operations only as required by the Shuttle
payload(s). Although Shuttle payload deployment and retrieval
operations are presently baselined so as not to require EVA/IVA
operations, EVA/IVA is required for the conduct of some of the
candidate Shuttle experiments and to support payload servicing
and maintenance operations, and may be required to provide on-
orbit checkout prior to final deployment of a payload.
Experiment Conduction
In the area of experiment conduction, the Shuttle Traffic
Model defines two (2) specific payloads (reference Nos. h7
and 49) that are EVA experiments ; the Manned "Work Platform
(MWP) is scheduled for flight in 1981 and the Astronaut
Maneuvering Unit is scheduled for flight in 1980. An artist's
concept of the _[WP is presented in Figure 4-2. The objective
of both of these experiments is to develop an understanding
of and a control over problems associated with utilization
of self-powered maneuvering equipment to perform specified
tasks in orbit. In addition, numerous Sortie lab experiments
proposed for Space Shuttle missions will require EVA.
'--i ,-
FIGURE 4--2. MANNED WORK PLATFORM
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4.1.2.1 Experiment Conduction - Continued
The following examples were identified in Volume II - technology
of the NASA Blue Book:
Experiment Title
a. Real Time Contamination Measurements
b. Surface Degradation Experiment
c. Contaminant Cloud CompositionMeasurement
d. Integrated Real-Time Contamination
Monitor: Optical Module Evaluation
e. Active Cleaning Technique Evaluation
Reference
Paragraph
1.4.2
1.4.3
1.4.4
EVA is required in support of these experiments for deployment
and retrieval of exposure samples, in situ measurements of
contamination effects, and for actual conduction of the
active cleaning experiments. Another representative set of
examples were identified in Volume VII - technology of the
NASA Blue Book:
Experiment Title
Reference
Paragraph
a. Oxygen Recovery and Biowaste ResistoJet 4.4 .i
b. Thermal Coating Refurbishment in Space 4.4.3
c. Leak Detection and Repair 4.4.5
d. Maintainable Attitude Control Propulsion
System 4.4.6
e. Space Exposure Effects on Material Bulk
Properties 4.4.10
EVA is required in support of these experiments for installa-
tion, inspection and maintenance of experiment equipment which
is located external to the spacecraft.
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h.1.2.2 Service and Maintenance
Thesecond area in which planned _CA/IVA is required is for
payload servicing and maintenance. The basic service and
maintenance functions required by payloads and to be provided
by the Shuttle Orbiter are:
a. Inspection
b. Cleaning
c. Replacement of Malfunc-
tioning items
d. Replacement of life-limited
items
e. Updating of instrumentation
f. Recharging of expendables
As shown in Table h-l, the Shuttle Traffic Model indicates
there are a total of 62 revisits planned to the following pay-
loads in the 1979 to 1990 time period. This indicates the
importance attached to payload servicing and maintenance:
PAYLOAD
High Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO)
Large Space Telescope (LST)
Large Solar Observatory (LS0)
Large Radio Observatory (LRO)
i
Total
NL_4BER OF
REVISITS
22
17
13
i0
62
TABLE 4--1. REVISIT MISSIONS
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4.1.2.2 Service and Maintenance - Continued
There are five (5) basic payload service and maintenance
mode options available for Shuttle operations:
a. Ground Refurbishment - Ground refurbishment consists
of payload retrieval in orbit and return to Earth. All
service and maintenance operations are then performed
in a controlled environment on Earth. Upon completio n
of these operations, the payload is then launched and
placed in orbit once again. While this mode permits
the most complete service and maintenance of the pay-
load, it also appears to be the most costly.
b. On-Orbit, Pressurized (Figure 4-3) - On-Orbit pressurized
LST require deployment of a resupply module and then
docking of the payload to the resupp!y module. When
possible, systems or equip-
ment required to support
maintenance operation will
be stored in the resupply
module. However, a limited
amount of maintenance-
related equipment can be
pro-installed in the sup-
portsystems module (SSM)
to reduce crew time re-
quirements or increase
crew safety. The major
advantage of this ap-
proach is that it allows
the crewman to work in a
shirt sleeve environment,
thus allowing him to per-
form at his maximum
%
FIGURE 4--3. ON ORBIT,
PRESSURIZED MAINTENANCE
O PTION
efficiency. However, this mode has disadvantages in that it
does not permit access to external items, it opens up the
payload, especially the Scientific Instrument Package (SIP),
to the "unclean" Shuttle environment, and it may be hazardous
for refueling operations (i.e., - hydrazine).
Co On-Orbit, Unpressurized with IVA - The on-orbit, unpressurized
with IVA mode is similar to the on-orbit, pressurized mode
except that servicing is performed in the unpressurized pay-
load, and the crewman is suited. This mode helps to mini-
mize the potential cleanliness problem mentioned in b. above.
However, the payload must be designed to permit a suited IVA
crewman to perform maintenance operations within the payload.
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4.1.2.2 Service and Maintenance - Continued
d.
e,
On-orbit_ unpressurized with IVA and/or EVA - This main-
tenance mode option is similar to the mode described in
c. above except that the additional capability of EVA
maintenance has been added. This capability provides
access to the external equipment for servicing.
O_-Or1_it, UnpressurSzed (Fi_ur_ 4,4) - The on-orbit,
uhpressurized-maintenance Option permits total maintenance
of the payload on each
revisit, requires mini-
mum maintenance time,
and has a minimum of
Shuttle interfaces. In
addition, this concept
permits ground calibra-
tion and test of spares
and provides maximum
flexibility for payload
redesign. Although the
crewman is suited and
pressurized for this
mode, it is anticipated
that he would still have
the required mobility
and dexterity to suc-
cessfully completehis
mission. The major
,=f//_ -i"_,
FIGURE 4--4. ON ORBIT,
UNPRESSURIZED MAINTENACE
0 PTIO N
disadvantage of this concept is it requires module replace-
ment (versus component replacement), thus requiring mandatory
replacement of many non-life-limited items and more elabor-
ate storage provisions in the Shuttle payload bay.
Note that the majority of these options require an EVA/IVA
capability to support payload servicing operations. As men-
tionea in paragraph 4.1.2.1, the NASA Blue Book identified an
experiment in which an EV crewman evaluates a cleaning unit.
It is anticipated that an EV crewman can operate a similar
cleaning device to clean critical payload equipment such as
telescope lenses and mirrors, camera lenses, sensitive instru-
mentation, solar panels, etc. An artist's sketch representing
an EV crewman preparing to clean the staz" tracker at the end of
the LST is presented in Figure 4-5 as an example of payload
servicing and maintenance. In this concept, the crewman mounts
a work station at the end of the manipulator and the manipulator
is used to translate the crewman from the airlock to the worksite.
4-6
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The crewman operates the manipulator from his work station. Dutch
shoes and a waist tether are provided to restrain the crewman. The
manipulator is attached to the LST by way of a telescoping connection
to secure it to the worksite and thus prevent excessive flexure or
bending of the manipulator boom due to crewman work forces.
_.i.2.3
h .1.3
0n-Orbit Checkout
Approximately 50% of payload anomalies and failures associated with
payloads launched with expendable boosters appear during the launch
phase. Due to this high degree of "infant mortality", it might be
very desireable to provide an on-orbit EVA capability for checkout
prior to final deployment of a payload by the Shuttle. Besides de-
creasing the "infant mortality" rate of payloads, an on-orbit EVA
checkout capability could also result in relaxed design and testing
requirements for payloads and thus lower total payload cost.
[
Unscheduled Tasks
Unscheduled tasks are defined as those tasks performed as an alter-
nate means of accomplishing Shuttle mission objectives, usually
preceded by a malfunction of the primary means. The NASA Space
Shuttle Orbiter Request for Proposal (RFP Number 9-BCh21-67-2-40P)
stated that the primary objective of the Space Shuttle Program is to
provide a new space transportation capabilitythat will:
a) Reduce substantially the cost of space operations.
b) Provide a future capability designed to support a wide range
of scientific, defense and commercial uses.
In order tO achieve this primary objective, the Shuttle must be
capable of successfully performing the functions of deployment,
retrieval, and serVicing and maintenance of various types of pay-
loads. In the event that any of the remotely-controlled electro-
mechanical devices which perform these functions does malfunction,
unshceduled EVA/IVA may be required to prevent a mission abort and
successfully complete the mission. Since mission aborts cannot be
tolerated due to the cost involved (approximately $10 mission per
flight) and the loss of public confidence incurred, a backup EVA/
IVA capability is required.
Sample sequential listings of the remotely-controlled automated
steps required to deploy, retrieve and service payloads are pre-
sented in Figures h-6, h-7 and h-8 respectively. EVA/IVA is
capable of backing up each of these functional steps in the event
of a malfunction. However, these systems must be designed to be
compatible with the crewman in order to ensure successful imple-
mentation of EVA/IVA as a backup capability.
4-8
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4.1.3 Unscheduled Tasks - Continued
• OPEN PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
• DEPLOY RADIATOR
• RELEASE MANIPULATOR
• ENGAGE PAYLOAD
• RELEASE PAYLOAD TIEDOWNS
• RAISE PAYLOAD FROM BAY
• RELEASE PAYLOAD
• SECURE MANIPULATOR
FIGURE 4--6. ORBITER OPERATIONS -- DEPLOYMENT
• OPEN PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
• DEPLOY RADIATOR
• RELEASE MANIPULATOR
• LOCATE AND GRAPPLE PAYLOAD
• TRANSFER PAYLOAD INTO PAYLOAD BAY
• SECURE PAYLOAD
• RELEASE PAYLOAD FROM MANIPULATOR
• SECURE MANIPULATOR
• DEFUEL PAYLOAD
FIGURE 4--7. ORBITER OPERATIONS -- RETRIEVAL
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h.l.3 Unscheduled Tasks - Continued
Q
Z
0
>
Ul
t_
I
Z
0
I-
<
0
Ul
i-
s
0
I
Ul
Q
L_
4-10
Hamilton .... U
OF UNITED AIRCRAFT COAPOAATIO_
Standard I::1®
SP Ol T73
4.1.4 Contin6ency Tasks
Contingency tasks are defined as those tasks performed to
alleviate or cope with a condition which could affect the
safety of the Shuttle crew, or the crew of another space-
craft. Contingency modes were classified into three
categories:
ao
b.
Emergency IV - Emergency IV modes include all failure
conditions affecting crew safety where operations per-
formed by the crew are conducted within the Shuttle
Orbiter. Examples of such failure conditions include
fire, explosion, contamination and loss of pressure.
Emergency EV - Emergency EVmodes include all failure
_e_m_ _f_P_g _ safety where operations Per-
formed by the crew are conducted in an _! mode. Examples
of such failure conditions include inability to undock from
a/payload, inability to close the payload bay doors and
inability to stow the radiator. All of these failure
conditions could prevent the Shuttle from returning to
Earth unless alleviated,
C, Rescue - Rescue modes include all operations associated
with the recovery and transfer of a crewman or crewmen
from a potentially hazardous area to a safe area. Examples
of such situations include an incapacitated EV crewman, who
has lost his tether, or the inability to alleviate an
emergency EV condition which prevents the Shuttle from re-
turning to Earth. In the event the Shuttle is not able to
return to Earth, another Shuttle is required to rescue the
stranded crewmen. Figure 4-9 depicts a Shuttle rescue
mission which is required due to the inability of the
stranded Shuttle vehicle to undock from the payload which
it was servicing. Note that in this situation, an extra-
vehicular space transfer of the stranded crew is required.
FIGURE 4--9. SHUTTLE TO SHUTTLE RESCUE
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4.1.5 Conclusions
The past history of the Gemini and Apollo EVA missions has demon-
strated that EVA can be used safely for productive tasks. Based
on this demonstrated capability and an evaluation of the Shuttle
missions, their payloads, and the potential need for EVA/IVA, the
following major conclusions were drawn:
a. EVA/IVA operations are required for planned conduction of cer-
tain experiments.
b. EVA/IVA enhances overall Shuttle flexibility and capability for
servicing payloads by providing the ability to conduct "total"
maintenance.
c. EVA/IVA might be required for onLorbit checkout prior to final
deployment of a payload.
d, EVA/IVA capability is required for unshceduled and contingency
operations to prevent mission aborts and ensure crew safety.
EVA/IVA Task Analysis
General
Once the potential Shuttle EVA/IVA tasks have been identified,
the next logical steps were to analyze these tasks in detail
and generate meaningful statistical information to aid in the
detez_ination of EVA equipment requirements. The logic
utilized in the EVA/IVA task analysis effort is presented in
Figure 4-10,
I,v%ItT'_.sI
I
I
I
I M[TABOLIC IRATES
FIGURE.4--10. EVA/IVA TASK ANALYSIS LOGIC
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4.2.1 General - Continued
The groundrules used in this analysis effort were:
a. One (i) man EVA/IVA's are used where tasks can be performed
easily by one man and when a short duration is required to
complete the tasks.
bl Two (2) man EVA/IVA's are used where possible to reduce on-
Qrbit operational times _ the number o_ _irlock depr_ssuri-
zations per Shuttle flight. However, dual EVA's are only
considered where both crewmen could be fully productive for
the majority of the EVA mission.
c. During revisit missions for payload service and maintenance,
!/4 +'-' 1 r_ ^_ ..... ..^^^_._ ..... ......... • ..............
A summary of the results of the EVA/IVA task analysis effort is
presented in Table 4-2 and indicates that 242 of the h07 NASA
Shuttle flights requireplanned EVA, and these 242 flights re-
quire a total of 486 planned EVA missions.
11979 1980 1981 1_2 "1983 1984 1985
TOTAL FLIGHTS 21 20 29 25 29 27 47
F LIGHT_ 0 5 8 I I 9 13 37
REQUIRING EVA
NO. OF EVA S 0 23 -_7 39 35 44 63
19B6 1987
37 48
30 33
54 45
1988 1989 1990 TOTAL
38 49 37 407
32 37 27 242
34 52 40 486
TABLE 4--2. POTENTIAL PLANNED EVA MISSIONS
4.2.2
The remainder of this section presents the detailed results of
the EVA/IVA task analysis effort.
Metabolic Rates
Metabolic rates for accomplishment of discrete elements of
EVA/IVA tasks which were common to most EVA/IVA missions were
estimated and the results are presented in Table h-3.
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4.2.2 Metabolic Rates - Continued
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h.2.3 Distances
The _86 potential planned EVA tasks were operationally analyzed
and the maximum distance traveled from the airlock was deter-
mined. In addition, 1148 potential unscheduled EVA tasks were
also identified and operationally analyzed to determine the
maximum distance traveled from the airlock. The results of
both of these _naly_s are presen_e_ in Figure 4-ii, As _
example= 29% of the planned _asks and 72% of the unscheduled
tasks require that the crewman travel a maximum distance of
between 50 to 60 feet to complete his mission. The maximum
estimated distance from the airlock for both planned and
unscheduled tasks is lO0 feet, except for the AMU and MWP
experiments referencedin the Shuttle Traffic Model and
described in detail in the NASA Blue Book.
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FIGURE 4--1 1. TASKS AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE
FROM AIRLOCK
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b,. 2.)4. EVA Mission Duration
The _86 potential planned EVA tasks identified were analyzed and
a duration for each was determined based on a single crewman
EVA. In an effort to reduce on-orbit EVA time and the number
of airlock depressurizations, dual EVA's were considered where
both crewman could be fully productive for the majority of the
EVA mission, The results of this effort are _reseDted in
Pigure _-IS. Note that only 3,5% of the EVA missions requi_e
an EVA equipment duration capability in excess of four (h)
hours and these are the AMU and MWP experiments.
400 -
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FIGURE 4--12. EVA DURATION--PLANNED TASKS
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EVA Mission Duration - Continued
A representative timeline for a 4-hour, dual EVA depicting
servicing of a LST is shown in Figure 4-13.
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==-_ =.r=
oo m_
= =o,,=,
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- m m _
° i ,=o,"=='=°
..=. == =-_ I_ E == u ¢
)'-z
= = I_= = == =
_'o ,o'o ,'=o ,_o ,'o ,'o _'oo ?o _lo
MISSION DURATION MINUTES
FIGURE 4--13. REPRESENTATIVE DUAL EVA
MISSION TIMELINE-- LST SERVICING
A similar effort was conducted to determine EVA duration of
unscheduled tasks. The 1148 potential unscheduled EVA tasks
were analyzed, a determination of single versus dual crewman
EVA was conducted, and a duration for each unscheduled EVA
task was determined. The results of this effort are presented
in Figure 4-14. Note that 83.5% of these tasks require an
EVA duration of four (4) hours or less. It was determined
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EVA Mission Duration - Continued
that the remaining 16.5% of these tasks could be accomplished
by two dual EVA's with the crewmen returning to the vehicle
after the first EVA, recharging their equipment, and then
returning to the worksite to complete their mission.
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FIGURE 4--14. EVA DURATION--UNSCHEDULED TASKS
The conclusion emanating from this effort is that the EVA
equipment shall be capable of supporting four (4) hour EVA
mission duration.
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4.2.5 Planned EVA Frequency
Figure 4-15 depicts the number of NASA Shuttle flights as a
function of potential planned airlock depressurizations per
flight. Note that 240 of the 242 flights which require EVA
will require six (6) or less airlock depressurizations. The
remaining two (2) flights are those which carry the AMU and MWP
experiments and additional payload provisions could be carried
on these flights to accomodate the increased number of airlock
depressurizations required.
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b.2.5 Planned EVA Frequency - Continued
Figure 4-16 presents the total planned EVA/IVA man-hours per
flight as a function of airlock depressurizations (or EVA
excursions). Results indicate, except for the unique AMU
and MWP experiment missions, that a maximum of 32 man-hours
of EVA/IVA capability is required. Therefore, if the EVA
equipment flies charged, the Shuttle Orbiter has to provide
24 man-hours of recharge capability. For the two (2) flights
which carry the AMU and MWP experiments, additional EVA equip-
ment recharge capability could be carried to accomodate the
increased EVA recharge requirements or the scope of the
experiments could be reduced.
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FIGURE 4--16. EVA/IVA MAN--HOURS PER FLIGHT
4-20
Hamilton U
Orv_s_ON OF UNITED AIr'CRAFT COr_pOt'_AT,ON
Standard 131_
SP 01T73
4.2.6 Number of Crewmen
An assessment of the number of crewmen required to perform
the potential planned and unscheduled EVA tasks was conducted
and the results shown in Table 4-4. Eighty-three (83) percent
of the potential planned EVA tasks and ninety-seven (97) percent
of the potential unscheduled EVA tasks require dual crewmen
EVA's.
4,
'4
PLANNED
UNSCHEDULED
SINGLE
83
DUAL
35
403
1113
TOTAL
486
1148
TABLE. 4--4 NUMBER OF CREWMEN REQUIRED FOR EVA
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4.2.7 Emergency Duration
The logic utilized to establish the EVA Emergency Life Support
System (ELSS) duration requirement is depicted in Figure 4-17.
EVA TASK
DEFINITION AND
ANALYSIS
ESTABLISH
LOCATION/DISTANCE
OF FAILURE WHICH
REQUIRES MAXIMUM
ELSS DURATION
I
ESTABLISH
METABOLIC RATES
ESTABLISH
AVAILABLE TRANSLATION
MODES AND
RATES OF TRANSFER
|
I DETERMINE
- EMERGENCY
RETURN TIME
FIGURE 4--17. EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
DURATION REQUIREMENTS LOGIC DIAGRAM
All of the planned EVA tasks were evaluated to determine the
worst case emergency duration tasks. The six (6) planned EVA
tasks that appeared to require the greatest EVA emergency
duration requirement (in the event an emergency situation
occurs requiring the crewman to activate his ELSS) were
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4.2.7 Emergency Duration - Continued
selected. The metabolic rates assumed for emergency EVA
operations were 1500 Bty/hr. nominal with a peak rate of
2000 Btu/hr for five minutes maximum. Based upon the meta-
bolic rates, distance from the airlock and mode and rate of
translation available, emergency return times were estimated
for these six (6) planned EVA tasks. Results of this evalua-
tion are presented in Table 4-5. Note that the longest
estimated return time was 11.7 minutes for the MWP experiment.
ACTIVITY/TASK
SERVICING/MAINTENANCE
HEAO, LST, LSO, LRO
DISTANCE
FROM"
AIRLOCK
(FT)
lO0
100
lOO
MODE
OF
TRANSLATION
MANUAL
MANIP./MAN.
POWER-ASSISI
SSUMPTIONS
AIRLOCK
REPRESS
RATE
(PSI/SEC)
RATE FAILURE
OF VERIFICATIO_
TRANSLATION DURATION
(FPS) (SEC)
l.O 180
2.0 18_
6.0 180
l.O 180
15.n 180
0.I
O.l
O.l
EMERGENCY
RETURN
TIME
(MINUTES)
9.3
8.5
5
AMU EXPERIMENT 200 AMU O.l 7.7
MWP EXPERIMENT 66n0 MWP O.l ll.7
TABLE 4--5. EVA EMERGENCY DURATION
A representative emergency mode timeline for a failure occurring
during servicing of the LST is shown in Figure 4-18. The mode
of translation for this timeline is manipulator-assisted/manual.
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4.2.7 Emergency Duration - Continued
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FIGURE 4--18. EMERGENCY MODE TIMELINE
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4.2.8 Translation Modes
The logic utilized to select the optimum translation modes for
the potential planned and unscheduled EVA tasks is presented
in Figure 4-19.
DETERMINEEVA TASK DISTANCE AND
DEFINITION MASS AS A
AND NALYSIS FUNCTION OF
TRANSLATION EVENTS
I I ESTABLISH I" I ESTABLISH ___ SELECT[OPTIMUMm_TRANSFER MODE_--_ SELECTION TRANSLATION
iAPPLICABILITYI I CRITERIA MODE
"FIGURE 4--19. TRANSLATION MODES SELECTION LOGIC DIAGRAM
Based upon the results of the EVA/IVA tasks identification
effort, the mass of equipment (cargo, tools, lights, etc.) to
be carried by the EV/IV crewman was estimated. The results of
this effort for each of the 645 planned EVA tasks is depicted
in Figure 4-20. As an example, for 20% of the planned EVA/IVA
tasks, the crewman will transport mass in the range of 20-40
pounds. Maximum estimated mass to be transferred is 195
pounds.
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4.2.8 Translation Modes - Continued
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FIGURE 4--20. PLANNED TASK AS A FUNCTION OF MASS
The results of the planned task as a function of mass analysis
was expanded to include planned tasks as a function of both mass
and distance traveled. The results of this effort are shown
in Figure 4-21.
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4.2.8 Translation Modes - Continued
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FIGURE 4--21 PLANNED TASKS AS A FUNCTION OF MASS/DISTANCE
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4.2.8 Translation Modes - Continued
There are 1096 translation events occurring during the 645
potential planned EVA tasks. Figure 4-22 presents the appli-
cability (% of total) of each of the major categories of
transfer modes to these translation events. As an example,
82.5% of these translation events can be accomplished manually
through the use of handholds or handrails.
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FIGURE 4JZ2. TRANSFER MODES--PLANNED TASKS
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4.2.8 Translation Modes - Continued
There are 10,350 translation events occurring during the 1,148
potential unscheduled EVA tasks. Figure 4-2B presents the
applicability (% of total) of each of the major categories of
transfer modes to these translation events.
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FIGURE 4--23 TRANSFER MODES-- UNSCHEDULED TASKS
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4.2.8 Translation Modes - Continued
Final selection of the optimum transfer modes was made based
on mass to be carried, distance to be traveled, general
applicability of the transfer mode, and in accordance with the
following selection criteria:
_) Manual Mode - EVA tasks within closed pa_vlo_d b_y; EVA
tasks within open payload bay in which crewman transports
less than lO0 pounds of mass.
b) Manipulator - Assisted Mode - EVA tasks within open pay-
load bay in which crewman transports more than lO0 pounds
of mass; EVA tasks outside payload bay but within the mani-
pulator reach envelope.
c) Manual Plus Manipulator - Assisted Mode - EVA tasks on the
exterior of the Orbiter or payload and beyond reach of
the manipulator.
d) Self-Powered Mode - To be used if there are no other alter-
natives.
Figure _-24 presents the results of the optimum transfer modes
selection effort.
100
PLANNED TASKS
MANUAL
80 \\\\\_
MANIPULATOR ASSISTED _\\\\\
\\\\\'_
MANUAL _\ _ \ \
f _4ANUAL PLUS ,_ _. _ ._ ._20 , MANIPULATOR ASSISTED \\\\\_
,o
UNSCHEDULED TASKS
MANIPULATOR ASSISTED
MANUAL PLUS
FIGURE 4--24. SELECTED TRANSFER MODES
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4.2.9 Suit Re%uirements
Based upon the EVA/IVA task identification effort, specific
mobility/dexterity/visibility requirements were generated. The
mobility requirements generated are listed in Table 4-6. These
requirements were then applied to the existing ILC A-7L-B suit.
ACTIVITY O_ MOTION (DEn_M_g)
i _R E_ 1 WRIST HIP _EE
X AXIS Y AXIS Z AX_S FE R SP FE _ FE F
Hatch or Shroud
TASK
O_n/Close Airlock
Reach
Grasp
Hold
Tral*s fez
Stow
Attach/Detach Tether
Reach
Grasp
Hold
Squeez_
Traverse - Handhold/
Han_rall
Conn/Disconn. Umbilical
Reach
Grasp
Hold
Transfer
Con_et
Stow
Inspection
Release Restraint
Restra2n ;Equipment
Grasp
Hold
Reach
Remove Equine nt
Reach
Grasp
Hold
Pumh-l_ll
90-llO 15-20 45-6O 7 r, - - 60-9o 6O-9C
90-110 15-20 45"60 " ]5 + 20 * 25 _0-_0 6_-_O
90-110 15 45-9O 7 I_ _ 2o _ 15 60-9c _3-_
30-80 15-45 45-60 70 - _ 25 =""-9,3 6_-9c
90¢i10 15-_5 O 45-60 70 _ 2_ 60-90 ---9¢
15-20 45-80
- 1%2o 4%80
45-9o 15 45-8o
45-9O 30
0-6o 45-9O
30-9O ZS-_O _5-9O
30-9O 15-2o _-9O
45-8o 15 _,5-8o
_5-80 15-_5
z5-"5 15-2o 45160
So-So z5-45 45-6o
9o z5 30
k5 0-15 Io
15 45-80
_5-'80 15-20 45-80
iO 45-80
15-2o 49-80
15-20 45-80
45_0 15 _5_O
k5_110 10
20-qu + 3':'
20._ _ ; 3r
20-h0 _ 30
0-9o _ 20
2o-9o + 3o
_O-9o + 3o
o-9o • 20
o-9o
3o-9o ± 30
20-90 + 30
20-9O + 30
0-90 + 20
0-90 + 20
20o110
o-9o + 20
20
11o 9O
_o-9o _* 30
O-go + 20
20-9O + 30
20-9o * so
0-90 + 20
_o-_ 7 30
Lo
70 + 20
70 + 20
7o _ 2o
70
÷ 15 + 20
?o
9° Z 20
7o
70
90 3o
Z 5 + _O
_5 ;2o
70
_5 -+20
+5 +20
70
70 -
+ 15
25
Z 15 n-3n
__ e5
_+ _
+ 15
15
lo
+ 15
÷ 15
9o 90
9o 90
90 9c
9o 9o
_o 9c
90 90
90 9o
TABLE 4.6. REPRESENTATIVE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS.
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h.2.9 Suit Requirements - Continued
_tSK
Mount/Disassemble
Reach
Grasp
Hold
Push-Pull
Turn
Remove Access Panel
Hold
Grasp
P_h-Pull
Place Item In Pro-
tectl_ Container
Grasp
Hold
Reach
Adheslve (Type) AppZic
Reach
Grasp
Hold
Push-Pull
Squ2eze
i Release/Secure Latch
Grasp
Hold
Reach
Push-Pull
ManuAl D_ploy.
Grasp
Hold
Reach
Push-Pull
BY: Shoulder Motion
X - Saglttal plane
y - Frontal Plane
Z - Transverse plane
ACTIVITY _ _OTION (,,_-_-_)
SHOCU_m ELSC_ WRIST _p K_
X AXIS ¥ A_IS _ AXIS FE R SP n AA rE
15-2o _5-8o 2o-9o + 30 7o - -
15-2o h5-8o 2o-9o _ 30 7o + 20 + 15
45-8o 15 4560 o-9o _ 20 + 5 _ 20 _ 15
45 -iio io _ io 7o
9o-12o 15-9o o- o-3o + 30 l 30 * 20 _+ 15
g5-80 15 45_0 0-90" + 20 + 5 + 20 _+ 15
15-2o 45_0 2O-90 ; 30 _ 5 _ 20 + 15 -
45-110 lO I0 70 -
45-80 15-20 45-80 20-90 * 30 70 - -15 ! 45-80 0-90 g 20 + 5 _+ 2O " + 15
15-20 45-8.80 20-90 • _ 30 7o
15-2o 45-80 20-90 + 30 70 + 20 + 15
4%80 15-2o 45-80 2o-_ _ Bo + 5 + 2o +_- 2515 45-80 o-ix) _+ 2o __ 5 _ 2o + 15
45-110 io i0 70 _ 20 _ 25
45-9o 3o o-9o 7o _ 2o _ 15
15-20 45-80 20-90 _ 30 + 5 + 20 + 25
45_O 15 45-80 0-90 + 20 ¥ 5 _ 20 • 15
15-2o 45-80 20-9o _ 30 7o _ 20 + 15
45-110 lO io - 7o • lO -_ 25
15-20 45-80 20-_) + 30 + 5 + 20 + i_
_5-8o 15 45-80 o-9o T 20 _ 5 _ 2o _ 15
15-20 45-80 20-90 ; 30 70 ; 20 ; 15
; -h -ii0 i0 I0 70
SP - Supernation - Fronatlon F - Flexlon
FE - Flexion - Extension
AA - Add_ntio_ - Abduction
R - Rotation
TABLE 4--6. REPRESENTATIVE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS
-- CONTINUED
Results of this evaluation indicated that the ILC-A-TL-B suit
mobility and dexterity is not adequate to meet the Shuttle
EVA/IVA mission requirements. The specific areas of the
ILC A-TL-B suit which reqtLire improvement are shoulder range
and torque, wrist torque and stability and finger dexterity.
The visibility afforded by the ILC A-TL-B suit was found to
be adequate.
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4.2.9 Suit Requirements - Continued
The Shuttie EVA/IVA mobility requirements, as defined by this
study, were then compared against the requirements specified in
the 8.0 psi Orbital EVA Space Suit Assembly request for pro-
posal dated June 20, 1972. The results of this comparative
evaluation are presented in Table 4-7.
MOVEMENTS
ISI_JLDERHOBILITY
X AXIS (LATERAL-MEDIAL)
Y AXIS (ADDUCT-ABDUCT)
Z AXIS (ROTATION X-Z
AND Y-Z PLANES)
ELBOW MOBILITY
FLEXION-EXTENSION
FOREARM MOBILITY
SUPINATION
PRONATION
WRIST MOBILITY
FLEXION-EXTENSION
ADDUCT-ABDUCT
SUPINATION
PRONATION
HIP MOBILITY
FLEXION-EXTENSION
KNEE MOBILITY
FLEXION
P4_NGE MAXIMUM TORQUE
SHUTTLE DESIGN
GOALS (DEGREES)
155
60 - 95
140
115
STUDY RE(_QT'S AS A
% OF DESIGN GOALS
(AVG - MAX)
60 - 80
30 - 95
45 - 65
40 - 95
SHUTTLE DESIGN
GOALS (IN-LBS)
STUDYRENT'SAS
% OFDESIGNGOALS
(AVG MAX)
100
100
100
100
145 20 - 60 2.5 100
25 80 - lO0 2.5 I00
30 - 42 50 - IOO 2.5 100
56 - 57 35 - 45 2.5 100
145 35 - 60 2.5 100
25 40 - IO0 2.5 I00
90 - 20 90 - lOO 24 100
I10 70 - 80 12 IO0
TABLE 4--7 SHUTTLE EVA SUIT MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS
COMPARISON
The need for Shuttle EVA suit waist mobility was evaluated
and results indicated that although this feature would aid
the crewman in the accomplishment of his tasks, it is not
an absolute necessity.
The conclusion emanating from this comparative evaluation is that
the 8.0 psi Orbital Space Suit Assembly design goals are adequate
to meet the Shuttle mobility requirements as defined by this
study.
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4.2.10 Restraints
An extensive literature search of candidate restraint concepts
was conducted with emphasis placed on the Apollo, Gemini,
Skylab and NASA Contractor research and development programs.
The restraint concepts considered were for crew worksite appli-
cations and not for translation. Restraints were for personnel
and equipment, and considered planned, unscheduled and contingency
tasks. Location of the worksites considered include:
a. Shuttle crew compartment
b. Airlock
c. Payload Bay
d. Payloads (Interior and exterior)
Results indicate that foot, waist and hand restraints, in
various combinations, are generally the most applicable and
effective crewman restraints. In general, the personnel and
equipment restraint requirements can be satisfied by utilizing
existing devices which have either been flight qualified or are
presently being tested. Figure 4-25 depicts planned EVA tasks
as a function of restraint concepts. As an example, all
planned EVA tasks require some sort of foot restraint but only
16% of the planned EVA tasks require only foot restraint.
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FIGURE 4--25. PLANNED TASKS AS A FUNCTION OF
RE ST RAI NT CO NCE PTS
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4.2.11 Payload Contamination Sensitivity
The sensitivity of Shuttle payloads to contamination is a
potential driving factor in establishing EVA equipment
requirements. Utilizing sources of data such as the NASA
Blue Book and the General Dynamics RAM Study, all the pay-
loads listed in the March 21, 1972 NASA/DOD Shuttle Traffic
Model were evaluated in detail to determine their contamina-
tion sensitivity. As a result of this investigation, eighty-
five (85) of the total of 677 NASA and DOD Shuttle flights
were estimated to be transporting contamination sensitive
payloads.
On seventy-eight (78) of these flights, the payloads are sensi-
tive to particulate deposition only. On seventy-three (73)
of these seventy-eight (78) flights, the contamination
sensitive payloads are astronomy free flyers. On these pay-
loads, the experiment package utilizes contamination shields
which normally remain closed whenever the Shuttle is in the
i_ediate area and are not opened _nti! forty-eight (48) hours
after the Shuttle leaves the area. Since it takes from one (1)
to thirty-five (35) hours for particulate to clear before an
experiment can be activated, contamination will not normally
pose a problem for these payloads. On the remaining five (5)
flights which carry payloads that are sensitive to particulate
contamination only, special precautions are required. The
instrumentation shields must be closed during EVA on these
flights and a waiting period of one (1) to thirty-five (35)
hours are required before the experiment can be activated.
On the remaining seven flights, three (3) are sensitive to
particulate contamination and all seven (7) are sensitive to
water vapor contamination. The payload instrumentation
shields must be closed during EVA on these flights to avoid
payload contamination. Although a PISS water umbilical could
be used to eliminate the major source of water vapor, the water
vapor contained in the EVA suit leakage is enough to contamin-
ate these payloads.
A general conclusion of this effort is if the payload instru-
mentation shields are closed during EVA operations which are near
contamination sensitive payloads, an Apollo-type EVA system
using water as a thermal control subsystem evaporant and having
a suit gaseous leakage rate of lO0 scc/min, is a useable sys-
tem for performing Shuttle EVA missions.
A detailed description of this effort is presented in Section
5.0, Appendix A of Volume II.
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4.2.12 Conclusions
Based on the results of the EVA/IVA task analysis effort,
the following major conclusions were drawn:
a. EVA mission duration required is four (h) hours.
b. The Shuttle Orbiter shall have the capability to support
six (6) dual EVA missions and 32 manhours of EVA.
C. Most planned and unscheduled EVA/IVA tasks require two
(2) crewmen.
d. Emergency duration required is fifteen (15) minutes.
eD The manipulator assisted mode of translation is the
selected mode for sixty-two (62) percent of the planned
tasks; the manual mode of translation is the selected
mode for eighty-three (83) percent of the unscheduled
tasks.
f,
go
he
The 8.0 psi Orbital EVA Space Suit Assembly RFP design
goals are adequate for the Shuttle EVA missions.
Required worksite restraints are foot, waist and hand
restraints, in various different combinations.
0nly thirteen (13) percent of all NASA and D0D Shuttle
flights carry contamination sensitive payloads. If the
instrumentation shields on these payloads are closed
during EVA operations, they will not be contaminated by
the EVA crewman or his equipment.
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GUIDELINES AND CONSTRAINTS
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5,0
5.1
GUIDELINES AND CONSTRAINTS
Establishment of the study guidelines and constraints is based
primarily on the results of the EVA/IVA task identification and
analysis effort. The guidelines and constraints were periodi-
cally reviewed, updated and revised, as required. In addition
to the Hamilton Standard study team, these guidelines and con-
straints were reviewed by personnel from NASA MSC, NASA MSFC,
NASA HQ, NR, GAC and MDAC. In total, 51 guidelines and
constraints were developed and are presented in this section.
GENERAL
a. EVA/IVA shall be utilized for planned Shuttle operations
as required by the payload. An EVA/IVA capability is
required on Shuttle for potential Shuttle, unscheduled
and contingency operations.
b. Whenever feasible, EVA/IVA support equipment shall be
designed for a service life of l0 years and 500 reuses
with a minimum of maintenance and refurbishment.
C. EVA/IVA support equipment are not required to be flight
maintainable, but shall be ground maintainable. Ground
turn-around time from landing/return to the launch facility
to launch readiness shall be less than 160 working hours
covering a span of 14 calendar days for any class mission.
d. In the design of the EVA/IVA support equipment, the Shuttle
design philosophy of "fail-operational, fail-safe" shall be
taken into consideration; in no case shall it be less than
"fail-safe".
e. EV/IV crewmen shall be within the 5th to 95th percentile
range.
f. An EV crewman shall not be required to perform in, on, or
near an uncontrolled tumbling spacecraft.
g.
The EV crewman shall not contact the Shuttle Orbiter radia-
tor and shall avoid contacting the Shuttle Orbiter reusable
surface insulation (RSI) during planned operations.
h. For planned Shuttle EVA/IVA operations, crewman assistance
shall be available for EVA/IVA equipment donning and
checkout.
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5.1 GENERAL - Continued
i. Recharging and/or regeneration of EVA/IVA equipment shall
be accomplished without the use of tools.
J. EV and IV planned activities shall be performed by properly
trained personnel.
5.2 PHYSIOLOGICAL
a. Prebreathing:
The prebreathing profile of Figure 5-1 shall be used as a
guideline.
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FINAL PRESSURE tPSIA)
RECOMMENDED CURVE FOR
FLIGHTCREW
--_-T " _ *-
_".__7_-! _. _ -J--_ (_ NASA DATA POINTS
NOTES :
(I) THIS CURVE INDICATES THE TIME REQUIRED FOR OXYGEN
PREBREATHING BEFORE DECOMPRESSION TO INDICATED
PRESSURE AND THEN ENGAGE IN MILD EXERCISE
(2_ REFERENCE :
DEGNER, E. A.; IKELS, K.G.: ALLEN° T. H.; DISSOLVED NITROGEN
MIXTURE DURING EXERCISE AT DECREASED PRESSURES,
AEROSPACE MED., 1965," 418--425
FIGURE 5--1 OXYGEN PREBREATHING
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5,2 PHYSIOLOGICAL - Continued
b. Oxygen Toxicity:
The EVA/IVA equipment and mission durations shall preclude
crewman exposure beyond the limits of the recommended curve
of Figure 5-2.
 ,ooo I
_,oooh , f_--l_-I
=o"°°° _I-T( _'Ng', o,,zzI,NESS
n 1,00O uJ
9oo_1-I N I I I I I I J...J_-_, MOST COMMONLY I I I I I I I I I -1800r'_L_,IIJ,..X"__COUGHING,-{--_I I I I I I I I - 15.47 o.
_. 7oor-r:9_ ....... 13.s4 Jooo_ l l.6O _<
=< 500 - . _,.,_ =_
7.73 _
1- __ o
w
100. <
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TIME TO ONSET OF SYMPTOMS HOURS
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WELCH. B.E._ MORGAN. T.E.: CLAMANN, H.G._
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TO OXYGEN TOXICITY IN MP.N. FED. PROC..
JUL AUG, 1963. 22:1053 1056.
FIGURE 5--2 OXYGEN TOXICITY
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5.2 PHYSIOLOGICAL - Continued
c. Oxygen Consumption:
For design purposes, the crewman's oxygen consumption
shall be in accordance with Figure 5-3.
0.24
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m
-J 0.16
<
0.12
I.-.
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0.08
U
f
/
i
q
RQ = 0.85
0 200 400 600 800 1000
METABOLIC RATE BTU/HR
1200 1400
FIGURE 5--3 OXYGEN CONSUMPTION RATE VS
METABOLIC RATE
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5.2 PHYSIOLOGICAL - Continued
d. Oxygen Pressure:
The design of the EVA/IVA equipment shall preclude
exposure of the crewman to oxygen concentration out-
side the unimp_ire_ performance zone of Fisu_e 5-_.
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FIGURE 5--4 -OXYGEN PRESSURE EFFECTS
et
f.
The maximum planned EVA/IVA duration shall be eight (8)
hours per day.
Crewman heat storage shall be limited to 300 Btu per EVA/
IVA.
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5.3 LIFE SUPPORT
5.4
a. Primary life support system duration shall be of sufficient
duration to accomplish all candidate EVA/IVA tasks.
b, The primary life support equipment shall be provided with
a warning system to alert the EVA/IVA crewman of an impend-
ing critical failure condition.
Co The EVA/IVA crewman shall be equipped with a functionally
independent emergency life support system. Duration of this
system should be sufficient to permit a safe return to the
Shuttle Orbiter.
de The primary life support equipment shall not generate and/or
emit contaminants which might adversely affect critical
surfaces in or around the Shuttle Orbiter and the payload.
e. Primary life support equipment shall be capable of being
recharged in flight, as required for multiple EVA/IVA's.
f. Emergency life support equipment is not required to be
rechargeable in flight.
g* During all EVA/IVA operations, two-way voice communications
shall be provided between EVA/IVA crewman and between an
EVA/IVA crewman and the Orbiter.
PRESSURE SUIT
ae Suit operating pressure shall be that level which does not
adversely affect the crewman or his performance, and has a
minimum impact on the Shuttle mission and the Shuttle
Orbiter.
BD The same pressure suit shall be utilized for both EVA and
IVA missions. Light-weight IVA suits shall be worn for
emergency IV operations and vertical development flights.
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5.5
5.6
¸5.7¸
TRANSFER DEVICES
ao The transfer devices (crewman and/or cargo) shall not
generate and/or emit any contaminants which might ad-
versely affect critical surfaces on or around the Shuttle
Orbiter and the payload.
b| Tethers, umbilicals, communioation lines an_ mobility
aids shall not be a constraint on the crewman's access
to candidate work sites. (Candidate work sites include
the 15' diameter by 60' long payload bay, the exterior
surface of the Shuttle Orbiter, and the interior and/or
exterior of a payload.)
RESTRAINTS
rm_ _ "_'[T a _1._-I 'I
Orbiter and/or the payload.
b. The crewman shall be provided with restraints at all work
sites (permanent or portable).
Ce Tools, cameras, instrumentation, etc. for EV usage, must
always be restrained or tethered to either the vehicle,
the worksite or the crewman.
WORKSITE PROVISIONS
a. All worksites shall have provisions for crewman restraints
and equipment restraints.
b. The crewman shall be provided with adequate lighting at
all worksites.
VEHICLE SUPPORT PROVISIONS
GENERAL
a. The Shuttle Orbiter shall provide a capability for EVA/IVA
operation during docked operations.
b. The Shuttle Orbiter shall be capable of supporting either
a dual or single crewman EVA/IVA, however, the planned
mode of operation shall be a dual crewman EVA/IVA.
c. The Shuttle Orbiter shall be designed to allow pressure
suit access to the unpressurized payload bay in flight.
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5.8.2 AIRLOCK
5.8.3
5.8.4
5.8.5
a. Airlock pressurization controls and instrumentation shall
be located such that an EV crewman can ingress to the
cabin without relying on airlock or hatch operations by
cabin personnel.
be The airlock shall accommodate two 95th percentile crewmen
wearing EVA equipment plus the equipment to be carried EV
by the crewmen (such as, tools, experiments, etc.) and
shall permit their operation of required airlock controls.
Co The airlock will be used for EVA/IVA only and will not be
designed to accommodate crew or passengers in the event
of a cabin decompression.
d* Hatches into and out of the airlock shall be designed such
that latch/unlatch operations can be performed from either
side of the hatch. Hatches shall be designed to accommo-
date the 95th percentile crewman with EVA equipment, tools,
etc. The outer airlock hatch shall remain open during
EVA/IVA.
e. Airlock to cabin communication shall be provided, both
visual and oral.
f. Final EVA equipment checkout shall be accomplished in
the airlock.
g. The airlock shall provide adequate lighting for airlock
operations.
RECHARGE
a. EVA equipment recharge shall take place in a pressurized
8x'ea.
STOWAGE
a. EVA/IVA equipment shall be stowed in a pressurized area.
EVA COMMUNICATION AND MONITORING
a. The Shuttle Orbiter shall provide provisions to enable
two-way voice communications between (i) EVA/IVA crew-
man and the Orbiter and (2) EVA/IVA crewman and the
space network via the Orbiter relay.
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5.8.6
5.9
VEHICLE PENALTIES
a. Oxygen Storage:
Liquid 02 - 0.25 lbs of tank per lb of 02
Gaseous 02 - 2.14 lbs of tank per lb of 02
b. Power:
Fuel Cell - 0.286 lbs/watt + 0.00198 lb/watt-hr
Battery - 50 watt-hrs/lb:
c. Water - None
d. Heating Penalty - Use electrical power
e. Cooling Penalty - 0.171 lbs/Btu/hr Sensible into cabin
0.134 lbs/Btu/hr Latent into cabin
0.054 lbs/Btu/hr Into vehicle coolant
system
EMERGENCY IV
ao IV emergency equipment, if different from EVA/IVA
equipment, shall not be required to be rechargeable.
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SUIT PRESSURE LEVEL DETERMINATION
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6.0
6.1
SUIT PRESSURE LEVEL DETERMINATION
General
The objective of the suit pressure level determination effort
is to establish the suit operating pressure which does not
a_versely affect the crewman or his performance, and has the
most beneficial impact on the Shuttle mission and the Shuttle
Orbiter. Since the Shuttle Orbiter will have an air atmosphere
at 14.7 psia, use of Gemini, Apollo or Skylab type EVA systems
(which operate at 3.5 to 4.0 psia) require that each EVA crew-
man prebreathes pure oxygen for a minimum of three (3) hours
prior to airlock depressurization. This in turn increases EVA
preparation time and requires additional vehicle support equip-
ment and consumables to support prebreathing operations.
Therefore suit operating pressure levels ranging from 3.5 to
!h.7 psia must be evaluated to determine thei_ applicability
and impact upon the Shuttle program. As shown in Figure 6-1,
there are a number of areas that are affected by variations
in suit pressure level and must be evaluated to determine the
optimum suit pressure level. This section discusses each of
these areas in detail and summarizes our conclusions.
LIF'_E SUPPORT}
FIGURE 6--1 OPERATING PRESSURE LEVEL
CONSIDERATIONS
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6.2 Crewman Considerations
From a crewman's physiological standpoint, selection of a
suit pressure level is dependent upon constraints imposed
on the crewman by:
a. Denitrogenation requirements prior to decompression.
b. Oxygen toxicity.
Based upon the physiological guidelines and constraints
presented in Section 5.0 of this volume, Figure 6-2
identifies the oxygen prebreathing requirements and oxygen
toxicity constraints as a function of suit pressure level
and exposure duration.
HAXI_ I
EVA I
DURATION l
4 HOURS
12-
0
0
OXYGEN TOXICITY
WITH PURE OXYGEN SYSTEMS
PRE-BREATHING REQUIRED
FOR DENITROGENIZATION
10 20 30
EXPOSURE TIME - HOURS
40
FIGURE 6--2 IMPACT OF DENITROGENATION AND
OXYGEN TOXICITY
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6.2.1
6.2.2
Decompression Sickness
A primary physiological consideration in the selection of a
suit pressure level is decompression sickness, the most
common form of which is termed the "bends". This problem
is the result of the release of nitrogen from the body
tissues after decompression. For aerospace usage, the cus-
tomary means of preventing decompression sickness is pre-
breathing of pure oxygen to eliminate the dissolved nitrogen.
The nitrogen contained in the lungs and dissolved in the
blood is removed almost immediately upon starting prebreathing,
while the nitrogen that is contained in the body tissue and
bones requires considerably longer to remove. A plot of
minimum prebreathing time versus final pressure level is
presented as a physiological constraint in Section 5.0 of
this report. The use of this guideline provides an
extremely high degree of probability ....._._ decompression
sickness will not occur. From examination Of the curve in
Section 5.0 and Figure 6-2, it can be seen that prebreathing
is required at any pressure below 8.0 psia. Consequently, it
is desirable to operate the suit at a minimum pressure of
8.0 psia to eliminate the possibility of decompression
sickness.
Oxygen Toxicity
An overabundance of oxygen, known as oxygen toxicity, can be
equally damaging as decompression sickness. The effect of
excess oxygen can range from mild coughing to dizziness,
fainting and even convulsions. Both the physiological
limitation and the recommended limitation on how long a
crewman can breathe pure oxygen at various pressure levels
are defined in Section 5.0. In addition, the recommended
level is presented in Figure 6-2. It can be seen on
Figure 6-2 that, for the maximum projected EVA mission
duration of four hours, oxygen toxicity is not predicted
to occur atpressures below approximately 15 psia.
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6.2.3 Summazy
As an objective, the selected suit operating pressure level
should eliminate or require a minimum of prebreathing, yet not
adversely affect the crewman or his performance. Based on the
physiological guidelines and constraints presented in Section
5.0 of this volume, it can be concluded that from a physio-
logical standpoint, a suit pressure level of 8.0 to lb.7 psia
is preferable. No prebreathing is required to decompress
from sea level to pressures as low as 8.0 psia and there is no
apparent danger of the occurrence ofdecompression sickness at
this level. In addition, for the EVA durations and frequencies
considered, oxygen toxicity is not considered to be a problem.
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6.3 Suit Considerations
The space suit provides a mobile anthropomorphic enclosure
with a controlled atmosphere to permit a crewman to perform
useful functions in the hostile environment of space. The
space suit considerations that must be evaluated to determine
the effect of operating pressure level variations upon the suit
are presented in Figure 6-3.
SUIT
FIGURE 6--3 SUIT CONSIDERATIONS
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6.3 Suit Considerations - Continued
As a basis for these evaluations, available data on the follow-
ing suits/Joints were utilized:
a. ILC A-7L-B Suit
b. Hamilton Standard MOL Suit
c. Litton Advanced EVA Suit
d. AiResearch Advanced EVA Suit
e. Space Age Control Advanced EVA Suit
f. Hamilton Standard Integrated Extravehicular Assembly
(IEVA) Suit
g. Litton Experimental Suit Joints
h. ILC Experimental Suit Joints
i. Hamilton Standard ExperimentalSuit Joints
The results of these evaluations are presented in the
remainder of this section.
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6.3.1 Leakage
An estimate of suit leakage versus pressure level is shown in
Figure 6-4. The curve shown is based on extrapolation of
leakage data for Apollo flight-qualified suit wrist lip seals.
This projection assumes that the Shuttle EVA suit will contain
all bearing Joints with lip seals at the wrists, shoulders,
neck, torso closure and hip, and that leakage is proportional
to pressure level.
_o
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FIGURE 6--4 SUIT LEAKAGE VS PRESSURE LEVEL
6-7
Hamilton U
_VlS*ON OF UN_TEO AIRCmAF'T CORPOrATiON
Standard I::1®
Jr UII/_
6.3.1
6.3.2
Leaka6e - Continued
Based on the above projection, the total PLSS 02 supply sub-
system weight penalty associated with the higher leakage rates
at 8.0 psia versus 4.0 psia is 0.2h pounds (02 + tankage).
Therefore, it is concluded that although suit leakage does
increase with pressure level, it is not _ si_ific_nt overall
factor in establishing suit operating pressure level.
Pressure Drop
An estimate of suit pressure drop versus pressure level for
various volume flows is shown in Figure 6-5.
3 ACFM 4 ACFM 5 ACFM 6 ACFM
I1,'1,'/,,>
I I I I
I.O 2.0 3.0 4[0 5.0
SUIT PRESSUREDROP-IN OF H20 (INCLUDES GAS CONNECTORS)
APOLLO A7LB PGA
_ APOLLO A7LB PGA
MODIFIED WITH SMOOTHBORE
VENT SYSTEMDUCTING
FIGURE 6--5 SUIT PRESSURE DROP VS PRESSURE LEVEL
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6.3.2
6.3.3
Pressure Drop - Continued
Suit pressure level is proportional to pressure drop which is
proportional to power which, in turn, is proportional to PLSS
fan and battery weight. Based upon the Apollo EMU PLSS con-
figuration, an increase in operating pressure from B.8 psia
to 8.0 p_ia results in a PLSS weight increase of 1.4 Rounds.
Although this weight inorease is significant to the PLSS,
overall it is not a significant factor in establishing suit
operating pressure level.
Mobility
In general, and regardless of specific Joint configuration,
suit mobility tends to degrade as operating pressure in-
creases. In order to achieve the mobility required to accom-
_7_ +_ _i_7_ VVA/TVA _k_ _dent_fied in Section 4 0 of
this volume, the complex suit Joints will most likely require
the incorporation of bearings inthe critical planes of
motion. In order to assess the impact of various operating
pressure levels upon suit mobility, it was necessary to
review the available test data on current and past suits
and suit Joint concepts in terms of range and torque and to
quantify, it possible, the effects of operating pressure upon
these parameters. Unfortunately, a very limited amount of
actual test data is available, and, where data are available,
the information is usually made up of single points (i.e. -
one specific Joint concept at only one pressure level).
Table 6-1 contains a list of the suit mobility data sources,
including the manufacturers and their various suit concepts,
as well as the pressure level at which test data were
generated.
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6.3.3 Mobility - Continued
l .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
ILC INDUSTRIES, INC.
a. APOLLO A7LB - 3.7, 8.0, 9.0 PSIA
b. INTRAVEHICULAR SPACE SUIT ASSEMBLY (I%A) - 8.0 PSIA
c. EXPERIMENTAL JOINT - 8.0 PSIA
HAMILTON STANDARD
a. MOL PSA, FLT. CONFIG - 3.5 PSIA
b. M-2A, IR&D CONFIG - 3.5 PSIA
c. XM-3, MOL EVALLIATION CONFIG - 3.5 PSIA
SPACE AGE CNNTROL (SAC)
a. INTRAVEHICttLAR SPACE SII!T (ISS) - 5.0 PSIA
LITTON INDt]STRIES
a. ADVANCED EXTRAVEHICULAR SPACE SUIT (LAES) - 8.0 PSIA
b. EXPERIMEr_TAL JOINT - 8.0 PSIA
AIRESEARCH
a. ADVANCED EXTRAVEHICULAR SPACE StlIT (AAER) - 8.0 PSIA
!_ASA-MSC: CSD-RFP
a. R.O PSIA ORBITAL EV _LIIT - 8.0 PSIA
?i,A.SA-MSC: ('%D-RF['
a. E_,_EI_/,ENCv IV %HIT ASSEMBLY - 8.0 PSIA
TABLE 6--1 SUIT MOBILITY DATA SOURCES
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6.3.3 Mobilit 7 - Continued
Figures 6-6 through 6-10 present range and torque data of
selected suit Joints as seattergraphs because of the lack of
comparative data points for any one configuration. Although
curve fitting of the data is not possible, there are trends
in the data that lead to the following conclusions:
al Lowest torque and highest mobility as a percent of nude
range can be achieved with constant volume Joint config-
urations such as the stove pipe and rolling convolute
Joints, particularly for complex Joints such as the
shoulder and hip-waist.
b. Fabricated soft convolute or tucked fabric joints appear
to provide satisfactory torque and range characteristic for
single axis Joints such as the elbow, knee and finger.
It is anticipated that with the incorporation of state-of-the-
art constant volume Joint technology in the complex suit Joints,
torque will be significantly reduced and effective range will
be increased to satisfactory levels, and suit performance should
not be affected to an appreciable degree by the operating suit
pressure levels being considered. Therefore, it is concluded
that suit mobility is not a significant factor in establishing
suit operating pressure level.
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6,3.3 Mobility - Continued
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6.3.3 Mobilit_ - Continued
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6.3.4 Wei6ht and Stowa6e Volume
There are three (3) general suit types which were considered
during this study:
a, Soft Suit: Upper and lower torso and limb transition
sections (excluding Joints) are constructed of soft fabric,
such as restraint cloth and bladder material.
b, Hard Suit: Upper and lower torso and limb transition
sections (excluding Joints) are constructed of rigid
material such as fiberglass and/or metal.
c. Combination Suit: Combination of soft and hard suit
subassemblies.
Note that suit Joints do not categorize the type of suit. The
various types of Joints mentioned in section 6.B.3, with or
without bearings, can be utilized in any suit type.
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6.3.4 Wei6ht and Stowa6e Volume - Continued
Table 6-2 summarizes suit weight and stowage volume versus
suit type based on available data for the Apollo, MOL and
advanced suit configurations.
SUIT TYPE WEIGHT (LB)
STOWAGEVOLUME
(FT 3)
SOFT 59-71 5-6
k
HARD 65-75 II
_^ .... _,_T_, 61 7_ 7-11
_UIVlDII_I £UI_ -s _ • • -
TABLE 6--2 WEIGHT AND STOWAGE VOLUME SUMMARY
Weight, which will have a relatively minor impact upon suit
selection, is a negligible function of suit pressure level
and, therefore, is not a significant factor in the selection
of a suit pressure level. The stowage volume of a suit is
purely a function of the type of suit selected. It should be
noted that the volumes presented in Table 6-2 assume that the
limbs are of soft construction and can be stored in the torso
and also that the helmet is stowed within the suit. Since
volume is uninfluenced by suit pressure level, it also is not
a factor in the establishment of a suit pressure level
requirement.
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6.3.5 Cost
6.3.6
6.4
As discussed in this section, the general design and con-
struction of the suit is not a significant function of the
operating pressure level. Accordingly, the suit pressure
level has little or no impact upon the cost of the suit.
In fact, cost does not represent a significant factor in the
selection of suit component design since suit detail costs
do not represent a major part of the total suit program cost.
The ultimate selection of suit components will be based pri-
marily on performance and life requirements. Cost is pri-
marily based on suit type. For a production program involving
approximately 1000 suits, the soft suit configuration recurring
cost is slightly higher than the hard suit configuration while
the nonrecurring cost for the hard suit configuration is much
higher than for the soft suit configuration. The suit cost
picture is discussed in greater detail in Section 9.0 of this
report, but, in summary, for selection of the suit operating
pressure level, suit cost is not a significant factor.
Summar_
Suit leakage, pressure drop, mobility, weight, volume and cost
were evaluated to determine the effect of suit operating pres-
sure level variations. Results of these evaluations indicate
that none of these factors are significantly affected by
variations in suit operating pressure level and are therefore
not major determinants in our suit pressure level determination.
Primar_ Life Support S[stem (PLSS) Considerations
The PLSS conditions and replenishes the atmosphere inside the
space suit and copls the suited crewman during his EVA mission.
The design of the ventilation subsystem of the PLSS is highly
dependent upon the selected suit operating pressure level.
Other subsystems such as the liquid cooling loop and the
communications and telemetry are not affected by the suit
pressure level. On that basis, this section concerns itself
exclusively with the suit ventilation subsystem, and the
summary parametric data presented refer to that subsystem only.
Detail parametric data supporting the summary data are presented
in Section 1.O, Appendix B in Volume II.
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6.4.1 Ventilation Requirements
The basic requirements for the ventilation subsystem of the
Primary Life Support System are as follows:
a. The mission duration is four hours.
b. The average metabolic rate of each extravehicular crewman
is lO00 BTU per hour.
c. The maximum permissible partial pressure of carbon dioxide
delivered to the crewman is 7.6 mm of mercury.
d. The maximum permissible moisture delivered to the suit
inlet is a 50°F dewpoint.
To satisfy these requiremenSs, ±uu_- =_=_=,= concepts _"=_
evolved, with total oxygen consumption being reduced as system
complexity increased. Each of these four concepts are
described in Section 6.h.2 and evaluated in Section 6.4.3.
System Descriptions
Concept Commonality
Each of the candidate system concepts evolved were based on
the same suit ventilation system and included both self-
contained and vehicle-supplied oxygen sources. The suit
ventilation system was assumed to be the same as used on the
ILC A-7L-B suit, with the exception that smooth-bore, self-
supporting ducting was used.
The oxygen supply for the ventilation circuit was evaluated for
both self-contained systems (wherein oxygen bottles would be
integrated into a back mounted PLSS and for vehicle supplied
systems (wherein an umbilical would connect the crewman to the
vehicle). In the case of the self-contained systems, it was
assumed that the rechargeable bottle would be charged to 900
psia from the vehicle. With the umbilical system, it was
assumed that the umbilical would have a lO0 foot free length,
would be of stainless steel braided construction, and would be
stored in a spherical drum. The pressure and flow rate
through the umbilical would be as required for each concept.
In all cases, final regulation of the oxygen pressure would
occur in the ventilation subsystem.
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6.4.2.2 Open Loop Concept
The open loop concept represents the simplest ventilation
subsystem considered and is shown schematically in Figure
6-11. It consists of a pressure regulator to obtain the
required pressure level inside the suit and a purge valve
to bleed the used oxygen from the suit. This concept has an
extremely high oxygen usage rate since no attempt is made at
recirculation of the oxygen.
f_ / PURGE
OR
SELF-CONTAINED
OXYGENSUPPLY
VALVE
FIGURE 6--11 OPEN LOOP PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
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6.4.2.3 Semi-Open Loop Concept
One technique for conserving oxygen is the semi-open loop
concept shown in Figure 6-12. The oxygen saving is achieved
by recirculating some of the exhaled oxygen. The incoming
oxygen is reduced in pressure to approximately 100 psia by
the regulator. From there, it enters the recirculation loop
through the ejector and, in expanding upon entering, causes
the oxygen to flow in the loop. The pressure control valve
continuously bleeds sufficient oxygen out of the recirculation
loop to prevent build-up of the carbon dioxide beyond acceptable
limits. The recirculated oxygen is Cooled as it passes through
the ejector and the resultant condensed moisture is removed in
the water separator thus providing humidity control. The
oxygen consumption with this system is approximately 50% of
that of the open loop.
• EJECTOR_ jHUMIDITY CONTROL
REGULATOR .. _ -_
0
SoExLyF_'I_!!_IIpNED' PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE_
FIGURE 6--12 SEMI-OPEN LOOP PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT
SYSTEM
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6.4.2.4 Semi-Closed Loop Concept
In order to achieve greater oxygen conservation than the
semi-open loop offers, it is necessary to add carbon dioxide
removal capability to the system. This is accomplished in
the semi-closed loop shown in Figure 6-13. This system
functions in the same manner as the semi-open loop except
that a means for chemically removing the carbon dioxide is
added. For this study, the use of lithium hydroxide was
assumed. By use of this technique, it is possible to achieve
an oxygen usage rate which is only 20% of its open loop
consumption.
HUMIDITY CONTROL
• EJECTOR. /
REGULATOR, _ /
H
LE
SELF-CONTAINED / / I I \
OXYGEN SUPPLY / / 3 _
• CONTAMINANTCONTROL VALVE
FIGURE 6--13 SEMI--CLOSED LOOP PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT
SYSTEM
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6.4.2.5 Closed Loop Concept
From an oxygen usage standpoint, the most desirable ventila-
tion subsystem is the closed loop shown in Figure 6-14. In
this concept, the oxygen usage is reduced to that required
for metabolic usage and to compensate for leakage from the
PLSS and suit. The pressure level of this system is maintained
by a demand regulator. Circulation within the loop is accom-
plished by a battery-powered, motor-driven fan. Humidity is
controlled by first cooling the oxygen in an expendable water
heat exchanger and then removing the condensed moisture in a
water separator. Carbon dioxide removal is performed by
lithium hydroxide as in the semi-closed loop.
jREGULATOR
W,o_,_
j
c° iiiii ,   
C,,
,II
u
FIGURE 6--14 CLOSED LOOP PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
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6.h.3 Concept
Weight and volume considerations provide an initial means
for eliminating some of the eight ventilation subsystems
concepts which are obviously uncompetitive.
For a vehicle oxygen supply system using a lO0 foot long
umbilical, the weight of the umbilical above is given in
Figure 6-15 for each of the four basic concepts. The
total weights of these umbilicals are a function of the
required flow rate and pressure level.
10
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OPEN LOOP SEMI-OPEN LOOP
NOTE: 100 FOOT LONG-UMBILICAL
0
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UMBILICAL WEIGHT - POUNDS
FIGURE 6--15 PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM UMBILICAL
WEIGHTS
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6.4.3 Concept - Continued
Total weight and volume relationships for both self-contained
and vehicle oxygen supply systems are shown in Figures 6-16 and
6-17 as a function of suit operating pressure. From the volume
relationship curves, it can be seen that, regardless of pressure
level, the self-contained open loop, semi-open loop and semi-
closed loop systems are impractical. The required volume is too
encumbering to be carried by an extravehicular astronaut. In
addition, considering both weight and volume relationships, the
closed loop, umbilical supplied system offers no clear cut
advantages and is dropped from further consideration on that
basis.
Based strictly on PLSS weight and volume, the remaining system
concepts, n___.ely the self-eont__ined closed loop and the umbilical
supplied open loop, semi-open loop and semi-closed loop systems,
offer no clear cut choices of system schematic or suit operating
pressure level. Accordingly, these four (4) systems are evalu-
ated further in Section 6.6 of this volume to determine their
impact upon the Shuttle Orbiter.
10-
8_
g_
, 6
D
4
gL
2-
O _
CLOSED/ SEMIOPENJ/  sEMI CL0SE0\J
SELF-CONTAINEDOXYGEN SYSTEMS
I I I I I I I I I
20 40 60 80 I00 120 140 160 180
SYSTEMWEIGHT-PK)UNDS
FIGURE 6--16 PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM WEIGHTS
6-23
Hamilton U
DJVl$_ (_ _TED A_CRAFT COR_AT_
Standard I:1®
SP OlT73
6.4.3 Concept - Continued
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6.4.3 Concept - Continued
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6.5
6.5.1
6.5.2
Emergency Life Support System (ELSS) Considerations
The ELSS provides emergency life support to a suited crewman
in the event of a malfunction of his primary life support
system or his suit. The ELSS is a self-c0ntained unit that
provides, as a minimum, an oxygen ventilation flow for
pressurization, metabolic oxygen consumption and thermal
control.
ELSS.Re_uirements
The basic requirements for the ELSS are as follows:
a. The ELSS shall provide pressure-regulated oxygen for
a period of fifteen minutes minimum.
b. The average metabolic rate of the crewman during the
period of usage is 1600 BTU per hour.
c. The maximum permissible partial pressure of carbon
dioxide delivered to the crewman is 7,6 mm of mercury.
Four candidate system concepts were evolved which satisfy
the above requirements. These systems are described in
6.5.2 and evaluated in 6.5.3.
System Descriptions
Unlike the PLSS, all of the ELSS concepts considered were
self-contained. This is necessary to ensure that the ELSS
is completely independent of the vehicle. In all systems
evaluated, the oxygen is delivered from a gaseous storage
tank at 6000 psia. A trade-off study was conducted to
determine the optimum ELSS gaseous storage pressure level
and is presented in Section 2.0, Appendix B of Volume II.
In the event of an emergency condition, the system would be
manually actuated by opening a shut-off valve, thus permitting
the oxygen to flow into the remainder of the system through a
regulator which establishes the required pressure level.
-5"
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6.5.2.1 Open Loop Concept
The simplest concept for an ELSS is the open loop concept
shown in Figure 6-18. In addition to an oxygen supply
bottle, valve and regulator, the system requires a purge
valve to bleed the oxygen from the suit.
SELF-CONTAINED OXYGEN SUPPLY
SHU'I:-OFFVALVE
REGULATOR
_ /URGE_..._.. VALVE
FIGURE 6--18 OPEN LOOP EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
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6.5.2,2 Semi-Open Loop Concept
The semi-open loop concept, shown in Figure 6-19, is essen-
tially the same operationally as the semi-open PLSS described
in Section 6.4.2.3. It conserves approximately 50% of the
oxygen used by the open loop ELSS concept by recirculation of
the oxygen with an ejector.
REGULATo_JECTOR_ . f.7 HUMIDITY CONTROL
SHUT-OFF VALVE
P SURE CO TROL VA
FIGURE 6--19 SEMI-OPEN LOOP EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT
SYST EM
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6.5.2.3 Semi-Closed Loop Concept
In the semi-closed loop concept, shown in Figure 6-20, a
contaminant control cartridge is added to the loop for carbon
dioxide removal. Oxygen recirculation continues to be per-
formed by the ejector, as in the PLSS semi-closed loop
discussed in Section 6.4.2.h. This concept conserves approxi-
mately 80% of the oxygen used by the open loop ELSS concept.
' /HUMIDITY CONTROL
EJECTOR k / '
•   OOLATO \
SHUT-0FF VALVE,_ ,_. _! .____=.. I/_ _ "
SoExLyFG-ECNONsTuA;pNE/ //_"LY / /_ -I 1
PRESSURE CONTROL VAI-VE
FIGURE 6--20 SEMI--CLOSED LOOP EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT
SYSTEM
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6.5.2.4 Closed Loop Concept
The ELSS concept shown in Figure 6.21 is a closed loop system
utilizing a heat exchanger for humidity and temperature control
and a fan for oxygen recirculation. Its mode of operation is
the same as the PLSS closed loop described in 6.4.2.5. Oxygen
consumption is reduced to the metabolic requirement and system
leakage, the lowest level of any of the potential systems.
SH_ATOR
FIGURE 6--21 CLOSED LOOP EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT
SYSTEM
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6.5.3 Concept Evaluation
Unlike the PLSS concept evaluation, weight and volume consid-
erations do not present a clear cut choice of an Emergency
Life Support System. As the curves of Figures 6-22 and 6-23
indicate, there are only minor variations between the various
system weights and volumes, although the semi-open loop does
tend to be slightly smaller and lighter than the other concepts.
The open loop system is carried forward for total vehicle impact
considerations on the basis that it is the simplest system and
its weight and volume are generally representative of any
Emergency Life Support System.
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6.6 Vehicle Support Provisions
Vehicle support provisions are those provisions which are
carried by the Shuttle Orbiter and are required to support
the Shuttle EVA operations. There are two areas of vehicle
support provisions that are affected by the selection of
suit operating pressure level: (a) Prebreathing Equipment
and (b) Orbiter PLSS expendablessupply system. Expendables
usage from the vehicle supply carries the following penalties:
al Each pound of oxygen withdrawn from the vehicle represents
1.25 pounds of vehicle weight (1.0 pound of oxygen and
0.25 pound of tankage).
b. One cubic foot of vehicle volume is required for every
71 pounds of oxygen withdrawn.
C* Since vehicle oxygen stowage is liquid, it is necessary
to heat the oxygen prior to use. To provide the electrical
energy for this heating requires 286 pounds of fuel cell
weight for each kilowatt plus 1.98 pounds of expendables
(oxygen and hydrogen) for each kilowatt-hour. However,
the fuel cells are sized by electrical requirements at
times other than when the EVA life support equipment are
being used or recharged and, consequently, more than
sufficient capacity exists to handle this load. Accord-
ingly, the only penalty associated with power consumption
is the oxygen and hydrogen expendables requirement.
d. In the closed loop systems it is necessary to supply water
to the condensing heat exchanger used for humidity control
and power to operate the fan. Analysis indicates that the
weight of the water involved is negligible and, therefore,
it is not considered in this trade-off. The penalty for
power used to recharge the batteries is 1.98 pounds of
expendables (oxygen and hydrogen) per kilowatt-hour. As
discussed earlier relative to oxygen supplies, no penalty
is charged for actual fuel cell weight or volume.
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6.6.1 Prebreathing Equipment
If a pressure level below 8.0 psia is used for the suit, it is
necessary for the crewman to denitrogenize his body and suit
prior to depressurizing from the airlock atmosphere to his
final suit pressure. To accomplish this, it is necessary to
prebreathe pure oxygen for a period of time which is dependent
upon the final pressure level selbcted. Therefore, part of the
suit pressure level study involves the evaluation of pre-
breathing equipment.
It was assumed that during the prebreathing period, the crewman
would be relatively inactive and, on that basis, a metabolic
load of 500 BTU per hour for the suited but unpressurized crew-
man was established. In addition, breathing oxygen purity
levels were established as a maximum of 3% of nitrogen by volume
and a maximum carbon dioxide partial pressure of 7.6 mm of
mercury. From that information, the prebreathing equipment can
be sized for any suit pressure level. If an open loop, contin-
uous purge system is used, it is necessary to flow 1.5 standard
cubic feet of oxygen per minute, in a s_mi-closed loop system
utilizing C02 scrubbing, the flow rate can be reduced to 0.3
pounds of oxygen per hour.
Two potential open loop systems are shown in Figure 6-24. In
both of these systems, the gaseous oxygen supply can be from
either a vehicle liquid storage system or from self-contained
gaseous oxygen tankage. Both systems utilize shutoff valves
and face masks with check valves to prevent reverse gas flow
upon inhalation and exhalation. In the first system, a demand
regulator is used to supply oxygen only upon inhalation. In
the second system, flow is continuous through both the regulator
and the flow limiting orifice and into the breathing bag. Upon
inhalation, the oxygen is drawn from the breathing bag into
the mask. The advantage of these systems is the relative sim-
plicity of the equipment, while the disadvantage is the quantity
of oxygen consumed.
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6.6.1 Prebreathing E_uipment - continued
MASK__ VALVE
EXHALA /INHALATION /DEMAND REGULATOR
-_ / /SHUT-OFFVALVEI
_ _ J OXYGEN SUPPLY
,-_ _ I FROMVEHICLE
_.L m_ LIQUID OXYGEN
\ _#_ SELF-CONTAINED
_ GASEOUS OXYGEN
A -- DEMAND REGULATOR SYSTEM
MASK _._,,..
.INHALATION VALVE
• EXHALATION VALVE ORIFICE
SHUT-OFF VALVE
L REGULATOR
_BREATHING BAG
OXYGEN SUPPLY
FROM VEHICLE
LIQUID OXYGEN
OR
SELF-CONTAINED
GASEOUS OXYGEN
B -- BREATHING BAG SYSTEM
FIGURE 6--24 OPEN LOOP PRE BREATHING SYSTEMS
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6.6.1 Prebreathing Equipment - Continued
The semi-closed loop system, which is shown in Figure 6-25,
can also obtain its oxygen from either the vehicle or self-
contained tankage. Incoming oxygen flow is continuous
through the regulator and the flow limiting orifice. Upon
exhalation, the gas flows through the mask outlet check valve
and into the breathing bag. On inhalation, the gas is drawn
from the breathing bag, through the lithiumhydroxide cartridge
for removal of carbon dioxide, and then through the face mask
inlet check valve. System pressure is maintained at approxi-
mately two inches of water above ambient pressure byperiodic
opening of the purge valve.
MASK
EXHALATION VAL'
PURGE VALVE \
BREATHING BAG
ATION "^',_L,E"
ORIFICE SHUT-OFF VALVE
OXYGEN SUPPLY
FROM VEHICLE
LIQUID OXYGEN
_I OR
SELF-CONTAINED
GASEOUS OXYGEN
'REGULATOR
ITHIUM HYDROXIDE CARTRIDGE
FIGURE 6--25 SEMI--CLOSED LOOP PREBREATHING SYSTEM
6-35
Hamilton .............. U
AI_C_AF T CORP_A T_N
Standard I:::1®
SP OlT73
6.6.1 Prebreathin 6 Equipment - Continued
The impact upon weight and volume for providing the prebreathing
capability on Shuttle is summarized in Figure 6-26. These curves
represent total weight and volume required, including both the
actual prebreathing equipment and the oxygen and its tankage,
whether the supply is from the vehicle or is self-contained.
Clearly, the self-contained systems are unacceptable on this
basis when compared with vehicle supplied oxygen systems. Due
to its considerably lower oxygen consumption, the semi-closed
loop offers substantial weight and volume advantages over the
open loop and would, logically, be selected if prebreathing were
required.
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6.6.1 Prebreathin_ E_uipment - Continued
In addition to purging nitrogen from the crewman's body_ it
is necessary to purge it from his suit prior to closure of
thesuit before depressurizing. Since this purging must
occur at a 14.7 psia ambient pressure and it is necessary
to obtain a maximum of 3% nitrogen by volume, a total of
3.15 pounds of oxygen are required per crewman for each EVA.
This oxygen comes from the vehicle oxygen supply. The impact
upon the vehicle weight and volume of supplying this oxygen
and its accompanying tankage is summarized in Figure 6-27.
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6.6.2 Orbiter PLSS Expendable Supply System
Based upon the vehicle penalties described in this section,
a weight and volume evaluation of the Orbiter PLSS expendable
supply system required for each of the four (4) PLSS ventila-
tion subsystems identified in Section 6.4 was conducted. The
total weight impact for operating each of the four subsystem
Q_nee_ts is p_esented in F$sure 6-28 and the volume impact ie
presented in Figure 6-29 . The data presented are for pressure
levels of four, six, eight and ten psia and for one to seven
dual extravehicular excursions. From these curves, it can be
seen that the umbilical supplied open loop and semi-open loop
concepts have excessive weight and volume impact upon the
vehicle at any suit operating pressure level. Of the other
two concepts, the self-contained closed loop offers lower
volumetric requirements regardless of suit pressure level.
The vehicle weight trade-off indicates that an 8.0 psia self-
contained closed loop ventilation subsystem is acceptable for
any number of EVA's and is actually the lightest weight
approach for four or more dual EVA's.
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6.6.2 Orbiter PLSS Expendable Supply System - Continued
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6.7
6.7.1
Shuttle Mission
Selection of suit operating pressure level affects the
Shuttle mission in two general areas: (a) Crewman utiliza-
tion and (b) EVA equipment materials oxygen compatibility.
Crewman Utilization
An additional impact resulting from the requirement for
prebreathing is the reduction in crewman utilization. As
stated earlier, the prebreathe period is one of relatively
light activity and, as a consequence, the crewman is
essentially unproductive. The effect upon mission manpower
utilization as a function of suit pressure is shown in
Figure 6-30. Based on the above curves, it becomes clear
that a suit pressure level below 8.0 psia is undesirable
from a crewman utilization standpoint.
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FIGURE 6--30 IMPACT OF PREBREATHING UPON CREWMAN
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6.7.2 Oxygen Compatibility
During the Apollo program a major effort was expended to
qualify non-metallic materials for pure oxygen exposure
(Reference: NASA Document MSC-PA-D-67-3 Titled "Non
Metallics Requirements for the Apollo Spacecraft"). Conse-
quently, in establishing the suit pressure level for the
Shuttle EVA system, materials qualification to higher 02
pressure levels was assessed. It was concluded that the
Shuttle application does not require any significant materials
qualification effort for pure 02 exposure due to suit pressure
level changes and therefore is not a factor in establishing
the suit pressure level. This conclusion was based on the
following:
a. The EVA equipment high pressure oxygen supply subsystem
materials and design configurations have been fully
qualified for 0 use and will satisfy the Shuttle needs.2
Materials which would normally be exposed to the Shuttle
cabin atmosphere, are currently qualified for 16.0 psia
pure 02 with the Shuttle cabin 02 pressure significantly
lower than 16 psia.
b, A few materials, normally utilized in the ventilation
circuits of the EVA equipment, such as water separator
wicking (nylon or dacron), silicone rubber, suit fabric
and fan bearing grease will not fully meet the non-
metallic requirements. However, they can be made completely
safe by utilizing the procedures used in the Apollo program.
This was accomplished by encapsulating the marginal
materials in fire shielding material and/or designing the
equipment to eliminate all credible ignition sources.
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6.8 Conclusions
A suit operating pressure level of 8.0 psia is selected
based on the following major conclusions drawn during this
study:
a. The potential for decompression sickness is eliminated.
b.
C.
No potential for oxygen toxicity exists.
By elimination of the prebreathing and suit purging
requirements, there are savings in equipment, cost,
and crewman utilization.
do No major technological advances are required in suits
or life support systems to provide the necessary
performance.
e. The 8.0 psia self-contained closed loop primary life
support system represents the minimum total impact
upon vehicle weight and volume for four or more dual
EVA's per mission.
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SECTION 7.0
PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
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7.1.i
PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT SYST_4
General
The primary functions of a Primary Life Support System (PLSS)
are to condition and replenish the atmosphere inside the space
suit and to cool the suited crewman during his EVA mission.
In order to accomplish this, the PLSS must provide the specific
life support functions depicted in Figure 7-1.
,,_,_,,,_-_ -
CONTROL rl/
FIGURE 7--1. PLSS FUNCTIONS
_COMMUNICATIONS I
POWER i
PRIME IMOVERS
HUMIDITY ]CONTROL
Tq_is section presents the results of the PLSS requirements
definition effort. Various candidate life support subsystem
concepts were identified and evaluated to determine the most
desirable approaches. The selected concepts were then carried
into the system studies where the subsystem concepts were com-
bined into various candidate system concepts. The system con-
cepts considered included both independent self-contained and
umbilical configurations. Because certain potential planned
and unscheduled EVA missions could involve contamination-
sensitive payloads, the impact of integrating noncontaminating
equipment into the most desirable PLSS system concepts was
also evaluated. These efforts resulted in the definition of
PLSS requirements presented herein.
i
Evaluation Criteria
The determination of the evaluation criteria was based on the
recognition that some requirements are absolute while others
are comparative. The absolute criteria define the minimum
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7.1.i Evaluation Criteria - Continued
acceptable requirements for a concept. If a concept does not
meet all of the absolute criteria, it is eliminated. The
absolute criteria are listed as follows:
a. Performance - All concepts must be capable of meeting
the entire performance spectrum.
bo Safety - Safety of each concept was evaluated to deter-
mine if there are any hazards present which cannot be
eliminated. If any serious problems were discovered which
could not be reasonably avoided, the concept was eliminated.
Co Availability - Availability is a measure of the probability
of a concept being fully operational within the required
time period (following reasonable development effort).
The comparative criteria are the principal evaluation criteria
for all concepts that pass the absolute criteria requirements
and are listed as follows:
Shuttle Weight - The physical aspects of any given concept
can be converted to a vehicle launch weight penalty for
purposes of comparison. Shuttle weight consists of sub-
system or system fixed weight, expendables, power require-
ments, heat rejection requiremehts, recharge equipment,
spares and interface equipment.
b. Shuttle Volume - Shuttle volume is a volumetric measure of
the items referenced in a. above.
c. PLSS Weight - PLSS weight consists of all PLSS equipment with
which the crewman must egress from the vehicle.
d. PLSS Volume - PLSS volume is a volumetric measure of all PLSS
equipment with which the crewman must egress from the vehicle.
eo Operability - Operability is a measure of the concept's
ability to be simply used for the mission's various operating
modes.
f. Cost - Cost consists of both Shuttle program and PLSS pro-
gram recurring and nonrecurring costs.
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7.1.2
7.1.3
Subsystem and System Studies Requirements
Table 7-1 presents the initial requirements developed as a
result of the EVA/IVA task identification and analysis effort
and utilized in the conduct of the subsystem and system studies.
Mission Duration h Hours
Metabolic Loads
Average
Minimum
Peak
I000 Btu/Hr.
400 But/Hr.
1600 Btu/Hr.
Suit Pressure Control 8.2 _ 0.2 psia
CO 2 Control 7.6 NIn l{g _x. Inspired
Humidity Control Suit inlet dewpoint less
than 50°F
Ventilation Flow As required to obtain humidity
and CO 2 control
Thermal Control Maintain crewman thermal comfort
with an inward heat !eak of 200
Btu/Hr.
TABLE 7--1. PLSS REQUIREMENTS
Vehicle Penalties
Table 7-2 presents the vehicle penalties utilized in the
conduct of the subsystem and system studies.
Oxygen:
LOX Storage - .25 Ibs. of tank per lb. of 02
Gaseous Storage - 2.14 lbs. of tank per lb. of 02
Power:
Expendables - .289 lb./watt + .00198 lb./watt-hr.
Fuel Cell - 50 watt-hours/lb.
Water - None
Cooling Penalty:
.171 lbs./Btu/Hr, sensible heat load into cabin
.134 lbs./Btu/Hr, latent heat load into cabin
.054 lbs./Btu/Hr, heat load into vehicle cooling system
Heating Penalty - Use Electrical Power
Radiator - None (has excess capacity during EVA phases of
Shuttle mission)
TABLE 7--2. VEHICLE PENALTIES
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7.1.3
7.2
7.2 .i
Vehicle Penalties - Continued
These vehicle penalties were applicable at the time they
were utilized. In the event that these change, it is felt
that the overall study results will remain applicable as
the bulk of the trade-off analysis is relative and the
trends indicated would not vary significantly.
Subsystem Studies - Self-Contained System
The objective of the subsystem studies was to evaluate and
select the most competitive subsystem concepts for the
closed loop, self-contained PLSS. This section summarizes
the results of this effort. The detailed results of this
effort, including schematics and parametric data for all
subsystem concepts considered, are contained in Appendix C
of Volume II.
Ox[gen Supply
The oxygen supply subsystem maintains suit pressure and
provides oxygen make-up flow for crewman metabolic 02
consumption and suit and PLSS external leakage in accordance
with the requirements listed below:
a. Suit Pressure
b*
C.
Oxygen Storage
Oxygen Delivery
Metabolic Consumption
Leakage
8.2 + 0.2 psi
0.77 ibs useable 02
0.175 lbs/hr
0.017 lbs/hr
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7.2.1 Oxygen Supply - Continued
A listing of the 0^ supply subsystem concepts identified and
evaluated is presented in Table 7-3.
I, Oxygen Storage
i. Gaseous (900-6000 psi)
2. Supercritical Utilizing Thermal Pressurization
3. Subcritical Utilizing Thermal Pressurization
h. Subcritical utilizing Positive Expulsion
5. Solid
II. Solid Decomposition
6. Superoxides (KO2)
7, •Peroxides (Li202)
8. Ozone.des
9. Sqdium Chlorate Candles (NaClO 3)
10. Lithium Perchlorate Candles (LiCl04)
III. Liquid Decomposition
ii. Hydrogen Peroxide
12. Reactant Storage (N2Hh/N204)
13. Reactant Storage (N2H4/N20 h)
IV. Electrolysis
14. Water Electrolysis
TABLE 7--3. OXYGEN SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM CONCEPTS
The results of the Op supply subsystem evaluation are pre-
sented in detail in Section 1.0 of Appendix C and indicate
that the most competitive concepts •are gaseous 02 storage
(900-6000psi). The present Shuttle Orbiter baseline
configuration has the capability to provide a maximum PLSS 02
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7.2.1 Oxygen Supply - Continued
supply subsystem recharge presssure of 900 psi. A schematic
depicting this candidate configuration is pictured in
Figure 7-2.
PLSS VEHICLE
VENT LOOP
L i
PRESSUREREGULATOR
SHUT-OFF
PRESSUREGAGE _ H VALVE
. _FILL FITTING
o@
SHUT-OFF
FILL VALVE
FITTING 900 PSl
_ VEHICLE
PRESSURE
SUPPLY
REGULATOR
FIGURE 7--2. 900 PSI OXYGEN SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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7.2 .I Oxygen Sup_l 7 - Continued
If a higher pressure 02 supply subsystem is desired to decrease
PLSS volume, a replaceable (vs rechargeable) subsystem presented
schematically in Figure 7-3 would be a viable candidate.
PLSS VEHICLE
VENT LOOP
•
QUICK
REGULATOR
PRESSURE SHUT-OFF VALVE
GAGE
FILL FITTING
PRECHARGED6000 PSI
BOTTLE STOOGE
FIGURE 7--3. 6000 PSI OXYGEN SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM
SCHEMATIC
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7.2.1 0x_en Supply - Continued
Figure 7-4 depicts the effect of both of these concepts on PLSS
and Shuttle weight and volume. Note that while there is a PLSS
volume benefit in going to the replaceable 6000 psi subsystem,
PLSS weights are about the same for both concepts and there is
a much greater Shuttle weight and volume penalty associated with
the replaceable 6000 psi subsystem. In addition, use of a
replaceable 6000 psi bottle might also require replacement of
the regulator to avoid connection/disconnection of high pressure
lines. This approach could prove to be costly and would intro-
duce undesirable interface constraints. Therefore, if the
Shuttle Orbiter baseline configuration remains the same, the most
desirable 02 supply subsystem is a rechargeable 900 psi gaseous
0 2 storage subsystem.
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Tn the event that the Shuttle Orbiter baseline configuration is
modified to permit a higher PLSS 0 2 supply subsystem recharge
pressure, there are other pressure level options available that
must be evaluated. Figure 7-5 presents 02 supply subsystem
weight and volume versus bottle pressure for rechargeable and
replaceable configurations.
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7.2.1 Oxygen Supply - Continued
Shuttle weight and volume versus bottle pressure for replaceable
bottle/regulator, replaceable bottle, and rechargeable configura-
tions are presented in Figure 7-6. Review of the data in Figures
7-5 and 7-6 indicate that an 02 supply subsystem pressure of
2500 - 3000 psi is the most desirable pressure level when con-
sidering the impact upon PLSS volume and weight.
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7.2,1 Oxygen Supply - Continued
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7.2.2 C02 Control Subsystem
The C02 control subsystem performs the function of maintain-
ing C02 partial pressure of the gas entering the unit within
an acceptable level.
The requirements specified for the C02 control subsystem are
listed below:
a. Maintain inspired C02 partial pressure below 7.6 mm Hg.
b. Remove 0.82 lbs. of C02.
Table 7-4 lists the CO 2 control subsystem concepts which were
evaluated. The results of the CO 2 control subsystem evalua-
indicates that lithium hydroxide (LiOH), shown schematically
in Figure 7-7, is the most competitive subsystem for the
Shuttle EVA requirements. LiOH was found to provide the
lowest PLSS and vehicle weight penalty and the lowest vehicle
volume penalty for the EVA requirements of less than 32 man-
hours per flight• The selection of LiOH also considered the
development status and its use in all previous manned space-
craft programs.
0o l
CANISTER
REPLACEABLECARTRIDGE
LiOH i 02
FIGURE 7--7. L, OH CO 2 CONTROL SUBSYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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7.2.2 CO? Control Subsystem - Continued
I. EXPENDABLES
L
II.
SOLID SORBENTS
I. HYDROXIDES (LiOH)
2. SUPEROXIDES (K02)
3. PEROXIDES (Li202)
4.-.OZONIDES
LIQUID SORBENT
5. HYDROXIDE SOLUTIONS
OPEN LOOP
6. PURGE FLOW
REGENERABLES
SOLID SORBENTS
7. ACTIVATED CHARCOAL
8. MOLECULAR SIEVE
9. METALLIC OXIDES
ZnO, MgO, Mg (OH)2
lO. SOLID AMINES
LIQUID SORBENTS
II. CARBONATE SOLUTIONS
12. LIQUID AMINES
Ill. ELECTROCHEMICAL
IV.
13. HYDROGEN DEPOLARIZED CELL
14. TWO-STAGE CARBONATION CELL
15. ONE-STAGE CARBONATION CELL
16. ELECTRODIALYSIS
17. FUSED SALT
MECHANICAL
18. SIMPLE MEMBRANE DIFFUSION
19. IMMOBILIZED LIQUID MEMBRANE,DIFFUSION
20. MECHANICAL FREEZEOUT
21. CRYOGENIC FREEZEOUT
TABLE 7-4. CO 2 CONTROL SUBSYSTEM CONCEPTS
L
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7.2.3
7.2.3.1
Contaminant Control Subsystem
The function of the contaminant control subsystem is to remove
trace and particulate contaminants which could adversely
affect the crewman or the system operation.
Trace Contaminant Control
The contaminant control subsystem maintains the concentration
of particulate matter, biological microorganisms, and trace
gases at acceptable levels so that the health and comfort of
the crewman is safeguarded.
The requirement for the trace contaminant control subsystem
is to limit the trace contaminant concentration to the levels
of Table 7-5. The trace contaminants in Table 7-5 are those
which are biologically generated and do not include trace
contaminants resulting from outgassing of system materials
such as coatings, lubricants, epoxies, etc. These trace
contaminants must be controlled at the design stage through
proper materials selection.
CONTAMINANT
ACETALDEHYDE
ACETONE
AMMONIA
n-BUTANOL
BUTYRIC ACID
CARBON MONOXIDE
ETHANOL
HYDROGEN
HYDROGEN SUFFIDE
INDOLE
METHANE
METHANOL
PHENOL
PYRUVIC ACID
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTION
RATEt LB/HR
9.6 X I0-9
2.02 X 10-8
2.62 X 10-5
1.2 X 10-7
6.92 X I0"5
1.43 X lO-6
3,68 X lO-7
8.08 X I0"7
4,61 X lO-IO
9.18 X 10-6
1.3 X I0-5
1.39 X I0-7
3.46 X 10-5
1.92 X 10-5
ALLOWABLE
CONCENTRATIONm MG/M3
360
2400
70
303
144
115
188O
(4.1%)
28
126
(5.3_)
262
19
9.2
TABLE 7--5. TRACE CONTAMINANT MODEL
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7.2.3.1 Trace Contaminant Control - Continued
The exposure limits presented in Table 7- 5 are based on
Threshold Limit Values. These limits generally apply
to eight (8) hour exposures for an industrial worker subject
to a five (5) day work week with the recovery of non-work
time taking place in a relatively contaminant-free atmosphere.
Space Maximum Allowable Concentrations are normally utilized
for space vehicle applications. However, these are defined
for continuous exposure and are considered too restrictive
for the PLSS application.
Based upon the defined model, the following trace gases build
up in the PLSS beyond the allowable concentration during the
four (_) hour EVA mission:
a. Butyric Acid
b. Indole
c. Phenol
d. Pyruvic Acid
All other trace gases generated remain within acceptable limits.
The concepts evaluated for trace contaminant control are
listed below:
a. Sorbead
b. Purafil
c. Activated Charcoal
d. Phosphoric Acid/Impregnated Charcoal
e. Catalytic Oxidizer
The results of the evaluation concluded that activated charcoal
is the most desirable concept since it is effective for removal
of butyric acid, indole, phenol and pyruvic acid, and it is
lightweight, inexpensive and can be integrated within the LiOH
cartridge to permit simple replacement prior to each EVA.
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7.2.3.2 Particulate Contamination Control
Control of particulate contaminants is required to prevent
particles of materials within the system from adversely
affecting the crewman or system operation. The requirements
of the particulate contamination control subsystem are listed
below:
a. Filter particulate contaminants as required to assure
system operation.
b. Limit Li0H dust to 0.1 mg/m 3 of suit ventilating gas.
7.2.4
The PLS$ design must consider the potential entry of particulate
contaminants such as hair, lint, skin flakes, fabric particles,
vom_tus and fecal matter and a means must be incorporated to
prevent these particles from entering the system. The use of
a debris trap at the inlet to the PLSS is an effective means
for control of these relatively large particles.
The requirement for Li0H dust control is the same as the
requirement specified for the Apollo EMU Program which can be
satisfied through the use of filters to limit the number of
Li0H dust particles. Selection of the filter type, size and
location is part of a future preliminary design study.
Thermal Control
The thermal control subsystem maintains thermal equilibrium
of the suited crewman and provides PLSS equipment cooling, as
required. The specific thermal loads imposed on this subsystem
consist of the crewman's metabolic load, PLSS equipment loads,
and the inward environmental heat leak. The thermal control
subsystem requirements are listed below:
a. Integrated Thermal Load - 7120 Btu
b. Peak Thermal Load - 2900 Btu/Hr
c. Average Thermal Load - 1_80 Btu/Hr
d. Minimum Thermal Load - 760 Btu/Hr
e. Suit inlet Dew-point - 50°F Max
f. Provide Variable Log Inlet Temperatures
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7.2.4 Thermal Control - Continued
A listing of the thermal control, subsystem concepts identified
and evaluated are presented in Table 7-6. The results of the
thermal control subsystem evaluation are presented in detail in
Section 3.0 of Appendix C and indicate that the most competitive
concepts are expendable water concepts. The three (3) ex-
pendable water concepts selected are the water boiler, water
sublimator and flash evaporator concepts. Three representative
PLSS schematics utilizing each of these concepts are presented
in Figures 7-8, 7-9 and 7-10, respectively.
FAN
H20 SEP
H20
BOILER"
FILL
PUMPo _ACCUMULATOR
CONTROL VALVE
BACK PRESSURE VALVE
FIGURE 7--8. WATER BOILER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
SUIT
LCG
FAN
I
I SUIT I
I
I
,2os P. pompt L,oHi
TEMPERATURE
CONTROL VALVE
FIGURE 7--9. SUBLIMATOR SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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7.2.b, Thermal Control - Continued
FAN 
H20 SEP. __L
H20 RESERVOI! t_i
I gllTT J
----I L,OHF
Exc.A,oE,_i} ' " Pu.P
VAP _- "_ FLASH EVAP' O !
ONT:-___._tt _ R.,._O i i
__FILTER _:_ _TEMPERATJREL_
._ T-," CONTROL VALVE
FIGURE 7--10. FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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7.2.4 Thermal Control - Continued
II.
IiI,
IV.
Ex!_endab les
Water"
i. Water Boiler
2. Super-Cooled Water Boiler
3. Super-Cooled Water Boiler with Vapor Regnerative Cooling
h. Water Sublimator
9. Super-Cooled Water Sublimator
6. Super-Cooled Water Sublimator with Vapor Regenerative Cooling
7. Plate Fin Flash Evapor&tor
8. Nonstea_ State Pulse Feed Flash Evaporator
9. Static Vortex Flash Evaporator
i0. Turblne-Rotary Vortex Flash Evaporator
ii. Motor-Rotary Vortex Flash Evaporator
12. MhAlti-Stage Flash Evaporator
13. Vapor Diffusion Through Suit Pressure Valves
14. VBpor Diffusion Through Water Permeable Membrance
_drogen Peroxide (R202)
15. H202 Dissociation into H20 and 02
/umonia (NH 3)
16. NH 3 Boiler
17. NH 3 Subllmator
Carbon Dioxide (C02)
18. CO2 Boiler
19. C0S Subllmator
MethLne (CH4)
20. CH 4 Sublimat or
Cryugenlcs
21. Cryogenic 02
22, Cryogenic H2
Radiation
Direct Cooling
23. LCG
24,. Heat Pipe
25. Water Adsorption Utilizing
26. LiCl" 3HsO
27 • C&C1.6H20
28. Molecular Sieve
29. Silica Gel
30. LiBr. 3H20
31. Na2Se- i H20
Indirect Cooling
32. Vapor Compression Refrigeration Cycle Using Freon
33. Water Adsorption Cycle Using NH 3
34. Water Adsorption Cycle Using LiBr
35. Hrayton Cycle Using Air
Thermal Storage
36. Ice
37. Subcooled Ice
38. Thermal Wax - Transit 86
39. Eutectic Salt - Sodium Sulphate (HAsSO4"IOH20)
40. Phosphoni_ Chloride (PH4CI)
41. Hydrogen (H2)
Hybrids
42. Expendable/Radiation - Direct Coo_ling
43. Expendable/Radiation - Indirect Coo_i_g
44. Expendable/Therma_ _tor_ge
45. Radiation/Therm__ Storage
46. Thermal Storage!Water Adsorption
TABLE 7--6 . THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM CONCEPTS
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7.2.4 Thermal Control- Continued
Figure 7-11 presents the weights and volumes of the three (3)
candidate thermal control subsystems concepts. The advantages
and disadvantages of each concept are listed in Tables 7-7,
7-8 and 7-9. ,An evaluation of the operational and cost aspects
of these candidate concepts in conjunction with the weights and
volumes depicted in Figure 7-11 does not indicate a clear-cut
advantage for either of the three (3) candidates. Therefore,
each of these concepts are still considered as viable candidates
to provide the PLSS thermal control subsystem function.
25-
_- ?n°
lsL
10-
WEIGHT
.J
EFFECT ON PLSS
1400-
1200-
1000-
800- _
6o0-
VOLUME
60-
4(]
, Ip
0
EFFECT ON VEHICLE
WEIGHT a_ 2500-
WATER SUBL IMATOR_
R/ " FL SH EVAPORATOR
WATER BOII.E
, 2000-
1500-
=, lOOO-
500-
o,
,,/FLASH EVAPORATOR
f.fWATER SUBLIMATOR
"_WATER BOILER
VOLUt4E
NO. OF 4 HOUR DUAL EVA'S NO. OF 4 HOUR DUAL EVA'S
FIGURE 7--11. THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM" WEIGHT
& VOLUME COMPARISON,
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7.2.4 Thermal Control - Continued
ADVANTAGES
I. HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND USED IN MANNED
SPACECRAFT PROGRAMS
2. CAN BE SHUT DOWN INSTANTLY
3. MINIMUM SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CORROSION
4. RELATIVELY SIMPLE CONTROL SYSTEM
DISADVANTAGES
I. POSSIBLE WATER CARRY OVER DURING START
2. RECHARGING WITHOUT WATER SPILLAGE RE-
QUIRE WATER LEVEL SENSORS AND ASSOCIATE
COMPLEXITY
3. SENSITIVE TO GAS BUBBLES IN EXPENDABLE
WATER SUPPLY
4. POTENTIAL WICK CONTAMINATION
_I"ABLE 7-- 7. WATER BOILER ADVANTAGES AND
D ISAD VANTAGES "
ADVANTAGES
I. HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND USED IN PORTABLE
SYSTEMS AND SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS
2. DOES NOT REQUIRE AN ACTIVE CONTROL SYS-
TEM FOR VARYING HEAT LOADS. IT IS SELF
REGULATING
DISADVANTAGES
I. SUSCEPTABLE TO PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION
DUE TO CONTAMINATION AND CORROSION
2. CANNOT BE STARTED AND SHUT DOWN
INSTANTLY
3. GAS BUBBLES IN EXPENDABLE WATER SUPPLY
MAY BE DETRIMENTAL TO SYSTEM DEPENDING
ON SYSTEM DESIGN
TABLE 7--8. WATER SUBLIMATOR ADVANTAGES AND
D ISAD VANTAGE S
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7.2.4 Thermal Control - Continued
ADVANTAGES
I. IMMEDIATE START-UP AND SHUT-DOWN CAPABILITY
2. LEAST SUSCEPTIBLE TO CORROSION AND CONTAMINA-
TION
3. NOT SENSITIVE TO GAS BUBBLES IN EXPENDABLE
WATER SUPPLY SINCE WATER PRESSURE IS EXPECTED
TO BE HIGHER THAN THE SATURATION PRESSURE
4, SOLENOID VALVE AND NOZZLE ARE EASILY REPLACED
FOR SERVICING
5, RELATIVELY LOW RECURRING COST
DISADVANTAGES
I. REQUIRES DEVELOPMENTFOR SPACECRAFT AND
PORTABLE SYSTEMS OPERATION
2. SIGNIFICANT CONTROL PROBLEMSARE EXPECTED
WHEN USED WITH AN EVA SYSTEM DUE TO THE
RELATIVELY LOW HEAT LOADS
3, MOST COMPLEX CONTROLSYSTEM
TABLE 7--9. FLASH EVAPORATOR ADVANTAGES
AND D I SADVANTAGE S
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7.2.5 Cooling Control Subsystem
The study baselined a liquid cooling system for removal of
metabolic heat from the crewman. Temperature control is to
provide crewman comfort over the entire range of metabolic
work rates and environmental conditions. The concepts
evaluated are listed in Table 7-10.
CONSTANT LCG FLOW
A) MANUAL TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE
B) AUTOMATIC TEMPEraTURE CONTROL VALVE
VARIABLE LCG FLOW
A) MANUAL FLOW CONTROL VALVE
B) AUTOMATIC FLOW CONTROL VALVE
TABLE 7--10. COOLING CONTROL SUBSYSTEM CONCEPTS
The evaluation concluded that either the constant or variable
LCG flow concept can be used although the variable LCG flow
concept results in larger temperature gradients across the
LCG.
The selection of manual control over automatic control was
made after review of Apollo EVA performance data which showed
that LCG inlet temperatures did not change frequently and were
usually maintained within a range of 65 to 80°F. Secondly,
manual control avoids the complexity and expense inherent in
the design and development of an automatic temperature control
subsystem. And lastly, manual contr,;1 is completely adequate
for the intended task.
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7.2.6 Humidity Control
The humidity control subsystem controls the relative humidity
within the space suit to prevent visor fogging and to maintain
a comfortable level for the suited crewman. It continually
removes water vapor which enters the gas stream as a product
of crewman respiration and sweating.
The candidate humidity control subsystem concepts identified
and evaluated are presented in Table 7-11.
A, CONDENSINGHEAT EXCHANGERCOMBINED WITH ANY OF THE FOLLOWING
"CHANGE-OF-MOMENTUM"TYPE DEVICES:
I) ELBOW WICK SEPARATOR
2) ELBOW SCUPPER SEPARATOR
3) U-SHAPED GRAVITY SEPARATOR
A_ _/nDT_V _DA_ITTV q_D8DSThP
5) MOTOR-DRIVENROTARY SEPARATOR
6) TURBINE-DRIVENROTARYSEPARATOR
B. WATER VAPOR ADSORPTION UTILIZAINGA DESSICANT SUCH AS SILICA GEL
C. WATER EMULSION FORMATIONAND STORAGE
D. FREEZEOUT
_I MECHANICALCRYOGENIC
E. CONDENSINGHEAT EXCHANGERIN SERIES WITH A HYDROPHOBICHYDROPHYLLIC
SCREEN SEPARATOR
F. WATER VAPOR DIFFUSIONTHROUGH PERMEABLEMEMBRANE
G. CONDENSATIONAND SEPARATIONUTILIZING A HILSCH TUBE
H. UTILIZATIONOF ELECTRICALENERGY TO PROVIDE SEPARATIONBY -
_I ELECTROLYSISPHORESIS
3) ELECTRO-OSMOSIS
• TABLE7--11. HUMIDITY CONTROL SUBSYSTEM CONCEPTS
A condensing heat exchanger in series with an elbow wick
separatorwas selected as the most desirable concept for the
Shuttle PLSS application. This concept is relatively simple,
small, light, not gravity sensitive, and does not require
electrical power for operation. In addition, a condensing
heat exchanger is an integral part of the thermal control
subsystem. Provisions for storing the condensed water must
be provided.
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7.2.7 Power Supply
Electrical power is required by the PLSS for the operation of
the prime movers and communications. The requirements for the
PLSS power supply are specified and listed below:
a. Power - 55 watts
b. Voltage - i0 to B0 VDC
c. Mission Duration - 4 hours
d. Activation Life - B0 days
e. Recharge Time - 12 hours
f. Shelf Life - l0 years
Many different power supply concepts were investigated, however,
as can be seen from Figure 7-12, only batteries trade-off in the
particular range required for the PLSS. Of all the battery
10 4 CHEMICAL DYNAMIC
CRYOGENIC CHEMICAL
10 3 _ DYNAMIC
l-
I-
LLIIIllNOC' ARDYNAM,C
Oj 10 2
._ -- SOLAR DYNAMIC
I __ AND NUCLEAR DYNAMIC
p-
_. SOLAR STATIC
I--
o_ lilllPrllillllPHOTO VOLTA IC
(3 OR RADIOISOTOPE
E
I,I
Z _ FUEL CELLId 0.
= BATTERY
0.01
1 5
MIN MIN
I 1 1 1 1 10
HR DAY WK MO YR YRS
DURATION TIME
FIGURE 7--12. POWER SUPPLY APPLICABILITY
systems currently in use, many can be eliminated because of
their very low energy densities, hazardous characteristics,
or very low state of development relative to the time period
of interest. The battery concepts identified as meriting
further evaluation are listed below:
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7.2.7 Power Supply - Continued
a. Nickel-Cadmium
b. Nickel-Iron
c. Nickel-Zinc
d. Silver-Cadmium
e. Silver-Zinc
f. Zinc-Air
g. Lithium-Organic
Figures 7-13 and 7-14 present the energy currently attainable
per unit weight and volume respectively for these different
systems.
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FIGURE 7--14. POWER SUPPLYVOLUME COMPARISON
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7.2.7 Power Supply - Continued
From these it is evident that the Zinc-Air System has the
highest watt-hr per unit weight and volume. However, it
only has a 7 day activation life making it unsatisfactory.
Further it requires an oxygen flow of at least 48 cc/min
to meet the requirements and thus poses an interface within
the PLSS not otherwise present.
The silver-zinc system is the next best on a watt-hour per
unit volume basis and is very competitive on a weight basis.
Although it is basically a disposable system, it is also
capable of 10-25 deep discharges as a rechargeable system.
The Ag-Zn system can obtain energy densities of 80 watt-
hrs/lb and B.7 watt-hrs/inB, has good regulation character-
istics, and meets the other basic requirements.
The Lithium Organic System is also an attractive concept on
a watt-hour per unit weight and volume basis. Since it is
a relatively new approach, this system requires more develop-
ment work, especially involving failure modes, before further
consideration can be given to it. With normal development,
however, it could become a strong contender and should not
be eliminated at this time.
The other systems considered were not selected because their
power per unit weight and volume were significantly less than
the silver-zinc and lithium organic systems.
Figure 7-15 presents a comparison between silver-zinc dis-
posable and rechargeable systems and a lithium organic
disposable system.
From these curves, it is evident that the rechargeable
silver-zinc system is the most efficient system, even wlth
the additional weight penalty of 2,6 lbs for a single battery
charger. In addition, battery recharging during Shuttle
station keeping operations impact fuel cell capacity, and
the fuel cell consumables (02 and H2) required for battery
recharge are minimal. For these reasons, the silver-zinc
rechargeable system was selected for use in the System
Studies (Section 7._).
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7.2.7 Power Sup_l_ - Continued
5O
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7.2.8 Closed Loop System Selection
The subsystem studies for the closed loop system have identi-
fied the most desirable subsystems for this system. Figure
7-16 identifies the selected subsystems which will be evaluated
against the umbilical systems. Figure 7-17 presents PLSS
weight and volume and Shuttle weights and volumes to support
various quantities of 4 hour dual EVA's. The weights and
volumes of Figure 7-17 does not include the weights and volumes
of a communications system or packaging hardware such as hard
covers, thermal covers, miscellaneous brackets and etc. These
items will be added after the number of system candidates have
been reduced further.
I 900 PSl 02
I AgZn I
REGULATOR BATTERY
LiOH
CHARCOAL r
FAN
WATER SEPARATOR
PUMP
0
I COMMUNI- IATIO S
THERMAL
CONTROL
IF
MANUAL TEMPERATURE CONTROL
FIGURE 7--16. SELECTED CLOSED LOOP PLSS
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Closed Loop System Selection - Continued
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Subsystem Studies - Umbilical System
• Oxygen Supply Subsystem
r_.e results of Suit Pressure Level Determination portion of the
study (Section 6.0) showed that the optimum source of the oxygen
is from the vehicle liquid oxygen (LOX) supply. This is
primarily due to the low penalties associated with liquid
oxygen storage. System sizing studies were performed to
satisfy the requirements of Table 7-1 which resulted in the
oxygen usages listed in Table 7-12 for each candidate umbilical
system.
02 FLOW
SYSTEM CONCEPT LBS/HR
OPEN LOOP II.0
SEMI-OPEN LOOP 8.75
SEMI-CLOSED LOOP 3.15
TABLE 7--12. UMBILICAL SYSTEM 0 2 FLOW REQUIREMENT
7.3.2
7.3.3
COp and Contaminant Control Subsystem
Control of C0 2 and trace contaminants with the open loop and
semi-open loop system is achieved by means of an overboard
dump. For the semi-closed loop system, the C0 2 and trace
contaminant removal requirements are not significantly differ-
ent than those of the self contained closed loop system.
Therefore, the selected subsystems of the closed loop system
are also applicable to the semi-closed umbilical system. These
subsystems are Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) for C0 2 control and
activated charcoal for control of trace contaminants.
Thermal Control
For the umbilical system, it was assumed that a liquid cooling
loop umbilical would be used for thermal control (similar to
the Skylab ALSA). This assumption is compliant with the
primary advantage of umbilical systems which is to minimize
the on-the-back volume of the PLSS. Secondly, the addition
of cooling umbilicals does not add significantly to any
umbilical management problems.
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7.3.4
7.3.5
7.3.6
7.3.7
7.3.8
Temperature Control
The temperature control requirements for an umbilical system
are the same as those for the closed loop system discussed in
paragraph 7.2.5. Therefore, the same selection is made for
the umbilical systems.
Humidity Control
Control of system humidity levels is achieved by overboard
dump in the open loop umbilical system. The semi-open and
semi-closed loop systems require an active humidity control
system. An evaluation of the concepts listed in Table 7-16
of paragraph 7.2.6 resulted in selection of a condensing heat
exchanger with a downstream elbow water separator as selected
1'or the closed loop system. However, the heat exchanger loads
and the storage capacity are reduced for the umbilical systems
due to the inherent cooling capabilities of the ejector and the
quantity of water vapor which is dumped overboard.
Prime Movers
Prime movers for the umbilical systems are not required since
ventilation is provided by means of ejectors or flushing oxygen
directly through the suit. Circulation of liquid cooling
through the liquid cooling garment is assumed to be provided
by the Orbiter thermal control subsystem. For assessment of
vehicle weights and volumes, an electrically driven pump is
used because of the low penalties for electrical power during
EVA operations.
Power
The power required for umbilical systems is that zecessary to
drive the communications and warning systems. The concept
selected for the umbilical PLSS configurations is a hardline
from the Shuttle and is similar to the existing Skylab system.
Umbilical Systems Selection
Each of the umbilical systems selected for systems evaluation
is shown schematically in Figures 7-18, 7-19, and 7-20. The
weights and volumes for each system are shown in Figure 7-21.
This figure does not include the weights and volumes of the
communications systems, and packaging hardware such as hard-
covers, thermal covers and miscellaneous brackets. Figure 7-21
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7.3.8 Umbilical Systems Selection - Continued
shows that the semi-closed system has the least weight and
volume impact on the Orbiter and, on the basis of weight and
volume, is the most attractive system. However, the other
two systems are less complex, lower in cost, and more desir-
able from an operational standpoint. Therefore, all three
umbilical systems were selected for further comparative system
level evaluation with the self-contained closed loop system.
/
H20 (TO VEHICLE)
_,,=--.-- H20 (FROM VEHICLE)
'=-----02(FROM VEHICLE)
FIGURE 7--18. OPEN LOOP UMBILICAL SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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7.3.8 Umbilical Systems Selection - Continued
H20 (TO VEHICLE)
WATER SEPARATOR
TEMP _
CONTROL _ H20 (FROM VEHICLE)
HUMIDITY CONTROL
_ EJECTOR
_ _ 02 (FROM VEHICLE)
' '
PRESSURE CONTROL
FIGURE 7--19, SEMI--OPEN LOOP UMBILICAL SYSTEM
SCHEMATIC
H20 (TO VEHICLE)
WATER SEPARATOR
TEMP
CONTROL J L _ '_ H20 (FROM VEHICLE)
PRESSURE CONTROL
02 (DUMP)
02 (FROM VEHICLE)
FIGURE 7--20. SEMI--CLOSED LOOP UMBILICAL SYSTEM
SCFEMATIC
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7.B.8 Umbilical STstem Selection - Continued
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7.4 Systems Studies
The objective of the system studies is to select the best
overall system for Shuttle EVA'so The effort performed as
part of the suit pressure level determination (Section 6.0)
reviewed life support systems and found that four basic
systems are competitive. These four systems are listed in
Table 7-13.
SELF-CONTAINED CLOSED LOSP SYSTEM FIGHRE 7-16
UMBILICAL OPEN LOOP SYSTEM FIGURE 7-18
FIGURE 7-19UMBILICAL SEMI-OPEN LOOP SYSTEM
e
UMBILICAL SEMI-CLOSED LOOP SYSTEM FIGURE7-20
TAB.,.= 7_,_ mr_AD=Trrlv_- PRIMARY I IFIE SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
The approach utilized to select the most desirable PLSS system
concept consisted of first conducting subsystem studies to
select the most desirable subsystem concepts for each of the
four competitive system concepts, Then each of these system
concepts were comparatively evaluated and a selection made.
This section describes the systems evaluation,
Figure 7-22 summarizes the weight and volume of each competi-
tive system in addition to the weight and volumes imposed on
the Orbiter to support each system for multiple quantities of
four hour EVA' s,
U!IBIL ICAL SYSTErlS
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FIGURE 7--22 OVERALL PLSS WEIGHT & VOLUME COMPARISON
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7.4.1 Wei6ht and Volume Comparisons - Continued
Although communications and packaging hardware are not included,
the closed loop system is the superior system from a weight and
volume standpoint. However, since the closed loop system has
considerably more components than the other system candidates
it is reasonable to expect the system weight and volume to
increase more than the other systems with the inclusion of
packaging hardware and communications system.
An assessment of complete systems was made by adding the weight
and volumes of packaging hardware and communications systems into
the two most competitive systems from the weight and volume
standpoint. The semi-closed loop umbilical system was selected
for evaluation with the self-contained closed loop system. For
communications, an Apollo EVCS was added to the self-contained
closed loop system and a Skylab communication umbilical was
added to the semi-closed loop umbilical system. Packaging hard-
ware weight additions consisted of ten (i0) pounds for the um-
bilical system and thirty (B0) pounds for the self contained
system. Figure 7-2B compares the two systems and reconfirms
that the closed loop system results in the minimum weight and
volume system.
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m ! ! !2 s 1 s 6
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I
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FIGURE 7--23. PLSS WEIGHT & VOLUME COMPARISON
7-36
Hamilton ....... o ....... U
AmC_AFT CO_P_AT_ON
Standard I 1®
SP 01T73
7.4.2 Cost Comparisons
From the cost standpoint, the open loop system is anticipated
to be superior to the other systems since it has the fewest
components and is the system with least complexity. The cost
comparisons of the open loop, semi-closed and the closed loop
systems shown in Figure 7-24 are based on the following:
a. Program cost estimates include design, development,
qualification, production and flight operation for each
system. Program period is from 1974 to 1990.
b. Vehicle non-recurring costs are equivalent to $15,230
per pound of EVA related equipment carried by the Orbiter.
me An operational penalty of $154 per pound per flight was
assumed for EVA related equipment. This is based on
$10,000,000 recurring cost per flight and 65,000 pound
payload capacity.
d. There are 677 Shuttle flights from 1979 to 1990.
O
Q_
-J
1.4-
1.3-
1.2-
1.1-
1.0
.9
OPEN LOOP UM_
_-_ \SEMI-CLOSED LOOP UMBILICAL
f _,SELF CONTAINED CLOSED LOOP
1 2 3 4
NO. OF 4 HOUR DUAL EVA/IVA'S
FIGURE 7--24. PLSS COST COMPARISONS
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7.4.2 Cost Comparisons - Continued
Figure 7-24 shows that the cost variations between the open
loop umbilical system and the closed loop, self-contained system
are not sufficient to dicate selection of the type of primary
life support system to be used for Shuttle. Therefore, PLSS
selection must be based on weight, volume and operational con-
siderations which are presented in Table 7-14.
FACTOR
WEIGHT - PLSS (ONE CREWMAN)
VEHICLE (ONE DUAL EVA)
VOLUME - PLSS (ONE CREWMAN)
VEHICLE (ONE DUAL EVA)
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
@ STORAGE EASE
• DONNING/DOFFING EASE
• CHECKOUT
• TRANSLATION-UMBILICAL/TETHER
MANAGEMENT
• TASK EXECUTION
• RECHARGE
• OPERATING LIFE AND MAINTAINABILITY
• POTENTIAL FOR CONVERSIOP_ TO NON-
CONTAMINATING SYSTEM
eVEHICLE SCAR
• COMPATIBILITY W/MANIPULATOR
ASSISTED TASKS
SYSTEM
SEMI-CLOSED LOOP UMBILICAL SELF CONTAINED
113 LB.
270 LB.
5920 IN3
36000 IN3 "
EQUIVALENT
ENGAGE UMBILICAL
SIMPLER
COMPLEX
LEAST EFFICIENT - RIGID ADHERENCE TO
PREPLANNED SEQUENCE - SLIGHT FORCE &
MOMENT CONSTRAINT
NOT REQUIRED
SLIGHTLY BETTER DUE TO FEWER COMPONENTS
POOR - ALL SUBSYSTEMS AFFECTED
GREATEST iMPACT
FAIR
61 LB.
122 LB.
3350 IN3
6700 IN3
EQUIVALENT
OON PACK & ENGAGE
UMBILICAL
MORE COMPONENTS
INVOLVED
SIMPLER
MORE EFFICIENT - GREATEST
LATITUDE FOR CHANGE IN TASK
PLAN - COMPLETE FREEDOM
MUST REPLENISH 4 EXPENDABLES
GOOD
GOOD - ONLY HEAT REJECTION
SUBSYSTEM AFFECTED
MINIMUM IMPACT
EXCELLENT
TABLE 7--14. OVERALL PLSS COMPARISON
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7.4.3
7.4.4
Operability Considerations
The closed loop system possesses more operational complexity
during EVA mission phases of check-out, start-up and recharge
than the umbilical systems. However, during operational phases
of EVA, such as task execution, the crewman must ensure that
the umbilical'does not become tangled or dynamically excited.
Secondly, with the umbilical system, the crewman must translate
between worksites via a route that is most convenient for the
umbilical rather than the most direct route available to him.
This becomes a more significant constraint for emergency return
to the airlock subsequent to a failure condition. Therefore,
it is concluded that the self-contained system is superior from
the operability aspect.
Summary
As a result of the system studies, it is concluded that the
self contained closed loop system is the superior system and is
recommended for the Shuttle EVA primary life support system for
the following reasons:
a. Minimum weight.
b. Minimum volume.
c. Superior operability during EVA by elimination of umbilical
management problems.
d. Basic system requires minimum modification for use on
contamination sensitive missions.
e. Cost is competitive with other system candidates.
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System Integration Studies
This section summarizes system level integration studies which
consider the total EVA system. Detail results of this effort
are reported in Appendix D. These studies established require-
ments for the topics listed in Table 7-15.
TOPIC PARAGRAPH
SUIT, PLSS, ELSS DESIGN INTEGRATION 7.5.1
COMMUNICATIONS 7.5.2
WARNINGS 7.5.3
INSTRUMENTATION 7.5.4
THERMALMODEL 7.5.5
SYSTEMTEST REQUIREMENTS 7.5.6
SYSTEMLIFE REQUIREMENTS 7.5.7
TABLE 7--15. SYSTEM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
Suit_ PLSS_ ELSS Design Integration
The configuration of the operational EVA system is dictated
to a large extent by the design approach taken for the
physical integration of the system. A totally integrated
system such as the Integrated Maneuvering/Life Support System
(IMLSS) has certain advantages which must be considered. These
advantages include minimumweight and volume through the elimi-
nation of interfacing umbilicals and more efficient utilization
of available volume by packaging PLSS and ELSS components with-
in the suit enclosure. A separate and independent system such
as the Apollo EMU also has discrete advantages which must be
traded off with those of the integrated system.
The study considered design integration of the PLSS and ELSS
into the pressure suit and design integration of the ELSS into
the PLSS and concluded that the ELSS and PLSS systems should be
integrated and that the pressure suit should not be integrated
with the life support systems. The primary factors for this
recommendation include design complexity, ground handling and
servicing, program cost and crew training.
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7.5.2 Communications
The task analysis effort described in Section 4.0 indicated
that most of the EVA's are dual EVA's where two crewman are
simultaneously performing tasks associated with a payload.
For normal EVA operations, it is essential that the EVA crew-
men have two-way voice communications with each other to
coordinate their activities. It is also necessary to have
communications with the crew within the Orbiter, manned pay-
loads or space stations to coordinate activities such as
refueling, manipulator operations, retrieval of film cas-
settes, etc. Two-way voice communications is also required
for coordination with ground crews, including NASA personnel
and principle investigators, for resolution of any anomalies
which may occur during a flight.
tion of EVA tasks between EVA crewmen, Orbiter crews, and
ground personnel, it is considered essential that a back-up
two-way voice communications system be provided to allow com-
pletion of mission objectives subsequent to an EVA or Orbiter
primary communications system failure.
Consideration was also given to payload or Orbiter conditions
which could affect the safety of the EVA crewman. Such condi-
tions include leakage of payload or Orbiter fuels or oxidizers,
malfunction of RCS thrusters, and any other failures of payload
or Orbiter subsystems that require the immediate alert of the
crew. An alert of such conditions would be initiated by either
the Orbiter crew or ground crews to notify the entire crew to
return to the Orbiter cabin. Since the EVA crewmen are part
of the Orbiter crew, any alert initiated by either the ground
or Orbiter personnel should be automatically transmitted to
EVA crewmen.
Voice communications via an umbilical or RF link was also con-
sidered and it was concluded that an RF system is desired for
the independent self-contained system to eliminate umbilical
management and stowage problems. Based on the above rationale,
the voice communications system requirements are listed below:
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7.5.2
7.5.3
7.5.3.1
Communications - Continued
al The Orbiter and EVA system shall provide for two-way
simultaneous voice communications between each crewman
and the Orbiter crew.
b. The Orbiter shall be capable of relaying the voice
communication from an EVA crewman to other EVA crewman,
ground, Space Station or other manned spacecraft associated
with the mission.
C. The Orbiter shall be capable of relaying voice communica-
tions from ground, Space Station or other manned spacecraft
to the EVA/IVA crewmen.
dl Any paging or alerts from ground, Space Station or other
manned spacecrafts shall automatically be transmitted to
the EVA/IVA crewmen.
el A back-up communications system shall be incorporated to
provide two-way voice communications between the EVA/IVA
crewmen and the Orbiter crew.
fl The communication range getween the EVA crewmen and the
Orbiter should be limited to a maximum of lO0 meters, with
omni-directional coverage, to minimize EVA communication
systems complexity.
An evaluation of communication system concepts resulted in the
following recommendations:
a. All PLSS communications systems should be identical.
bl Establishing the operational frequencies of the EVA
system must be accomplished by NASA to ensure noninter-
ference with the Orbiter, payloads, Space Station and
operational satellites.
Instrumentation
Require d Instrumentation
EVA equipment instrumentation is required to provide EVA equip-
ment performance monitoring to permit checkout prior to EVA and
to permit status monitoring during conduct of an EVA. Instru-
mentation to provide these functions fall into two (2)
categories:
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7.5.3.1 Required Instrumentation - Continued
aQ Warnings - The purpose of a _arnlng system is to alert the
crewman of PLSS failures which could Jeopardize his life or
safety. Identification of candidate parameters for warn-
ings was accomplished by considering the man's need for
life support rather than performing a failure analysis on
the proposed EVA system. The candidate parameters were
then screened by giving consideration to the ability of
man as a sensor and to the type system he uses.
be
It was concluded that a minimum of three warnings are re-
quired to alert the crewman both visually and audibly of low
suit pressure, battery voltage and of high C02 partial pres-
sure levels. If the C02 levels are sampled in a location
other than the helmet, such as in the Apollo EMU PLSS, then
an additional warning is required to alert the crewman that
the C02 level may be building up within the helmet due to
loss of ventilation flow (i.e.-a ventilation flow sensor).
_"_nefeasibl_z_y of ........... "'_"
also investigated based upon a C02 sensor similar in concept
to that of the Apollo PLSS. it was found that the sensor
element with a pre-amplifier is small enough (1 in. dia. x
3 in. long) to fit within the helmet. Its power requirements
are estimated to be less than 20 milliamps at 16 VDC. Place-
ment of a C02 sensor within the helmet is recommended for fur-
ther design study since it can decrease the complexity, power,
weight, volume and cost associated with the ventilation flow
sensor.
Visual Displays- Visual displays are required for checkout
of the PLSS and ELSS prior to EVA, to monitor critical sub-
system performance parameters during EVA, to monitor PLSS
consumables status during EVA, and as part of the warnings
system.
Pressure level displays are required for checkout of the PLSS
and ELSS high pressure 02 supply subsystems to establish
proper subsystem operations and consumables status prior to
EVA. A power supply check-out is also recommended since the
power supply is essential to certain PLSS functions includ-
ing CO2 and contaminant control, humidity control, thermal
control, warnings and communications.
Monitoring of critical subsystem performance parameters
during an EVA is required by the crewman to verify proper
system operation and expendables status. However, it is
desirable to minimize the amount of instrumentation to be
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7.5.3.1 Required Instrumentation - Continued
b. Visual Displ_ys - Continued
placed within the visual field of the EVA crewman since
it occupies the visual field which could be utilized for
accomplishing productive tasks, and also to minimize
system complexity. After a review of system operations,
it is recommended that visual displays for the crewman to
monitor during EVA should consist of suit pressure, battery
voltage and PLSS O3 supply pressure. The suit pressure
display provides verification of proper suit pressure
control which is a common function of both the primary and
emergency life support systems. The power supply voltage
display provides verification that the power supply is
functioning properly. This display could indicate degraded
battery or battery cell performance and should be appropri-
ately color coded to indicate unacceptable voltage levels.
Since the power supply performance (power output) is
dependent upon the type of power consuming devices, it may
be found that other displays such as an ammeter or watt-
meter would serve as a better indication of power supply
performance.
The crewman desires the capability to periodically check
status of system consumables to verify that the EVA tasks
can be completed during the scheduled time period. A visual
display of oxygen quantity has little design complexity when
compared to that of LiOH, power supply and water quantity
status. To minimize the design complexity, cost and number
of visual displays, it is recommended that a visual display
of oxygen quantity be required and that the consumables be
sized such that oxygen is the constraining consumable for
all normal operating modes.
The suit pressure and 02 quantity displays are also utilized
in conjunction with warning system activation for low suit
pressure. Firstly, a display of suit pressure is required
for the crewman to verify suit pressure level following a
low suit pressure warning. Secondly, a visual display of
02 supply pressure or quantity is necessary to determine
if the cause of the low suit pressure warning is a regulator
failure or depletion of the oxygen supply.
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7.5.3.2 Desirable Instrumentation
EVA instrumentation is desirable, but not absolutely mandatory,
for on board automatic monitoring of EVA performance and data
storage and transmittal to ground. On board automatic monitor-
ing provides the following benefits:
a. Redundancy for the crew-man's warning system.
b. Guidance and consultation in the event of a PLSS malfunction.
EVA performance data storage and transmittal to ground provides
the following benefits:
a. A basis for assessing ground maintenance requirements,
especially since ground checkout may not always reveal
problems associated with zero gravity.
be Operational data which could significantly reduce EVA equip-
ment _,,+ r_q,,_+_ _+-,_ _,,++i_ __ A _
detailed study effort is required to determine the true
impact on Shuttle equipment servicing.
Co A means for real-time anomaly assessment either during an
EVA or between EVA's. This capability contributed signi-
ficantly to the Apollo program.
Based upon the experience gained on past manned space programs,
plus that to be gained on Skylab, it is felt that telemetry of
biomedical data is not necessary for the Shuttle missions.
The Orbiter baseline includes the requirement to receive, display
and relay telemetry data. In accordance with our discussions
with North American Rockwell personnel, the addition of EVA tel-
emetry data does not adversely impact the Orbiter since the quan-
tity of EVA telemetry data is insignificant when compared to
Orbiter and payload requirements. The Orbiter capability to dis-
play EVA data can be utilized to provide an additional warning
capability to the Orbiter crew. For example, the system could
be used to alert the Orbiter crew when the PLSS oxygen quantity
reaches the level that EVA close-out operations should begin.
Similar use of the system can provide warnings of abnormal opera-
tions during EVA. These parameters could include high current
drain, low voltage, and abnormal thermal control system perfor-
mance.
This study identifies the recommended telemetry parameters to
be included in the EVA system. However, since there are three
viable candidates for the thermal control subsystem, a complete
listing cannot be made at this time.
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7.5.3.3 Summary"
A summary of the recommended instrumentation for warnings,
visual displays and telemetry is presented in Table 7-]-6.
PARAMETER
SUIT PRESSURE
PLSS 02 SUPPLY PRESSURE
CO 2 PARTIAL PRESSURE
POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE
POWER SUPPLY CURRENT
THERMAL CONTROL PERFORMANCE
ELSS 02 SUPPLY PRESSURE
ELSS 02 OUTLET PRESSURE
WARNI_G VISUAL T'_
DISPLAY
X X K
X X
X X
X x x
X
X
REMARKS
LOCATED IN VISUAL FIELD
DURING EVA
LOCATED IN VISUAL FIELD
DURING EVA
IF SENSOR IS NOT PLACED IN HELMET,
A VENT FLOW SENSOR IS ALSO REQUIRED
LOCATED IN VISUAL FIELD
DURING EVA
4 PARAMETERS ESTIMATED
NOT NECESSARY TO LOCATE IN
VISUAL FIELD DURINa EVA
TABLE 7--16 INSTRUMENTATION SUMMARY
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7.5.4 Thermal Models
Evaluation of orbit altitudes and inclination angles indicates
that it is possible to conduct EVA's with the majority of the
time exposed to direct sun. Re-orientation of the Orbiter can
place the EVA crewman such that he will be continually in the
shadow of the'spacecraft and exposed to cold conditions of
deep space. Thermal models for both the hot and cold environ-
ments are included in Figures 7-25 and 7-26. The surface temper-
atu_.es indicated _re NorthAmericanRock_ell estimates.
PAYLOAD
VIEW FACTORS
TO VEHICLE SURFACES 80%
TO SPACE 20%
VEHICLE AND. PAYLOAD SURFACE PROPERTIES
SOLAR ABSORBTIVITY 0.2
INFRARED EMISSIVITY 0.8
SURFACE TEMPERATURE + 200F
DURATION OF EXPOSURE 4 HOURS
FIGURE 7--25. THERMAL MODEL--HOT CASE
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7.5.1, Thermal Models - Continued
CREWMAN
PAYLOAD
ORBI TER
SUN
CREWMAN LOCATIONS
IN SHADOW OF ORBITER WITH NO VIEW FACTOR
TO EARTH OR ORBITER RADIATORS
VIEW FACTORS
TO DEEP SPACE 80%
TO VEHICLE AND PAYLOAD SURFACES 20%
VEHICLE AND PAYLOAD SURFACE PROPERTIES
SOLAR ABSORBTIVITY 0.2
INFRARED EMISSIVITY 0.8
SURFACE TEMPERATURE -250F
DURATION OF EXPOSURE 4 HOURS
FIGURE 7--26. THERMAL MODEL--COLD CASE
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7.5.5
7.5.5.1
Test Philoso_hF
This section presents an evaluation of PLSS ground acceptance
test requirements in order to evolve a test philosophy that
provides effective system verification. The objective of a
ground acceptance test program is to demonstrate that the hard-
ware is capable of meeting all requirements that can be imposed
upon it in the subsequent flights. This acceptance testing of
hardware must be such that it not only indicates performance
against "go/no-go" criteria, but also highlights any incipient
performance degradation which could cause flight anomalies.
Because of the Shuttle program's flight frequency, between-
flight testing must be held to a minimum of cost, time and
manpower.
PLSS ground acceptance testing consists of three basic
categories:
• Pre-Delivery Test Programs
• Pre-Flight Acceptance Testing
• Periodic Maintenance
The following paragraphs expand on these three categories.
Pre-Deliver_ Test Programs
The key to an effective pre-flight acceptance test lies in
a thorough knowledge of the equipment's life and performance
characteristics. This knowledge is gained in the overall
sense by the development and qualification phases, and in
particular, by the pre-delivery acceptance test of the
individual unit. Actual experience acquired during usage
further supplements the formal test program information.
The basic knowledge of the performance and life expectancy
of the total system and the individual components within it
is obtained during the development and qualification test
programs. Development testing is performed on equipment to
provide assurance that the item will meet its end use per-
formance and environmental requirements and will successfully
pass the qualification program. The development test program
consists of structural, functional and endurance testing
oriented primarily to support and extend the design program.
The more formal qualification test program demonstrates that
the hardware meets or exceeds all requirements of the system
specification and is thus suitable for its intended purpose.
The hardware to be tested are manufactured with production
tooling and from production drawings made subsequent to
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7.5.5.1
7.5.5.2
Pre-Deliver_ Test Program - Continued
completion of development testing. Two units are tested
during the qualification test program with one unit being
subjected to a program probing its performance endurance
limits, and the other to a structural limit program.
Full performance maps of all functional components are
obtained over a spectrum both within and outside nominal
specification ranges. Performance characteristics of all
components are obtained as a function of operational hours
or cycles, as appropriate.
Acceptance testing of production hardware prior to delivery
is an extensive program designed to:
a. Verify that the system, as assembled, functions to
specification requirements at both the component
and assembly levels.
b. Screen all components to eliminate any infant mortality.
Ce Establish a reliable baseline for monitoring of changes
in system performance during pre-flight checks and
flight usage.
The recommended test program would consist of the following
tests:
a. Drawing compliance and examination of product
b. Vibration (electronic and electrical assemblies)
c. Thermal cycling (electronic and electrical assemblies)
d. Proof pressure
e. Leakage
f. Performance
g. Weight
h. Examination of product
Pre-Fli6ht Acceptance Testing
During the pre-delivery production acceptance test program,
extensive testing is performed to demonstrate the total
capability of the hardware. In large measure, these tests
are made extensive in order to reduce field pre-flight
acceptance testing to a minimum. With a minimum time span
of approximately two weeks between flights, it is essential
that time utilization efficiency be maximized. On that basis,
all tests not essential to assurance that the system is
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7.5.5.2
7.5.5.3
7.5.6
Pre-Fli_ht Acceptance Testin 6 - Continued
capable of flight are eliminated and those tests that are
required are reduced to the minimum practical limit. The
proposed test sequence consists of:
a. Examination of product
b. Deactivation
c. Leakage
d. Functional
Following this test sequence, the system is ready for
recharging and vehicle stowage.
Periodic Maintenance
for any system that must have the overall life span of the
Shuttle Primary Life Support System. The frequency of this
maintenance will be defined by the results of the development
and qualification test programs and the monitoring of the
results of the pre-flight acceptance tests. Close monitoring
of performance is more than adequate to define the amount of
time remaining before a particular item needs maintenance.
The periodic maintenance is performed on the total system
at one time. Once maintenance is performed, the complete
production acceptance test defined above is performed to
verify that the system has been returned to a totally
acceptable condition.
System Life Requirements
Table 7-17 summarizes the life requirements of major items
of the EVA system and the rationale use to establish the
requirements.
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?.5.6 S_stem Life Requirements - Continued
ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
FREQUENCY OF FLIGHT 1 FLIGHT/WEEK BASED ON MARCH 21, 1972 TRAFFIC MODEL
NO. OF ORBITERS
NO. OF CREWS
EVA EQUIPMENT ASSIGNMENTS
PLSS & ELSS
PERSONAL EQUIP.
(PRESSURE SUIT, LCG & ETC.)
AVERAGE EVA TIME
EVA EQUIPMENT USEFUL LIFE
HARDWARE (PLSS & ELSS)
SOFT GOODS (PRESSURE SUIT,
LCG & ETC.)
OPERATIONAL EVA TIMES
PLSS
ELSS
SOFT GOODS
TEST TIMES
PLSS
ELSS
SOFT GOODS
TOTAL OPERATIONAL TIMES
PLSS
ELSS
SOFT GOODS
RECOMMENDED OPERATIONAL LIFE
REQUIREMENTS
PLSS
ELSS
SOFT GOODS
2 PER ORBITER
2 PER ORBITER
l PER CREWMAN
4 I/2 HOURS/
FLIGHT
15 YEARS MIN
YEARS MIN
600 HOURS
30 HOURS
95 HOURS
600 HOURS
30 HOURS
30 HOURS
1200 HOURS
60 HOURS
125 HOURS
6000 HOURS
300 HOURS
700 HOURS
CURRENT NASA PLANS
SIMILAR TO MILITARY USAGE OF BLUE
AND GOLD CREWS
TWO PLSS'S AND ELSS'S ARE ASSIGNED
TO EACH ORBITER
BASED ON 645 PLANNED EVA'S OF 4 HOURS
DURATION EACH PLUS PRE-EGRESS CHECK
OUT AND POST EVA OPERATIONS
SIMILAR TO ORBITER EC/LSS
CONSIDERED REASONABLE GOAL FOR
SUIT MATERIALS
BASED ON 4 I/2 HRS OPERATION EVERY
5 WEEKS FOR 12 YEAR PERIOD
CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE OF 15 MINUTE
USAGE ON EACH FLIGHT
BASED ON 4 I/2 HRS OF OOERATION EVERY
10 WEEKS OVER A 4 YEAR PERIOD
ASSUMED TO BE SAME AS EVA TIMES
ASSUMED TO BE SN.IEAS EVA TIMES
BASED ON l I/2 HRS OF TEST PRIOR TO
EACH FLIGHT
SUMMATION OF EVA TIMES AND TEST TIMES
SUMMATION OF EVA TIMES ANn TEST TIMES
SUMMATION OF EVA TIfIES AND TEST TIMES
A FACTOR OF 5 IS APPLIED TO TOTAL
OPERATIONAL TIME TO ACCOUNT FOR
VARIATION IN NUMBER OF EVA'S, POTEN-
TIAL REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF CREWS OR
ORBITERS AND TO ADD DESIGN MARGIN.
TABLE 7--17. EVA SYSTEM LIFE REQUIREMENTS
AND RATIONALE
7-52
Hamilton
Standard
U
DIVISK_N OI = U_IITED AImCAAF T C(_Rr_ATIO¢4
SP 01T73
Noncontaminating System Studies
General
As a result of the EVA/IVA task Identification and Analysis
effort described in Section 4.0 of this volume, it was deter-
mined that eighty-eight (88) of the total of 677 NASA and DOD
Shuttle flights will transport contamination sensitive pay-
loads. An analysis of these payloads indicated that an Apollo-
type EVA system using water as a thermal control subsystem
evaporant and having a suit gaseous leakage rate of lO0 scc/min
is a usable system for performing Shuttle EVA missions if the
instrumentation shields on the contamination sensitive pay-
loads are closed during EVA operations.
However, since the results of a strictly analytical study of
a complex subject such as contamination sensitivity is subject
to controversy, and since instrumentation shields can malfunc-
tion, Hamilton Standard evaluated the options available in the
area of noncontaminating EVA systems. There are three (3)
main categories of potential EVA system contaminants:
a. Water vapor exhausted from a PLSS expendable water thermal
control subsystem
b. Suit and PLSS gaseous leakage (02 + N2 + C02 + H20)
c. Particles
The most critical of the above three (B) categories, and the
one which is most easily eliminated is water vapor exhausted
from a PLSS expendable water thermal control subsystem. The
remainder of this section identifies and evaluates non-
contaminating thermal control subsystems that can be incor-
porated in or added onto the basic PLSS configuration. For
purposes of this evaluation, the contamination sensitive mission
requirements are specified in Table 7-18.
CONTAMINATION SENSITIVE MISSION REQUIREMENTS
EVA DURATION 3 HOURS
METABOLIC RATE I000 BTU/HR (AVERAGE)
DISTANCE FROM AIRLOCK I00 FEET
TABLE 7--18 CONTAMINATION SENSITIVE MISSION
REQUIREMENTS
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7.6.2 S_stems Evaluated
Table 7-19 presents a listing of the concepts identified and
evaluated as noncontaminating thermal control systems.
CONCEPTS
THERMAL STORAGE/ICE
REFERENCE PARAGRAPH
7.6.2.1
UMBILICAL TO ORBITER 7.6.2.2
ADSORPTION/RADIATOR 7.6.2.3
RADIATOR/HEAT PUMP 7.6.2.4
RADIATOR/HEAT PUMP/THERMAL STORAGE 7.6.2.5
TABLE 7--19. NONCONTAMINATING SYSTEMS EVALUATED
7.6.2.1 Thermal Storage/Ice
Figure 7-27 presents the thermal storage/ice system schematic.
PRIMARY
LIFE ICE CHEST
SUPPORT
SYSTEM
FIGURE 7--27 THERMAL STORAGF_JICE SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
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7.6.2.1 Thermal Storage/Ice - Continued
As can be seen from this schematic, ice, in contact with a
conductive surface, is utilized to provide cooling of the
LCG water and the ventilation loop. This heat exchanger
device is attached to the PLSS when no venting is allowed
and thus precludes the necessity of using the PLSS thermal
control system and its resulting water vapor exhaust.
A prime consideration in utilizing the ice chest is the
selection between a replaceable or regenerable chest.
Figure 7-28 presents a comparison between regenerative and
non-regenerative ice chests on a vehicle equivalent weight
basis.
600 -
5)0-
_J
_ 400-
300-
200 -
1O0
/
NO[;-R[.GENLRATIVL 1 I/Z IIUUR ICE CHLSTS
//RLGEilLRATIVL 1 I/2 flOUR ILl (:IIESIS
I I I I
2 3 -i 5
;,i}. ]r DUAL 3 IiOUF: E'.'AI Vf
FIGURE 7--28. COMPARISON OFREGENERATIVE &
NON--REGENERATIVE ICE CHEST
From this figure it can be seen that a regenerative ice chest
has a significant vehicle weight advantage when more than
one (1) EVA is required.
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7.6.2.1 Thermal Storage/Ice - Continued
Figure 7-29 presents a freezer system schematic that could
be utilized for regenerating the ice chest.
FREEZER
EXPANSION VALVE
COMPRESSOR
0
0
CONDENSOR
VEHICLE
COOLANT
FIGURE 7--29. FREEZER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
7.6.2.2 Umbilical to Orbiter
This concept, shown schematically in Figure 7-30, is an
umbilical PLSS and returns the liquid cooling loop flow
to the Shuttle for temperature conditioning.
VEHICLE
PRIMAR7
LIFE
SUPPORT
SYSTEM
FIGURE 7--30. UMBILICAL SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
An unattractive feature of this concept is the long um-
bilical required which encumbers the crewman and limits
his flexibility for task performance.
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7.6.2.3 Adsorption/Radiator
This concept, shown schematically in Figure 7-31, removes
the water exhaust from the PLSS expendable thermal control
subsystem and adsorbs it.
SHUT-OFF VALVE__r •PRIMARYLIFE
f'l I I'_ n _ n-i-
SYSTEM
EXPENDABLETHERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM_EXHAUSTPOR_T
_L_RADIATO R " :ii
FIGURE 7--3 I. ADSORPTION/RADIATOR SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
The heat resulting from this adsorption is then radiated to
space. This concept is an add-on to the PLSS and allows use
of the PLSS thermal control subsystem.
/
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7.6.2.4 Radiator/Heat Pump
This concept is schematically presented in Figure 7-32.
RADIATOR---/
EXPANSION VALVE--7 /
_RI.ARYI II I I
LI_E I II "I I
soPPOR_I 11 I I
----, = q,
FREON/WATERHEATEXCHANGER" --COMPRESSOR
FIGURE 7--32. RADIATOR/I-EAT PUMP SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
As can be seen from this schematic, a freon/water heat
exchanger is utilized to provide LCG and ventilating loop
cooling in place of the PLSS thermal control subsystem.
A radiator is employed for heat transfer to the ambient.
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7.6.2.5 Radiator/Heat Pump/Thermal Storage
This concept, shown in Figure 7-33, is similar to the
preceding radiator/heat pump concept except a thermal
storage unit is employed to minimize the heat load trans-
mitted to the radiator. Thus the radiator size can be
reduced by designing for average rather than peak loads.
SP 01T73
RADIATOR
EXPANSIO_CVALVE --7
DISCONNEC_ __ _ ,..__
v__11 _,_
PRIMARY
LIFE
SUPPORT
SYSTEM __
/
FREON/WATERHEAT EXCHANGER j
WITH THERMAL STORAGEUNIT--
FIGURE 7--33. RADIATOR/I-EAT PUM P/THERMAL
STORAGE SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
Concept Evaluation
Based on a preliminary evaluation, all the radiator concepts
were eliminated as they require surface areas of 12 to 17 sq.
ft. which is considered impractical for an EVA system. Thus,
the viable noncontaminating system concept are reduced to:
• Thermal Storage/Ice
• Umbilical to Orbiter
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7.6.9 Concept Evaluation - Continued
Figure 7-3_ presents a comparison between these concepts on
a PLSS and vehicle weight and volume basis.
A. 100 FT HzO UI'IBILICAL
R. TWO 1 1/2 HR ICE CHESTS/MAN/EVA USED SEQUENTIALLY.
z 4,
_'_ 6°t _ I I _,_ 3-
. 40 _= 2
o o
z
200-
150-
1OO-
so-
==> o
40'
B __,
_,_ 20"
JA
=B
I I ! I O I I !
2 3 4 2 3 4
NO. OF DUAL EVA 140. OF DUAL EVA
FIGURE 7--34. WEIGHT & VOLUME COMPARISON'
These curves are somewhat inconclusive since the concept
with the minimum PLSS weight penalty results in the maxi-
mum weight penalty for the Orbiter.
Table 7-20 presents a more comprehensive comparison of a
self-contained ice chest and a water umbilical as an
alternative to using expendable water for heat rejection.
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The same factors that were used to 'select the basic PLSS
for noncontamination sensitive flights are applied in this
table.
FACTOR _TER UMBILICAL
WEIGHT - SUBSYSTEM (ONE CREWMAN} I04LBS
- VEHICLE (ONE DUAL EVA) 211 LBS
VOLUME - SUBSYSTEM (ONE CREWMAN) Z790CU. IN.
- VEHICLE (ONE DUAL EVA) 38,200 CU. IN,
RELATIVE COST 1.0 "
OPERATING LIFE & MAINTAINABILITY SLIGHTLY BETTER DUE
TO SIMPLICITY
VEHICLE SCAR REQUIRES COOLANT
DEVELOPMENT RISK LOW
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
STORAGE
- EASE
- INTERFACE
DONNING/DOFFING EASE
CHECKOUT
TRANSLATION - UMBILICAL/TETHER
MANAGEMENT
TASK EXECUTION
RECHARGE
COMPATIBILITY WITH MANIPULATOR
ASSISTED TASKS
EQUIVALENT
AIRLOCX
SIMPLE
EQUIVALENT
COMPLEX
LEAST EFFICIENT - RIGID
ADHERENCE TO PREPLANNED
SEQUENCE - SLIGHT FORCE
AND MOMENT GON_T_AINT .
NOT REQUIRED
FAIR
PLS$ WITH:
TWO I I/2 HOUR
ICE CHESTS/EVA
93 LBS
288 LBS
444G MIN
16,900 MIN
1.04
• GOOD
REQUIRES COOLANT"
AND POWER
GREATER (REFLECTED
T_I,r_CT_
EQUIVALENT (FREEZER
•PAYLOAD BAY CONTAINS FREON)
MORE COMPLEX
MORE COMPLEX
SIMPLER
MORE EFFICIENT - GREATEST
LATITUDE FOR CHANGE IN TASK
PLAN - COMPLETE FREEDOM - MORE
ON BACK MASS AND VOLUME
SIMPLE
EXCELLENT
TABLE 7--20 NONCONTAMINATING SYSTEMS COMPARISON
As can be seen in this table, the ice chest approach imposes
the greatest weight impact on the vehicle, costs more, has
greater development risk, does not lend itself to check-out
and requires refreezing between EVA's. It does, however,
provide the greatest flexibility for task execution as it
does not require a cumbersome umbilical and does not limit
the cre_unanto specific transfer routes.
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?.6.4
7.7
Noncontaminating S[stem Selection
Based on the preceding evaluation, it appears that a liquid
cooling loop umbilical is the most desirable concept for
incorporation into the PLSS for contamination sensitive EVA
missions. The umbilical system has minimum overall impact
on the Shuttle as it offers the lightest weight and smallest
on-the-back volume, is simpler, and presents minimal develop-
ment risk. The ice chest, however, is not eliminated at this
Juncture because of the potential management problems with
the umbilical system. Pending resolution of development
risks, the ice chest approach could still be very competitive.
Conclusions
Based on the results of the PLSS system and subsystem studies,
it is concluded that the Primary Life Support System, as
described in Table 7-21, be used for the Space Shuttle Program.
SYSTEM TYPE CLOSED LOOP SELF CONTAINED
02 SUPPLY 900 PSIA GASEOUS OXYGEN
CO2 CONTROL LiOH REPLACEABLE CARTRIDGE
CONTAMINANT CONTROL ACTIVATED CHARCOAL
THERMAL CONTROL
BASIC SYSTEM EXPENDABLE WATER
NONVENTING MODES WATER UMBILICAL
HUMIDITY CONTROL CONDENSING HEAT EXCHANGER
WITH ELBOW TYPE WATER
SEPARATOR
PRIME MOVERS ELECTRICALLY DRIVEN
POWER RECHARGEABLE SILVER-ZINC BATTERY
COMMUNICATIONS RF DUPLEX SYSTEM WITH TELEMETRY
OF PERFORMANCE DATA
TABLE 7--21, SHUTTLE PLSS DESCRIPTION
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T.T Conclusions - Continued
System integration studies performed as part of the PLSS
effort provided additional system requirements as summarized
in Table 7-22.
CONFIGURATION PHYSICAL INTEGRATION OF
ELSS AND PLSS
COMMUNICATION RF DUPLEX SYSTEM WITH ORBITER
RELAY
WARNINGS
INSTRUMENTATION
VISUAL DISPLAYS
TELEMETRY DATA
LOW SUIT PRESSURE
HIGH CO2 PARTIAL PRESSURE
SUIT PRESSURE
_l _C _ Clln_l V nn_ccir_P
i_ u _urr,LI F_L_JU_L
POWER _UPPLY VOLTAGE
ELSS 02 SUPPLY PRESSURE
ELSS REGULATED 0 2 PRESSURE
SUIT PRESSURE
PLSS 02 SUPPLY PRESSURE
CO2 PARTIAL PRESSURE
POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE
POWER SUPPLY CURRENT
THERMAL CONTROL PERFORMANCE
TABLE 7--22. ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS
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SECTION 8.0
EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
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8.0
8.1
8.1.1
EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
General
The primary function of the Emergency Life Support System
(ELSS) is to provide emergency life support to a suited
crewman in the event of a malfunction of his PLSS or suit.
Such a provision is required to ensure the safe return of
an EVA astronaut to the Shuttle Orbiter.
This section presents the results of the ELSS requirements
definition effort. Various candidate emergency system
concepts are evaluated to determine the most desirable
approach. The concepts considered include open loop,
semi-open loop, semi-closed loop and closed loop systems.
The following sections present the results of this defini-
tion and evaluation effort.
Evaluation Criteria
__e determination of the evaluation criteria is based on
the recognition that some requirements are absolute while
others are comparative. The absolute criteria define the
minimum acceptable requirements for a concept. If a con-
cept does not meet all of the absolute criteria, it is
eliminated. The absolute criteria are listed as follows:
a. Performance
All concepts must be capable of meeting the entire
performance spectrum.
b. Safety
Safety of each concept is evaluated to determine if there
are any hazards present which cannot be eliminated. If
any serious problems are discovered which cannot be
reaaonablyavoided, the concept is eliminated.
c. AvailabilitE
Availability is a measure of the probability of a con-
cept being fully operational within the required time
period (following reasonable development effort).
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8.1.1
8.1.2
8.1.3
Evaluation Criteria - Continued
The comparative criteria are the principal evaluation areas
for all concepts that pass the absolute criteria require-
ments. Comparative criteria are listed as follows:
a. ELSS Weight
ELSS weight consists of all ELSS equipment with which
the crewman must egress from the vehicle.
b. ELSS Volume
ELSS volume is a volumetric measure of 8.1.1a.
c. Operabilit F
Operability is a measure of the concept's ability to be
simply used as emergency requirements demand rapid
activation.
d. Cost
Cost consists of both Shuttle program and ELSS program
recurring and nonrecurring costs.
Emergency Life Support System Stud_ Groundrules
The following groundrules were utilized in identifying and
evaluating ELSS candidates:
a. The ELSS shall be functionally independent of the PLSS
and its operational duration shall be sufficient to
permit a safe return to the Shuttle Orbiter.
b. Emergency life support equipment is not required to be
rechargeable in flight.
Emergency Life Support System Requirements
Studies presented previously (Section 4.2.7) have indicated
that a fifteen (15) minute emergency system is required to
provide sufficient time for return to the Shuttle following
a failure involving the EVA system. General performance
requirements are listed in Table 8-1.
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8.1.3 Emergency Life Support STstem Requirements - Continued
MISSION DURATION 15 MINUTES
METABOLIC LOAD 1600 BTU/HR
HEAT LEAK
SUIT PRESSURE CONTROL
HUMIDITY CONTROL
CO2 CONTROL
THERMAL CONTROL
200 BTU/HR
8.2 + .2 PSIA
SUIT INLET DEWPOINT
LESS THAN 50°F
7.6 Hi,i HG bIAXIb;UMINSPIRED
LIMIT CREWMANHEAT STORAGE
TO 300 BTU
TA=,9,.I =" 8--!. ELSS PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
8.2
8.2.1
System Studies
ELSS Candidates
The specific life support functions required for an ELSS are
depicted in Figure 8-1.
COO<:C_ NLTAM INANT _ i .... /" /'"
:......#/
THER%IAL !
CONTROL I
HU_4 IDIT Y ]
CONTROL
(VISOR DEFOG)
FIGURE 8--1. ELSS FUNCTIONS
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8.2.1 ELSS Candidates - Continued
Based on the functional requirements presented above, the
following systems were selected for evaluation to determine
the most desirable ELSS approach.
a. OPEN LOOP - 6000 PSIA 02 SUPPLY
b.
C.
SEMI-0PEN LOOP - 6000 PSIA 02 SUPPLY
SEMI-CLOSED LOOP SYSTEM - 6000 PSIA 02 + Li0H
d. CLOSED LOOP
i) 6000 PSIA 02 + Li0H
2) 6000 PSIA 02 + Li202
3) K02
8.2.1.1
Note that the concepts utilizing high pressure gaseous storage
all have a storage pressure of 6000 psia. An ELSS bottle pres-
sure trade-off study was conducted and the detail results are
presented in Appendix D, Volume II.
The following sections present the methodolgy involved in
each candidate's selection as well as a system description
and schematic for each concept.
Open Loop - 6000 psia 02 Supply
This system was selected as it is the simplest approach to
an ELSS and has successfully been employed on past programs
(Apollo and Skylab). Simplicity is achieved by utilizing
a constant purge flow of oxygen to provide the required 09
supply, and C02 and contaminant control. Figure 8-2
schematically illustrates the operational concept for this
system.
_REGULATOR \
PURGE
_ALVE
FIGURE 8--2. OPEN LOOP--6000 PSIA 02 SUPPLY SCHEMATIC
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8.2.1.1
8.2.1.2
Open Loop - 6000 psia 02 Supply - Continued
From this schematic, it can be seen that oxygen is drawn from
a 6000 psia storage tank through a downstream pressure regu-
lator which maintains the suit at 8 psi. A purge valve in
the suit wall establishes the flow required to properly exhaust
CO from the helmet. A thermal control subsystem is not
required with this concept. The total heat load is 475 Btu's
for 15 minutes at an average metabolic load of 1600 Btu/hr and
an inward thermal heat leak of BOO Btu/hr. For a 4 cfm, 8 psia
purge system with an inlet gas temperature of 50°F, 12 Btu of
sensible heat load is dissipated. Assuming 100% drying effi-
ciency, 180 Btu's of latent heat are also dissipated. This
leaves a net of 283 Btu's (475 - 180 - 12) which is within the
thermal storage capability of the crewman.
An unattractive feature of this concept is the relatively large
amount of oxygen dumped overboard. The large flow capacity of
this device, however, is a significant advantage if suit leakage
demands large flows to maintain pressure.
Semi-0pen Loop - 6000 psia 09 Supply
In an effort to reduce the amount of oxygen utilized in the open
loop concept, a semi-open loop concept was selected for evalua-
tion. The amount of oxygen dumped overboard is reduced by adding
an ejector to provide recirculation in accordance with the high
helmet flow requirements. Only the oxygen required for C02 and
contaminant control and ejector operation is dumped. This system
is schematically depicted in Figure 8-3.
.
FIGURE 8--3. SEMI--OPEN LOOP_6000 PSIA 02 SUPPLY SCHEMATIC
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8.2.1.2
8.2.1.3
Semi-O_en Loop - 6000 psia 0p Supply - Continued
Oxygen is supplied from a high pressure gas bottle through a
downstream pressure regulator and finally into the primary
nozzle of an ejector which determines the rate of fresh 02
flow. This primary flow induces suit ventilation flow through
the venturi of the ejector. A pressure control valve is
utilized to maintain suit pressure by relieving overboard.
A thermal control subsystem is not required for similar reasons
as those presented for the open loop concept, Section 8.2.1.1.
Semi-Closed Loop - 6000 psia 02 Supply and Li0H
In order to reduce the oxygen required still further, a semi-
closed loop with active thermal/humidity, C02 and contaminant
control was investigated. This approach requires increased
ejector performance in order to conserve the oxygen dumped.
This semi-closed system is shown schematically in Figure 8-4.
HUMIDITY
THERMAL CONTROl'
It
CO2/CON
PRESSURE CONTROL _j_
FIGURE 8--4. SEMI--CLOSED LOOP--6000 PSIA 02 SUPPLY
AND L, OH SCHEMATIC
Oxygen is supplied from a high pressure storage kottle through
a downstream pressure regulator to the ejector loop for metabolic
02 consumption and ejector requirements. The ejector circulates
oxygen through the suit and ELSS where humidity, thermal, C02
and contaminant control is provided by active subsystems. A
pressure relief valve maintains the suit loop pressure by exhaust-
ing to ambient. This concept requires isolation during normal
operation of the PLSS to preclude unnecessary consumption of Li0H.
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8.2.1.4 Closed Loop - 6000 psia 02 and LiOH
To further reduce oxygen storage requirements, a closed loop
system utilizing a fan for circulation was studied. This
system, schematically presented in Figure 8-5,requires
electrical power to drive the fan instead of oxygen to
drive the ejector as in preceeding concepts. Thus, no
overboard dump is required.
FIGURE 8--5. CLOSED LOOP--6000 PSIA 02 SUPPLY & L|OH SCHEMATIC
The fan circulates oxygen through the suit and ELSS which
contains provisions for thermal, humidity, and contaminant
control. LiOH is incorporated for control of CO2. Isolation
provisions are again required for this concept during opera-
tion of the PLSS to conserve the ELSS C02 removal capability.
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8.2.1.5 Closed Loop - 6000 psia 05 Supply and Li202
This system, shown schematically in Figure 8-6, is the same as
the closed loop system previously presented except lithium
peroxide (Li202) replaces lithium hydroxide (LiOH) for CO 2
removal.
CONTROL'x4w__
CO2/CONTAMINANT CONTROL
I I
FIGURE 8--6. CLOSED LOOP--6000 PSIA O 2 SUPPLY
AND L, OH SCHEMATIC
In addition to removing C02, Li202 also generates
02, thus reducing the amount of 02 that must be stored in the
high pressure bottle.
8.2.1.6 Closed Loop - K02 Solid Chemical 02 Supply and C02 Removal
This concept, shown schematically in Figure 8-7, utilizes K02
which has the dual capacity to remove C02 and release all
required oxygen. Thus no oxygen supply tankage is necessary.
CONTROL _ I I
CO2/CONTAMINANT CONTROL _
AND SOLID CHEMICAL
0 2 GENERATOR
FIGURE 8--7. CLOSED LOOP--KO 2 SUPPLY & CO 2 REMOVAL SCHEMATIC
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8.2.2
8.2.2.1
Closed Loop - KO 2 Solid Chemical 02 Supply and CO 2 Removal -
Continued
As can be seen from this schematic, a fan is utilized for
circulation through the suit, the K02 and the thermal/humidity
control provision. A distinct disadvantage associated with
this concept is its limited 02 supply capability making it
impossible to handle any excessive suit leakage condition which
might occur.
ELSS Evaluation
All of the ELSS concepts presented in Section 8.2.1 meet the
absolute criteria of Section 8.1.1 for performance, safety
and availability. The following sections present a compari-
sion of these concepts in terms of the comparative criteria
of weight, volume, operability and cost.
_T..q._ W=='t n-l_+
Figure 8-8 presents a weight comparison between the ELSS can-
didates as a function of mission duration.
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FIGURE 8--8. ELSS CONCEPTS WEIGHT COMPARISON ,
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8.2.2.1
8.2.2.2
8.2.2.3
ELSS Wei6ht - Continued
The weights indicated in this curve are for components only.
Packaging hardware was not included since the ELSS may be
integral with the Primary Life Support System. From this
curve it can be seen that for a fifteen (15) minute capacity,
all the systems evaluated weigh approximately the same,
although the closed and semi-closed loop systems are
slightly heavier.
ELSS Volume
Figure 8-9 presents the volumes for the ELSS concepts studied
as a function of mission duration.
for the components only.
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FIGURE 8--9. ELSS CONCEPTS VOLUME COMPARISON
From this graph it can be seen that the volume of the closed
loop systems are significantly higher than for the other sys-
tems analyzed.
O_erability
Comparing the operability of these systems, the open loop
system is the least complex and easiest to activate. The
closed, semi-closed, and semi-open loop systems requirepre-
egress check out of all functions by additional instrumentation
and are more complex than the open loop system.
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8.2.2.4 Cost
8.2.2.5
8.3
Since all the concepts studied are within the state-of-the-art,
cost variances are primarily a function of the complexity
differences with no significant development problems and
risks. As such, the open loop system being the simplest is
also the cheapest. The closed and semi-closed loop systems
are the most complex and consequently the most expensive.
Concept Selection
Based on the preceeding evaluation, the open loop system is
recommended for Shuttle ELSS applications. A summary of
the reasons for this selection follows:
• Competitive on a weight and volume basis
• Least complex
• Simple pre-egress check out of all functions
• Lowest cost
• Not flow limited and can thus handle a greater variety of
suit leakage conditions.
• Does not require isolation during PLSS operation
Conclusions
An open loop ELSS was selected for Shuttle EVA applications.
This was the simplest and cheapest system evaluated and con-
sisted of a regulated oxygen purge through the suit from a
high pressure bottle. The adequacy of this concept has
previously been demonstrated on the Apollo and Skylab Programs.
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SECTION 9.0
PRESSURE SUIT ASSEMBLY
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9.2
9.2.1
9.2.2
9.2.3
PRESSURE SUIT ASSEMBLY
General
This section summarizes a study to define requirements for the
EVA Pressure Suit Assembly. To obtain this information, it
was necessary to survey space suit technology, to identify state-
of-the-art concepts and problems, and to obtain data and other
test and usage experience relevant to the Space Shuttle EVA/IVA
Requirements Study. Within this section, system level require-
ments and their impact upon existing suit technology are dis-
cussed first. The second part reviews suit components currently
available or under development for applicability to the EV
suit. In addition, a final section reviews emergency IV suit
requirements.
The potential use of female crewmembers was not considered in
this study.. However, the only area of the study that would be
impacted by their use would be the suit sizing schedule and
the waste ......... + ....
Suit System Study
General
Presented within this section are the basic system level re-
quirements for the pressure suit. Existing suit technology
is evaluated against each requirement and, where developments
beyond the state-of-the-art are required, the magnitude of such
improvement is discussed.
Pressure Level
The impact of operating pressure level upon the suit is dis-
cussed in detail in Section 6. Accordingly, no further
discussion will be presented here. All other parameters eval-
uated and discussed in this Section 9 assumed a suit pressure
level of 8.0 psi.
Mobility
The primary impact upon extravehicular astronaut performance
comes from suit mobility. Mobility is a measure of the
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9.2.3 Mobility - Continued
suited crewman's ability to perform useful tasks. It
quantitatively measured in terms of range and torque.
is
u
ABDUCTION
ADOUCTION
EXTENSION
FLEXION
LATERAL
M ED IA L
PRONATION
SUPINATION
ROTATION
O
W
N
DEFINITIONS
AWAY FROM X--Z PLANE IN X--Y PLANE
TOWARD X--Z PLANE IN X--Y PLANE
STRAIGHTENING OR INCREASING ANGLE BETWEEN BODY PARTS
BENDING OR DECREASING ANGLE BETWEEN BODY PARTS
AWAY FROM X--Z PLANE IN Y--Z PLANE
TOWARD X--Z PLANE IN Y--Z Pt.ANE
FACE DOWN
FACE UPOR ON BACK
REVOLVING ABOUT THE AXIS OF" A BODY PART
FIGURE 9--1 PLANES & DIRECTIONS OF MOTION
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9.2.3 Mobility - Continued
In Section h.2.9, a detailed analysis was performed of the actual
movement ranges involved in various activities to be performed by
an extravehicular crewman. From this analysis, the suit mobility
requirements were developed m_d compared with those contained in
the Statement of Work of the June 20, 1972 Request for Proposal
on an 8.0 psi Orbital EVA Space Suit Assembly. It was concluded
that all mobility design goals specified in the Statement of Work
are adequate for the anticipated movements. It must be noted,
however, that it is customary to measure mobility performance on
an unoccupied suit and, therefore, the actual mobility achieved
by the suited astronaut is not necessarily the same. The complete
range of suit mobility design goals for the Shuttle EVA missions
are presented in Figures 9-2, 9-3, 9-h and 9-5 for the shoulder,
arm, hip and leg Joints respectively.
_J
<
NOTE: BACK RIGID SHOULDER
IS ALLOWED TO ROTATE.
ADD UCTION/ABDUCTION
..p - /
-,' t / 50
LATERAL/MEDIAL
160° I "._i 'X
 ×.ON/E×TEN ,O.
140°_ -- NEUTRAL
NAGITA L PLANE
.J
ROTATION
LATERAL/MEDIAL
./
FIGURE 9--2 SHOULDER MOBILITY
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9.2.3 Mobility - Continued
J
ELBOW
FLEXION--EXTENSION
56 ° 57 °
WRIST ADDUCTION/
ABDUCTION
FOREARM SUPINATION (PALMS UP)
AND PRONATION (PALMS DOWN)
NOTE: NEUTRAL IS PALM
PERPENDICULAR TO FLOOR
WITH THUMB VERTICALLY UP
WRIST
F LEXON/EXTENSION
(FORWARD/BACKWARD)
FIGURE 9"-3 ARM JOINT MOBILITY
HIP ADDUCTION
(LEG STRAIGHT)
f_5 ° ,_15_
HIP ADDUCTION
ABDUCTION
(HIP BENT)
FIGURE 9--4
HIP ROTATION HIP
(SITTING) EXTENSION/FLEXION
HIP MOBILITY
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9.2.3 Mobilit 7 - Continued
.J .-
I- 1 10 °
,
KNEE FLEXION
(STANDING)
i\
i i
I
i
i
Jj •
J %k
ANKLE
hAL
KNEE FLEXION
(KNEELING)
I
_P"_"45° ,/
/
EXTENSION/FLEXION
ROTATION
_'-,-._ 20 o
ANKLE
ADDUCTION/ABDUCTION
FIGURE 9"--5 LEG JOINT MOBILITY
i ¸"
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9.2.3 Mobility - Continued
No mobility requirements are given for the neck Joint since
the results of this study indicate that the nodding motion
which is required on the A71-B suit is not necessary when a
hemispherical bubble helmet is used. Similarly, no require-
ments are give_ for waist mobility since this form of motion
is desirable but not considered essential for Shuttle EVA.
As stated earlier in this section, a complete mobility require-
ment consists of both a range of movement and a force required
to achieve that movement. For the Shuttle EV Suit, the actuating
torque requirements for the various Joints are as defined in
Table 9-1. These requirements were derived from analysis of
the tasks required and basic anthropometric data.
JOINT MOVEMENT TORQUE
..
Shoulder Adduction/Abduction
Lateral/Medial
Flexion/Ext_nsion
Rotation
l.O Foot-pound
1.0 Foot-pound
1.0 Foot-pound
O.l Foot-pound
Elbow All 1.0 Foot-pound
Wrist 0.I Foot-poundAll
Finger
Thumb
Glove 1.0 Inch-pound
2.0 Inch-pound
Hip All 1.0 Foot-pound
Knee Standing Flexion 1.0 Foot-pound
Kneeling Flexion 2.0 Foot-pound
Ankle All l.O Foot-pound
TABLE 9--1 SUIT JOINT ACTUATION TORQUES
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9.2.3
9.2.4
9.2.4.1
Mobility - Continued
In terms of mobility alone, the A7L-B suit is unacceptable for
the Shuttle EV application. At the required pressure level the
energy necessary to move the suit itself is prohibitive (in fact,
some Joints cannot be moved at all at 8.0 psi). To achieve the
required torque values, it is necessary to use the constant
volume concepts (such as the stovepipe) for certain Joints. These
Joints utilize bearings in the critical planes of motion. Joints
of this type are currently under development and are discussed in
Section 9.3.2.
Wei6ht and Stowa6e Volume
Weight
The previously mentioned Statement of Work for the 8.0 psi
Orbital EVA Space Suit Assembly specifies a design goal maximum
dry weight of h0 pounds for the comp!ete su_t excluding the
Integrated Thermal Meteoroid Garment. In assessing this require-
ment, actual weights of current suit assemblies were obtained.
These are presented in Table 9-2.
SUIT
COMPONENT
Torso Limb Assembly
Thermal Meteoroid Garment
Helmet
APOLLO
A7L-B TARGET AAES LAES
33.6047.18" 35.70 42.00
- 18.00 16.50 15.00
2.71 2.12 2.15 2.50
5.68 3.57 4,00Visor Assembly 4.40
Liquid Cooling Garment 4.60 4.40 4.60 4.60
Fecal Collection System 0.50 0.34 0.50 0.50
Urine Collection System
Gloves
0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
2.99 2.40 2.40 2.40
0.42
0.21
0.45 0.42Electrical Harness 0,42
Bio-medical Harness 0.21 0.21 0.21
Relief Valve 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Purge Valve 0.55 0.55 055 0.55
65.50 73.99TOTAL 68.40
*This weiaht includes the Intearated Thermal Meteoroid Garment.
64.84
TABLE 9--2 CURRENT SUIT WEIGHTS
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9.2.4.1
9.2.4.2
The ATL-B suit has been shown to be unacceptable for the
Shuttle EV application from a mobility standpoint. To a
large extent the Shuttle suit will have to utilize the Joints
uned on the AES's to achieve the mobility requirements.
Allowing approximately 15 pounds for the I_G, the total EV
suit weight is expected to be approximately 15 pounds over
the design goal based on the use of a soft body suit. The
suit weight would increase approximately two pounds beyond
that level if a combination suit construction were used in-
stead of a soft suit and approximately five pounds if a hard
suit were used.
Stowa6e Volume
The 8.0 psi Orbital EVA Space Suit Assembly Statement of Work
establishes a stowage volume design goal of 6.0 cubic feet.
The Apollo A7L-B suit can be stowed in a 5.0 cubic foot
volume and the LAES could be stowed in a 10.15 cubic foot
volume. Since the basic configuration of the Shuttle suit
is expected to be closer to the A7L-B than to the LAES, it
should be possible to meet the stowage design goal. The
maximum stowage volume would be required by a hard suit and
would be approximately ll.O Cubic feet.
Life
Useful Life
Based upon an analysis of flight frequency, crew utilization,
interchangeability of suits between crewmembers and suit
materials capability, a useful life requirement of four (4)
years after delivery and testing has been established. During
this four year period, the suit would be used approximately
125 hours. In the Orbital EVA Suit Statement of Work, the
service life design goal is specified as 50 EVA missions of
6 hours each over a one year period. The one year period can
be increased as any suit designed and fabricated for the
Shuttle EVA should be able to meet the four year useful life.
Neoprene rubber which is used in molded Joints and dipped
fabrics has a life span of five years by military standards
and typifies the limitations imposed on soft goods. The other
requirement, for 300 EVA hours within the useful life period,
is conservative. Based upon the analysis made in this study,
it is more likely that total suit or suit component would be
exposed to 95.EVA hours during its useful life.
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9.2.5.2 C[clic Life
The establishment of a cyclic life requirement presents a
more complex problem than does the service life require-
ment. First, it is difficult to forecast the precise number
of flexures that will occur in a particular Joint during any
given EVA. Secondly, as shown in Section 4.2.9, the bulk
of the anticipated motions occur over a smaller range than
the entire cyclic range specified for the Joint. However,
based on the work to be performed on a typical EVA mission
and considering the previously established service life, a
cyclic life requirement of 100,000 flexures per Joint was
established. This requirement is the same as the design
goal given in the Orbital EVA Suit Statement of Work. Exist-
ing suit component data were reviewed to evaluate the poten-
tial for meeting this 100,O00 cycle requirement. The
available data are presented in Table 9-3.
JOINT TYPE
• Stovepipe
APPLICATION
AAES Shoulder
CYCLICTEST EXPERIENCE
450,000rotary;some spalling,
torqueand leakageincreased.
•Rolling Convolute LAES Shoulder 120,000axial,I00,000rotary;
minorDivotwear.
oMoldedConvolute A7L-BShoulder 56,000;sliqhtabrasion
• Convolute LAES Elbow I00,000;delamination,pivotwear
• Convolute ScottJoint lO0,O00;no failure
• Convolute LAES Knee 109,859;pivotwore through
• Convolute A7L-BKnee 700; root tapes slipped
• Convolute LAES Ankle I00,000;some pivotwear
• TuckedFabric SAC Knee 255,000;developedleakaqe.
TABLE 9--3 JOINT CYC'LIC LIFE
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9.2.5.2
9.2.6
Cyclic Life - Continued
Frc_ this limited test data it can be projected that the
cyclic life requirement is practical, depending upon the
selection of particular Joint types. However, since the
majority of thes_ tests were not conducted to failure, the
results are insufficient to allow projection of the margin
by which actual performance will exceed the requirement.
Leakage
The design goal maximum EV suit leakage established by the
suit Statement of Work is 400 scc per minute at 8.0 psig
(relative to atmospheric pressure) upon delivery to NASA.
Over the design service life, this leakage rate is allowed
to increase to an absolute maximum of lO00 scc per minute.
Both of these goals are considered low considering total
mission requirements.
No empirical data for total suits at 8.0 psia exists, so
assessment of the requirement must be extrapolation.
Assuming that the final suit will use closure rings rather
than zippers (which are the primary source of leakage on
the ATL-B suit) a reasonable approximation of the leakage
rate can be obtained by extrapolation of leakage data for
the flight qualified ATL-B suit wrist lip seals. This
calculation indicates a total suit leakage rate of 85 scc
per minute or less at 8.0 psia. This extrapolation then
tends to indicate that the established leakage requirement
is one that the production suits can meet. It should be
noted that severe leakage problems have been experienced
during suit development phases; for example, the stovepipe
shoulder Joint on the AAES had a leakage rate in excess of
1000 scc per minute at 3.7 psig due to distortion of a
bearing. However, as discussed later (see 9.3.2.1.1)
solutions do exist for these leakage problems.
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9.2.7.2
Suit Sizin_ Schedule
Purpo se
One of the most critical factors in achieving maximum mobil-
ity and comfort in a suit is the extent of custom sizing.
Independent of all other considerations, the greater the degree
of personalized fit provided, the greater is the mobility and
overall performance efficiency of the man-suit system. How-
ever, on the Shuttle Program it is desirable to reduce the
amount of customized hardware to the absolute minimum. Exper-
ience indicates that it should be possible to develop a suit
sizing schedule such that selected "off-the-shelf" components
could be assemblied into one unit for a particular crewman and
thus provide the maximum possible mobility and comfort. These
suit components (such as shoulder, upper torso, gloves, etc. )
would each incorporate a degree of personal adjustment in
certain critical anatomical dimensions. This personal adjust-
ment capability could be as simple as a lacing cord-restraint
section located at strategic points within the component.
A detailed sizing schedule would be evolved from detailed
analysis of anthropometric data. Data typical of that evalu-
ated during this study is presented for the glove, shoulder
and boot in Table 9-h on the next page. Of all body areas
studied, these three represent the most critical from a sizing
standpoint.
Sizin_ Schedule
As Figure 9 - 6 shows, it is expected that the number of
sizes of each component can be reduced to a maximum of three
with the exception of the gloves. This is felt to be the
optimum attainable. There are three specific areas where
considerable effort will be required to provide component
type suits that will satisfy all Shuttle mission requirements.
These are, in order of criticality, the glove, the boot and
the shoulder. The glove is undoubtedly the most critical
area requiring optimum fit or adjustment capability. Elonga-
tion and ballooning of the fingers and ballooning of the palm
are major causes of mobility-tactibility-dexterity loss. These
parameters can be controlled only through proper sizing of the
associated patterns and a significant degree of final fit
adjustment. At present there is no program which provides
pressure gloves of the required type using a standard DOD
procurement schedule (6-8-12 sizes). Table 9 - h clearly
demonstrates this need for vernier adjustment capability
in the gloves. The boot is critical from the standpoint of
using lower leg/foot restraints in both EV and IV modes.
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9.2.7.2 Sizing Schedule - Continued
SHOULDER
2 SIZES
UPPER TORSO
3 SIZES
ARM--El
2 SIZES
@
LOWER TORSO
3 SIZES
GLOVE
6 SIZES
HIP
1SIZE LEG-KNEE
3 SIZES
BOOT
3 SIZES
FIGURE 9--6 SUIT SIZING SCHEDULE
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9.2.7.2 Sizin_ Schedule - Continued
The number of standard sized boots required could be held to
a minimum by the use of as few as three pressure/restraint
shells and a limited number of liner inserts. The shoulder
is also a critical area primarily because of its ultimate
effect upon arm/glove efficiency. This section must provide
clearance for donning and doffing while minimizing the pres-
surized free-volume in order to maintain a stable crewman
position in the suit. Excessive free-volume within the
shoulder allows the glove to move away from the hand, partic-
ularly at the finger tips, severely degrading the effective-
ness of the glove.
In summary, using standard components with vernier adjustment
capability where necessary, the most probable combination of
suit component configurations is as follows:
Component Configuration
Glove 6
Arm-elbow 2
Shoulder 2
Upper torso 3
Lower torso 3
Hip l
Leg-knee 3
Boot 3 (plus liner & inserts)
r
TABLE 9--4 SUIT COMPONENT CONFIGURATION
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9.2.8 Relative Cost
Actual comparative cost data for each of the various suit
construction concepts presented herein was not available.
The relative cost of these various concepts will not differ
greatly since suit detail costs do not constitute a major
percentage of the total cost of a suit program. The ultimate
selection of suit components will be based on performance and
life requirements and cost will not be a significant factor,
although the more promising Joints from a performance stand-
point are also cheaper to produce. It should be possible,
however, to accomplish significant cost savings over the unit
cost of the ATL-B program. There are several reasons for this;
the use of a standard sizing schedule rather than custom-fit
suits, Joints which are less expensive to produce, reduced
field maintenance and design improvements.
Suit Component Stud_
General
This section summarizes the state-of-the-art in advanced
space suit concepts and hardware. Each major suit compon-
ent is treated separately with the available concepts being
described and assessed for applicability to the Shuttle suit.
The primary sources for the data presented here were, chro-
nologically, the ILC Industries' Apollo ATL-B Suit, the
Hamilton Standard MOL Suit, the AiResearch and Litton Advanced
Extravehicular Spacesuits (AAES and LAES respectively) and
various NASA development programs.
Suit Joints
Shoulder Joint
There are four basic shoulder Joints which have been considered
for use on advanced space suits; the stovepipe Joint, the rolling
convolute, the modified ATL-B Joint, and the two bearing fabric
Joint. Of these, the stovepipe Joint and the rolling convolute
appear to be the best prospects for the 8 psi suit while the
modified ATL-B Joint is not acceptable.
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9.3.2.1.1 Stovepipe Joint
This concept was generated at NASA/Ames and was used in the
AiResearch AES. It consists of five (5) rotary bearings
interconnected by four (_) sections of suit restraint material.
The interconnecting sections of suit restraint material are
shaped roughly like the bases of oblique truncated cones.
Figure 9-7 shows a stovepipe Joint. All motions (abduction/
adduction, flexion/extension, and lateral/medial) are accom-
modated by the rotation of the five (5) bearings.
i
SCYE BEARING
(#1 SEARING)
UI_o_ _BEARING 03 BLEARING
SECTIONS
• BETWEEN BEARINGS
IA, _#4 BEARING
/ _,
_ #5 BEARING
SUlT ARM
OBLIQUE TRUNCATED CONE SUIT
(INTERCONNECTING FABRIC SECTIONS) TORSO
FIGURE 9--7 STOVEPIPE SHOULDER JOINT
The measured average work for this Joint on the AAES was
13.0 foot-pounds for a 150 ° range of lateral/medial movement.
Although this torque is somewhat high, it is b_lieved to have
been caused by distortion of the innermost, or scye, bearing.
This distortion resulted in high torques for certain motions
and high leakage.
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9.3.2.1.1 Stovepipe Jo in t  - Continued 
Both of these leakage and torque problems could be resolved 
by modification of t h e  bearing mounting technique. 
sea l ing  technique a re  shoyn i n  Figure 9-8. 
Poten t ia l  
RESTRAINT FABRIC 
\ / ROVING OR CLAMP 
ADHESIVE 
CAPTURE RINGS 
ABRASION U Y E R  
LGATHERED BUDDER MATERIAL 
GATHERED SEAWBEARING 
)FABRIC RoviNG OR CLAMP. 
A L  
CAPTURE RINGS 
FACE BEAUBEARING 
FIGURE e 8  POTENTIAL SEALING TECHNIQUES 
Accordingly, t he  stovepipe jo in t  i s  believed t o  of fe r  the 
most po ten t ia l  for  the Shut t le  EV Sui t  shoulder j o in t .  
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9.3.2.1.2 Rollin_ Convolute Joint
This concept was developed by Litton and used in the Litton
AES. The convolute, rather than being molded in a bellows
shape, is constrained by metal bands in such a manner that
it is forced to roll when the Joint is flexed rather than
extend or compress as is the case with the ATL-B molded
convolute Joints. A concept sketch of this type of Joint
is shown in Figure 9-9. Plug loading is carried by linkages
attached to the restraining bands of the rolling convolute
Joint along the constant length lines. Rotation ispermitted
by a bearing at each end of the Joint.
RESTRAINT/BLADDER
.....g...,,'r"Ir'_RERE S T RA i N i N G
BANDS
FIGURE 9--9 ROLLING CONVOLUTE JOINT
The measured average work for this Joint on the LAES was
6.9 foot-pounds for a 150 ° range of lateral/medial movement.
No significant potential for improvement of these work
levels exists and, on that basis, it is not cousidered to
have the potential for use on the Shuttle suit that the
stovepipe Joint has.
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9.3.2.1.3 Modified ATL-B Joint
The ATL-B Joint consists of a molded bellows-shaped convolute
which flexes as shown in Figure 9-10. Plug loading is taken
by cable restraints. Rotation is permitted by bearings.
The modified ATL-B Joint would be essentially the same as the
ATL-B Joint except that the cable restraints would be external
to the molded convolute rather than molded integrally. The
reason for this is that the integrally molded cable has cycle
life problems. Molding cables integrally with the bellows
results in cable strands rubbing together and abrading.
External cabales would not have this problem.
-Jk/Vk/k/b-
FIGURE 9--10 MOLDED CONVOLUTE JOINT
This type of Joint appears unacceptable for use at pres-
sures over approximately 6.0 psi at which point it becomes
essentially too stiff to move due to the tendency of the
convolutes to balloon.
9-18
Hamilton U
U_VlEO
Standard ="_ .... A®c...... _,,o.
SP OlT73
9.3.2.1.4 Two Bearin6 Fabric Joint
The two bearing fabric Joint consists of an all fabric Joint
with a rotary bearing at each end. An all fabric Joint (such
as used in the elbow or knee Joints) is shown in Figure 9-11
and described in 9.3.2.4.2. It would be attached to the
bearings by one of the techniques shown in Figure 9-8. With
this type Joint, the fabric provides axialbending and the
bearings provide rotary motion.
: , , . I!I--.EsT..,..
: i ) ,I , , , j
FIGURE 9--11 ALL FABRIC JOINT
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9.3.2.1.h Two Bearin 6 Fabric Joint - Continued
This type of Joint permits good mobility in abduction/adduc-
tion and flexion/extension but minimal mobility in the lateral/
medial range. This reduces its acceptability for the EV Suit
shoulder, however, its relatively low bulk and weight make it
attractive for'an IV Suit.
9.3.2.2 Neck Joint
As described in 9.3.6, a spherical helmet should be used on
the suit. Since a helmet of this type permits adequate head
movement and visibility without the need for a neck Joint,
no neck Joint should be included in the Shuttle suit. By
eliminating the neck Joint, the suit design can be simplified,
the quantity of hardware required can be reduced and the poten-
tial for leakage can be reduced.
9.3.2.3 Hip Joint
The three types of hip Joints available for the suit are the
stovepipe, the AAES hip Joint and the A7L-B hip Joint. Of
these, the stovepipe Joint presents the best potential for
the Shuttle Program.
9.3.2.3.1 Stovepipe Joint
The stovepipe hip Joint would be the same as the shoulder
Joint described in 9.3.2.1.1 above and shown in Figure 9-7
except that three bearings and two fabric interconnections
would be used instead of five bearings and four intercon-
nections. This Joint was used on the LAES and in testing
exhibited an average work load of 6.6 foot-pounds for a
70 ° flexion range.
9.3.2.3.2 AAES Joint
This Joint consists of a fabric convolute section which
provides flexure motion with rotary bearings at each end
of the Joint. A fabric "wedge" section (or oblique trun-
cated cone section) connects the upper end of the convolute
to the upper thigh bearing. The average measured work for
this Joint was 5.3 foot-pounds over a 60 ° flexion range.
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9.3.2.3.3 ATL-B Joint
The ATL-B hip Joint is a molded convolute type as described
above in 9.3.2.1.3. As with the shoulder Joint, it is un-
acceptable for the Shuttle Suit application since it is too
stiff to move at the required operating pressure.
9.3.2.4 Elbow and Knee Joints
These are grouped together as the same concepts are applicable
to both areas. There are basically two types of Joints consid-
ered for these areas: convoluted Joints and all fabric Joints.
The all fabric Joint offers the greater potential of the two types.
9.3.2.4.1 Convoluted Joints
The LAES, AAES, and ATL-B suits all utilize convoluted Joints.
These are all roughly similar in concept, incorporating bellows-
shaped convolutes which flex as shown in Figure 9-10 and which
are restrained axially by cables. In addition to the LAES con-
volute, Litton has developed a soft convolute (called the Scott
convolute) which utilizes a tape rather than cable restraint.
The average measured work on this type of elbow Joint has varied
from a low of 1.1 foot-pounds for the Scott convolute to a high
of h.5 foot-pounds for the LAES, all over a range of 100 ° of
flexion/extension. On the knee Joint in standing flexion, the
required work varied between h.7 (LAES) and 7.5 (AAES) foot-
pounds over a 100 ° range.
9.3.2.4.2 All Fabric Joints
This type of Joint (also called tucked fabric Joint) is de-
picted in Figure 9-11. Plug loading is taken by restraint tape.
Flexure of the Joint occurs by virtue of the fact that the
Joint contains a greater free length of bladder material than
of restraint material. One of the prime advantages of this
type of Joint is high cycle life; one knee Joint was subjected
to over 255,000 109 ° bend cycles before excessive leakage
occurred. Additionally, this type of Joint has a somewhat
lower torque/range characteristic than the convoluted Joint.
9.3.2.5 Ankle Joints
Concepts similar to those used for elbow and knee Joints (i.e.,
convoluted and all fabric Joints) are applicable to ankle Joints,
with the most appropriate being a single axis, all fabric ankle
Joint. The AAES utilized a two axis Joint for this application.
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9.3.2.5
9.3.2.6
9.3.3
9.3.3.1
Ankle Joints - Continued
This consisted of two convoluted Joints with their planes of
flexure 90 ° apart to provide bending in the sagittal and fron-
tal planes. This Joint is considered too sophisticated for
the needs of a Shuttle suit.
Waist Joints
All of the applicable waist Joints employ convolutes for
bending. Again, the AAES was unique in that it had two
convolute Joints with their planes of flexure 90 ° apart
to allow bending in the sagittal and frontal planes. The
other suits allowed bending only in the sagittal plane.
The ATL-B waist Joint was totally unacceptable at 8 psi.
It would not bend full range as at 4 psi. Adjacent areas
of the suit would collapse before the Joint would bend full
range at 8 psi. The LAES waist Joint had the best torque/
range characteristics. However, it had a serious problem
in that it pinches the subject's skin in the belly area
during flexion. The AAES waist Joint required about three
times as much work to move it through a given range as the
LAES waist Joint. It did not pinch the subject, however.
Both the LAES and the AAES Joints require structural strength-
ening before they can be considered acceptable for 8 psi use.
However, based on the analysis of mobility requirements, it
is questionable if a waist Joint is really necessary for
the Shuttle Suit. The minor convenience that results from
a waist Joint does not Justify the increased suit complexity
that would result from its incorporation.
Gloves
There are four basic types of glove design which are of
interest for advanced suits: ATL-B type, MOL suit type,
Slip Net type, and Mini-convolute type. Of these, the Mini-
convolute glove appears to hold the most promise for improve-
ment in mobility and comfort for the EV application.
A7L-B Glove
This type of glove utilizes a dipped bladder which serves
as both the pressure retaining and load carrying material.
The bladder is thick and thus presents mobility/tactility
problems, especially at higher pressures. Wrist mobility
is provided by a convoluted Joint and is considered poor.
Fatigue in the fingers and wrist and ballooning in the
palm area are unresolved problems with this type glove.
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9.3.3.3
9.3.3.4
MOL Suit Glove
This glove is similar in construction to the tucked fabric
Joint described in 9.3.2.4.2 in that a thin dipped bladder
is used to retain pressure while a separate fabric layer
carries the pressure load. The thinner bladder allowed
improved mobility.
Slip Net Glove
The Slip Net Glove, used in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory
at MSC, is essentially a variation of the link net Joint
concept used in the Gemini suits. Its mobility character-
istics are not as good as the Mini-convolute Glove. Its
mobility relative to the Apollo ATL-B and MOL Suit Gloves
is not known.
Mini-Convolute Glove
This glove, the construction of which is shown in Figure 9-12,
was developed for NASA/Ames. The concept appears to provide
excellent mobility with little, if any, spring back tendency.
The NASA/Ames glove has relatively low-wrist mobility; however,
this could be provided by adding mini-convolutes in the wrist
8/ea.
FIGURE 9--12 MINICONVOLUTE GLOVE
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Mini-Convolute Glove - Continued
The wrist Joint would then be a true two axis Joint (i.e.,
two single axis Joints with planes of flexure 90 ° apart).
Two separate single axis Joints could also be used for
thumb mobility.
Closures
The basic type of closures considered for the Shuttle suit
were pressure sealing zippers, roll seals and closure rings.
Closure rings are felt to hold the highest potential for the
EV suit.
Pressure Sealing Zippers
The Apollo ATL-B suit makes use of an inner pressure sealing
zipper and an outer restraint zipper which takes plug loading
plus the man-induced loading. However, the loads imposed
upon a zipper by the 8.0 psia pressure level represent con-
siderably higher stresses than the present zippers are capable
of absorbing. To provide the necessary factors of safety it
would be necessary to develop a new zipper with approximately
twice the strength of the strongest zipper currently available.
Roll Seals
A roll cuff seal, shown in Figure 9-13, consists of the bladder
material of each portion of the suit to be Joined together and
a restraint zipper. The crewman completes the closure by
rolling the two halves of bladder material together around the
circumference of the portion of the suit to be connected and
then zips up the outer restraint zipper. The rolled up bladder
material restrains pressure (much like a tin can seam) and the
restraint zipper carries the plug load. This system gave satis-
factory results on the Intravehicular Space Suit Assembly (ISSA)
and is considered more reliable than a pressure sealing zipper.
RESTRAINTZIPPER
_'-- RO LLED UP
BLADDER MATERIAL
FIGURE 9--13 ROLL CUFF SEAL
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9.3.4.3 Closure Rings
Closure rings, or hard disconnects, are used at the wrist
and neck of the ATL-B suit. In service, these have proven
reliable and easy to actuate. On the EV suit, the waist
disconnects would be essentially identical to the ATL-B
rings except, possibly, for some structural strengthening
for the higher pressure loads. Similarly , the neck ring
would be of the same type although additional helmet retain-
ing pins would be required for 8.0 psi operation.
9.3.5
Analysis of waist closure techniques• indicates that a closure
ring should be used for that application in the Shuttle EV
Suit. Closure rings were used at the waist of the AAES and
LAES and proved satisfactory. The only disadvantage to a
closure ring system is its weight but this is more than
offset by its reliability advantage. Additionally, with a
closure ring it is easier to don and doff a suit than it is
with either a zipper or roll seal system.
Basic Suit Construction •
Three general types of suits were considered for this study;
namely, soft, hard and combination suits. A soft suit is an
assembly wherein the upper and lower torso and the limb tran-
sition sections (excluding Joints) are constructed of soft
fabrics (usually a restraint cloth and a bladder material).
In a hard suit, these same components are constructed of rigid
materials (such as fiberglass or metal). A combination suit
is one that utilizes components of both types. The type of
suit does not categorize the Joints used; for example, a
stovepipe shoulder Joint is appropriate for use in a soft,
hard or combination suit. The applicability of various
components to suit types is shown on Table 9-5 on the next
page.
Suit stowage volume is primarily a function of suit construction.
Stowage volumes were determined for each of the types of suits
under consideration. It was assumed in deriving these numbers
that the limbs and helmet could be stowed inside the torso
assemblies. Weight ranges were also estimated for the three
types of suits.
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9.3.5 Basic Suit Construction - Continued
The results are presented in Table 9-5. As can be seen,
the soft suit configuration offers both weight and stowage
volume advantages and should be selected on that basis.
The other concepts should be considered only if materials
availability or other problems preclude a soft suit.
SUIT TYPE WEIGHTRANGE - POUNDS STOWAGEVOLUME- CUBICFOnT
Soft 59 - 71 5.0 - 6.0
Hard 65 - 75 ll.O
Combination 61 - 73 7.0 - I0.0
TABLE 9--5 SUIT WEIGH'r AND STOWAGE VOLUME
REQUIREMENTS
If a soft type suit is used, three various types of restraint
and bladder constructions may be used in the suit. These are:
(a) A uni-layer material including a single substrate coated
on one or both sides.
(b) A uni-layer material including multiple fabric substrates
that are coated on one or both sides and then laminated
together.
(c) A bi-layer material consisting of two distinct fabrics ;
one being a bladder layer and the other a restraint layer.
Evaluation of the characteristics of these methods of construc-
tion results in the selection of the bi-layer for the EVA suit.
All three materials are essentially equal with regard to sealing,
gas retention and abrasion resistance. The uni-layer, multi-
substrate construction is considerably heavier and bulkier and
less comfortable than the other two materials, and, since it
offers no distinct advantages, is not considered a viable
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9.3.5
9.3.6
9.3.7
9.3.8
Basic Suit Construction - Continued
candidate material. The remaining two materials are approxi-
mately equal in weight. Of the two, the single-substrate,
uni-layer construction is easier to fabricate and should
prove easier for the crewman to don and doff. However, the
bi-l_yer system offers advantages of greater user comfort,
lower stiffness and higher reliability and is selected on
that basis.
Helmet
Evaluation of the ATL-B helmet for the Shuttle application
shows it to be unacceptable based on two stress areas. The
ATL-B helmet-suit ring has two hold-down points. Since it
is desirable to provide uniform loading distribution at an
8.0 psi differential, this attachment technique is not
acceptable. The second point is that the A7L-B helmet
basically follows head contours and has flattened areas on
the sides. At the higher pressure levels this results in
an undesirable stress pattern. Accordingly, a hemispherical
blown bubble, such as used in the LAES, is the type of helmet
that should be used, designed, of course, to the higher
pressure level.
Boots
Evaluation of existing boot designs indicatesthat the boots
for the EV suit should be of a soft fabric design with a
semi-rigid sole. A restraint layer/pressure layer construc-
tion is preferred over a laminated structure because of weight,
volume and comfort considerations. As stated in 9.3.2.5, the
ankle Joint on the boot should be a single-axis all-fabric
Joint.
Vent System Ductin_
The ATL-B suit utilizes a soft walled ducting with "triloc"
used to prevent crushing of the ducts. This triloc is a
nylon covered helix and three of them are used inside each
duct. The AES's utilizes a smooth-bore duct of approximately
the same cross-sectional shape and size of the ATL-B ducting.
k
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9.3.8 Vent System Ducting - Continued
However, as shown in Figure 9-1_, the ducts in the AES's
achieved wall rigidity by the use of a spirally wound wire
integral with the duct wall. Based on this type of ducting,
significant improvements in pressure door are expected.
Figure 9-15 shows the pressure drop in the total suit that
could be expected from the use of this self-supporting
ductwork.
___W_RE WOUND INTEGRALLY WITH
DUCT WALL PROVIDES WALL
RIGIDITY
J
APPROXIMATE
DUCT CROSS
SECTION
FIGURE 9--14 SMOOTH BORE VENT DUCTS
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9.38 Vent System Ducting - Continued
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9.3.9 Liquid Cooling Garments
Work has been initiated to evaluate various advanced liquid
cooling garment (LCG) concepts to improve the cooling effec-
tiveness of LCG's. However, to date no advanced LCG's have
been built. All tests have been performed on sample "patches"
of various LCGconcepts. These include capillary tube con-
structions and a laminated type of construction where coolant
flows through channels in laminated layers of LCG material.
Test data is not yet available, hence it is not possible to
estimate flow vs. pressure drop characteristics o_ each
concept. As higher thermal effectiveness is achieved,
crewman comfort will depend on increasingly accurate control
of coolant inlet temperature. Hence, advanced temperature
control systems may be required for advanced LCG's.
Three types of advanced temperature controllers are cur-
rently under development, but no test data are available.
The types are:
(a) Sweat Rate Thermal Controller
(b) Honeywell Fluidic Temperature Controller
(c) Webb Skin Temperature Sensitive Thermal Controller
9.3 .lO
It must be noted, however, that it is doubtful that these
advanced LCG systems will be required. The Shuttle EVA
metabolic loads are comparable to, or lower than, the
metabolic loads of the Apollo EMU. In addition, the Apollo
mission durations are longer. The Apollo LCG and its three-
position manual flow control valve on the PLSS proved satis-
factory for that application and, therefore, should prove
acceptable for the Shuttle application. The advanced systems
do not offer any advantages to off-set their increased com-
plexity, expense and inherent unreliability of automatic
control systems.
Waste .Mana$ement Systems
The waste management system developed for the Apollo EMU
has proven itself fully acceptable for the over-seven-hour
duration missions of that program. With the shorter dura-
tion missions of the Shuttle program, both the Apollo urine
and fecal collection systems should adequately satisfy the
waste management requirements forShuttle EVA and no further
design or development effort is required.
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EVA Suit Conclusions
Based on the results of the EVA suit evaluation study, the
following major conclusions were drawn:
(a) The design goals established in the 8,0 psia EVA Suit
Statement of Work for mobility, leakage, weight, life
and other parameters are adequate based upon current
program scope.
i
(b) Suit mobility requirements necessitate the use of
advanced constant volume Joints in most areas and also
preclude the use of the ATL-B suit.
(c) Suit-generated contamination should be minimized by
system design.
(d) A suit sizing schedule should be used to minimize the
necessity for custom-fitting and to permit interchanging
of suit components.
(e) The recommended suit configuration consists of the
following components:
(f)
iI
2.
3.
4.
5.
6,
7,
8.
9.
lO,
ll.
12,
13.
l_.
Helmet - blower hemisphere
Neck Joint - not required
Torso-Limb Assembly - bi-layer soft suit
Shoulder Joint - stovepipe
Elbow Joint - all fabric
Glove - mini-convolute
Waist Joint - not required
Hip Joint - stovepipe
Knee Joint - all fabric
Ankle Joint - all fabric
Boots - bi-layer fabric
Closures - hard ring disconnects
Liquid Cooling Garment - existing Apollo EMU
Waste Management - existing Apollo EMU
J:
There is no significant cost differential between
applicable suit concepts. The unit cost for the
Shuttle suit should be relatively lower than the
Apollo ATL-B suit. The final selection of a suit
concept will be based on mobility and other require-
ments, not on a cost basis.
9-31
UHamilton ................ o.....
Standard I::1®
SP 01T73
9.5 Emer6enc_ IV Suit
Based upon the results of the emergency IV evaluation de-
scribed in Section 1B.O, the need for an emergency IV suit
was identified. The emergency IV suit must provide a light-
weight, quick-donning mobile anthropomorphic enclosure with
a controlled atmosphere to permit a crewman to perform use-
ful functions within a vehicle enclosure under emergency
conditions such as a depressurized cabin or a contaminated
cabin. In order to define requirements for this configura-
tion, it was necessary to survey present technology, identify
state-of-the-art concepts and problems, and obtain data and
other test and usage experience analogous to Shuttle emergency
TV situations. Based on these efforts, and as a result of the
emergency IV modes and requirements effort, the following
emergency IV suit requirements were generated:
(a) Operating Pressure - 8.2 _ 0.2 psia
(b) Pressure Relief - 8.5 to 8.9 psid
(c) Leakage - 400 scc/min maximum
(d) Pressure Drop - B.4" H20 at 6 ACFM and 8.2 psia
(e) Donning Time - One (1) minute maximum
(f) Waste Management - Urine collection and transfer of up
to 1000 cc is required. In addition, feces containment
is also required.
(g) Comfort - The suit should provide reasonable comfort for
periods of up to 96 hours which is the maximum duration
required for a Shuttle rescue operation.
(h) Shelf Life - Four (4) years minimum
(i) Cyclic Life - 50,000 cycles per Joint
(J) Weight - 19.0 pounds
(k) Stowage Volume - 2.0 cubic feet
The above listed performance requirements maybe satisfied
through use of the same technology or designs as used for the
EVA suit. The weight and volume requirements may be satisfied
through elimination of the thermal/meteoroid cover, use of soft
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9.5 Emer6enc T IV Suit - Continued
helmet, and by reducing the number of mobility Joints. The
arm and hand mobility should be equivalent to that of the
EVA suit to allow the crewmen to perform flight related tasks
for a mission abort. Therefore, some weight savings maybe
realized by reducing the range capability of the leg, knee
and ankle Joints.
Consideration should be given to design integration of the
microphones and ear phones into the helmet. This approach
may reduce weight and stowage volume, but more importantly
can enhance suit donning time by elimination of procedures
for communications carrier donning and an electrical connec-
tion to the suit wiring harness.
exceed that of the EVA suit.
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i0.0 RESTRAINTS
Provision for adequate body and equipment restraint is one
of several factors which can assure the success of an Extra-
vehicular Activity (EVA) or Intravehicular Activity (IVA)
mission. Pursuant with this importance this section presents
specific body restraints (hand, torso and foot) and equipment
restraints which may be utilized for the Shuttle orbiter/pay-
load based upon present definition of EV/IV mission task
requirements. Candidate restraint devices, taken from Gemini,
Apollo, MOL, Skylab and various NASA-Contractor R&D programs,
are considered in terms of the associated crew stations/tasks
(planned, unscheduled and contingency) as a sole restraint and
in various combinations with other devices.
The remainder of this section is presented in accordance with
the outline in T_ole 10-1.
REFERENCE
TOPIC PARAGRAPH
BODY RESTRAINTS I0.I
EQUIPMENT RESTRAINTS I0.2
TABLE 10--1. RESTRAINT PROVISIONS OUTLINE
10.1 Bod_ Restraints
Body restraint devices can be classified according to location,
i.e., hand, torso or foot. Table 10-2 presents a listing of the
various restraint devices considered under each classification.
In addition, special restraint devices that are not classified
by hand, torso or foot locations are also presented
I0-I
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i0.i Body Restraints - Continued
Handheld Restraint Devices (Reference Appendix E.I)
Handrails permanent*
Handrails portable
Handrails permanent deployable
Handholds permanent*
Handholds portable (Velcro, pip-pins)*
Handholds permanent deployable
Ladder and Handrail Combination+
Portable Handrail+
Linear Induction Mobile Handhold+
Rigid Rope+
Hand Model (Single-Pole) Electroadhesor+
Flexible (Single-pole) Electroadhesor+
Hand Model (Two-pole) Electrcadhesor+
Torso Restraint Devices (Reference Appendix E.2)
Pelvic Restraint+
Inflatable Mid-Torso Restraint+
Tigid Waist Tether+
Slide Assembly-Rigid Tether+
Belt-Waist Tether+
Flexible Waist Tether+
Leg-Rail Restraint+
Astronaut Boom Attachment System (Multi STEM)+
Positioning Tool (Maintenance Tether System)+
Serpentuator (Serpentine Actuator)+
NASA Shuttle Crew Seat (RFP definition, only)*
USAF Dutch Chair (Fit. Test Support Equipment)+
Foot/Lower Leg Restraint Devices (Reference Appendix E.3)
Fixed Foot Restraint (Dutch Shoes).*
Astrogrid Shoes Restraint+
Lower Leg Restraint+
Foot Restraint Platform+
Magnetic "Shuffler" Shoes+
Suction Shoes+
Zero Gravity Surface and Interlocking Structure+
Variable Foot Restraint (Skylab, Dutch Shoes)+
Special Restraint Devices (Reference Appendix E.4)
KUPU Latch+
Extendable Boom+
Restraint Buttons and Applicator+
Stud Bonding Tool+
Restraint/Translation Track+
Continuous "Clothesline" Restraint/Translation Device*
Electromagnetic Restraint+
t
* Flight Qualified
+ R&D concept and/or feasibility/development tested
* Concept on!y
TABLE 10--2. BODY RESTRAINT TYPES
Detailed descriptions and uses for each of the hand, torso,
foot and special restraints listed in this table are presented
in Appendix E.
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i0.i Body Restraints - Continued
The purpose of this section is to investigate the applicability
of these devices for Shuttle EVA restraint requirements. To
achieve this objective, the candidate restraint devices are
evaluated in terms of mission constraints, crew station appli-
cability, and orbiter/payload task requirements in order to
select the best restraints for the Shuttle. Table_10-3 _re-
sents a sample of the evaluation matrix which was applied to
each of the candidate concepts.
As a result of this evaluation, handholds or handrails, the
rigid waist tether, and a variable foot restraint are found
to be the most generally applicable restraint devices. Other
devices which may be used for specific "limited" locations
are as follows; (1) the ladder handrail combination in the
members during payload installation and/or checkout; (2) the
Pelvic Restraint and the "Dutch chair" for crew/work stations
where long timelines involving continuing activities are pro-
gramed; (3) Lower Leg Restraints for short duration tasks in
place of the foot restraints, and; (4) the Special Restraints,
to construct a temporary restraint mounting point for contin-
gency and/or emergency modes.
During this evaluation special use (i.e., rigid rope, etc.)
and/or limited application (i.e., serpentuator, etc.) devices
were eliminated, as were those devices which required elabor-
ate and/or unique support equipment (i.e., hand model electro-
adhesor and the magnetic restraints).
The selection between handholds, waist tethers and foot re-
straints is primarily dependent upon the nature of the work
tasks. Analysis of Shuttle planned tasks, shows that combina-
tions of the above restraints are required for most of the
tasks and that several tasks can be accomplishedby foot
restraints alone. Figure 10-1 depicts the percentage of
Shuttle planned tasks requiring a particular restraint or
combination of restraints.
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i0.1 Body Restraints - Continued
Restraint Device Evaluation Primary
Summary Mission Constraints
Evaluation Criteria
Crew Interface
- Selected Restraint
Concepts
handi,eld Restraints
(Ref. Appd. E.l)
- Handrail
Handhold*
- Ladder-Handrail
Combination
Torso Restraints
(Ref. Appd. E.2)
- Pelvic Restraint
- Rigid Waist Tether
- USAF "Dutch Chair"
Variable
Foot Restraints
(Ref. Appd. £.3)
- Variable Foot
Restraint *
- Lower Leg Restraint
Special Restraints
(REf. Appd. E.4)
- KUPU Latches
- Restraint Buttons and
•Applicator
___N o " "T, NZ
X XXX XX X-
X XXX XX XX
Primary
Crewstation
Applicability
e
gg- _
= 8)=o:
,Sl o_ E
X XX XX- XX
X XX XX X XX
Primary
Task Appl icabi Iity
o
X XX XXX XXX XXX
X XX XXX XXX XXX
Notes/Remarks:
h Most effective device at
crew/work station when
used with waist and/or
foot restraint.
Z. Same as above.
X X - - X - X ........... X .......... 3, Limited application be-
cause of structural mass
and route limitations.
X X - - X .... X - X - X ..... X X X X .... X - 4. Limited to "permanent"
continuous use crew/
work stations.
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5. Most effective device
at crew/work station
when used with hand and/
or footrestraints.
X X - - X .... X - X ....... X X X X ....... Same as 4 above.
X X - X X X - X X X X X X X X X - X X X X X X X X X 6. Most effective device at
crew/work station when
used with waist and/or
hand restraints.
X X X - X X X - - X X X - - X X - - X X X X X X X - - - 7. Effective device at crew/
work station when used
with waist and/or hand
restraints.
X X X X X X X .... X - - X ............. X 8. This device could be
used effectively at
crew/work station -
where a pegboard panel
is provided.
In an emergency, holes
could be made in struc-
tures not critical for
re-entry.
X X X X X X X X - - - X - - X - - X ......... X 9.This device would be an
excellent temporary
bersonnel/equipment re-
straint for unscheduled
and contingency modes.
In an emergency, it could
be applied to the ex-
terior of the Orbiter,
without affecting re-entr_
re-entry.
*Best restraint combina-
tion for general EV
task requirements.
TABLE 10--3. RESTRAINT CONCEPTS EVALUATION MATRIX
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i0.1 Bod_ Restraints - Continued
From this graphical presentation it can be seen that all planned
tasks require some sort of foot restraint with 16% requiring
only foot restraints.
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• FIGURE 10--1. PLANNED TASKS AS A FUNCTION OF
RE ST RA! NT CONCE PT S
Having established that handholds or handrails, the rigid waist
tether and the variable foot restraint are the perfered,restraint
mechanisms offering a wide range of applications, the following
sections are devoted to a description of these devices, and a
presentation of their merits, deficiencies, and design require-
ments.
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lO.l.1 Handholds/Handrails
Handholds and handrails can be either permanent or portable; and
as shown in Figure 10-2, they can be either recessed or protruding.
A
IrLU_
SURFACEqNTED
FIGURE 10--2. HANDRAILS AND HANDHOLDS
Both handholds and handrails have been qualified on the Gemini
and Apollo Programs.
Specifications (from SC-E-O006 - Preliminary)
Size - Cross section shall be as shown in Figure 10-3.
Clearance - At least 2.25 inches above mounting surface for EVA.
At least 1.50 inches above mounting surface for IVA.
-F
L
L/W RATIO = 1.66 TO 3.00
PREFERRED L/W = 2.00
R = I/2 W
L_EVA's) = 1.22 TO 1.50 IN.
L(IVA'S) = .75 TO 1.50 IN.
LONGITUDINAL GRIP LENGTH 5.81"
FIGURE 10--3. SECTIONAL VIEW OF HANDHOLD
1_-6
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lO .1.2
Handholds/Handrails (Continued)
Load Capability - 600 pounds in any direction for EVA
250 pounds in any direction for IVA
Advantages
•Requires no electrical power
• Light weight
• Durable
• Reliable
•Simple
•Maintenance Free
• Applicable at all levels of
gravity
•Positive control
• Previously qual_fied
Disadvantages
• Requires use of one or
both hands
•Difficult to manage large
packages
• Structural interface with
vehicle - should be incor-
porated in vehicle design
Rigid Waist Tether
The rigid waist tether, shown in Figure 10-4 consists of a
telescoping, rigid tube affixed to the crewman's waist tether
belt.
FIGURE 10--4. RIGID WAIST TETHER
As can be seen from this sketch, the rigid tube has a ball
Joint on a slide permitting the tether to swivel at the waist.
Once extended to the desired length, a collet clamp is used to
lock the position. This restraint can be used with swiveling
pip-pins which can be locked into receptacles on the vehicle/
payload surface.
I0-7
Hamilton ......... U
A._I_I_AI:V COle_ATION
Standard I::1 
SP OlT73
i0.1.2
i0.1.3
Rigid Waist Tether (Continued)
Specifications
Although no explicit specification requirements have been
published, the restraint(s) must be of sufficient length and
have adequate adjustment capability to maintain the crewmen
in the proper position relative to the worksite. Its load
capability mustbe compatible with the crewman induced loads,
which depend on the restraint length, crewman forces and
torques, and on the amount of load taken by other restraints.
Advant a6e s
Uses no electrical power
Broad applicability
Usable in all gravity levels
Simple
Light weight
Can be made portable
Variable Foot Restraints
The variable foot restraint consists of a toe section and a
caming heel section as illustrated in Figure 10-5.
FIGURE 10--5. VARIABLE FOOT RESTRAINT
This device is utilized by inserting the toe in the forward
section with the heel facing the open contour section of the
heel restraint (foot at an angle). The foot is then rotated
into the heel restraint which forces and retains the heel of
the boot into a fixed position. Work forces are through the
reaction points at the heel and toes.
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Variable Foot Restraints - Continued
Specifications (from SC-E-O006 - Preliminary)
Spacing
Nominal center-to-center distance for EVA foot restraints shall be
i0 to 17 inches. The actual dimension shall be determined from
analysis of the tasks to be performed.
Load Capabilit[
All foot restraints shall be designed to withstand the ultimate
design loads of 140 pounds in tension and shear and 1,800 in-lbs
torsion.
Restraints must be provided to handle packages and equipment at
the worksite when they are not in the EV astronaut's hands.
Brown and Hayes (Reference ) have identified the following
requirements for equipment restraints/tethers:
Tethering of equipment is not required when hard locks are
provided or when transferring equipment from one locked loca-
tion to another, if both hands are available. Tethering of
equipment is required in all other conditions.
• Equipment tethering techniques to be considered include:
- Wrist Tethers
- Waist Tethers
- Locks to fix equipment to structures
- Telescoping tethers either attached to the crewman or
to structures.
Table 10.4 lists body restraint concepts previously discussed
which can also be used as temporary cargo-equipment restraint
interfaces for the Shuttle• The handholds, handrails and
ladder-handrail combination provide excellent restraint points
for using short, flexible tethers (i.e., D-rings, clips and
fabric) for all sizes and shapes of payloads. In addition,
the latter two devices could incorporate the capeobility for
a continuously engaged tether using a slot in the rail and an
10-9
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HANDHELD RESTRAINTS HANDRAIL
HANDHOLD
TORSO RESTRAINTS LADDER - HANDRAIL
COMBINATION
ADJUSTABLE - RIGID
WAIST RESTRAINT
SPECIAL RESTRAINTS KUPU LATCHES
RESTRAINT BUTTONS
AND APPLICATOR
EXTENDABLE BOOM
TABLE 10--4. BODY/EQUIPMENT RESTRAINTS
interface connector on tether. The adjustable rigid waist
restraint may be used as a temporary restraint point to the
crewman for small payloads (i.e., less than i00 pounds)
during translation to and brief stops at crew/work stations.
The special restraints may serve as cargo-equipment restraints
in much the same manner and mission modes as they are used
as personnel restraints.
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The successful accomplishment of Shuttle EV tasks is dependent on the
ability of the astronaut to maneuver outside the spacecraft to various
worksite locations. The requirement for an astronaut to move from
place to place and to control his body orientation during the activity
requires specific techniques primarily due to the absence of gravity.
There are a variety of such techniques which an astronaut can utilize
to accomplish this locomotion and they can basically be divided into
the four categories of Table ll-1.
MANUAL
MANIPULATOR ASSISTED
MANIPULATOR ASSISTED/MANUAL
SELF-POWERED
TABLE 11--1. TRANSLATION CATEGORIES
Manual locomotion is accomplished by using only the astronaut's arms
and legs to propel and orient himself. The Shuttle mainpulator can
be utilized for translation by incorporating an astronaut carrying
platform at the end. The manipulator assisted/manual mode involves
utilization of the manipulator to the end of its range followed by
manual devices for increased range. Powered systems span the gamut
from simple unstabilized thrusting units to thrust platforms which
provide facilities for tools, spare parts, telemetry and life support
provisions for missions of extended range and duration.
Specific translation concepts evaluated for Shuttle EVA utilization
are listed in Table ll-2.
L_
MANUAL TRANSLATION
HANDHOLDS
HANDRAILS
ASTROGRID SHOE
MAGNETIC SHOE
VELCRO SHOE
SOARING
MANIPULATOR ASSISTED
MANIPULATOR ASSISTED/MANUAL
SELF-POWERED
HAND HELD
BACK MOUNTED
PLATFORM
TABLE 11--2. TRANSLATION CONCEPTS
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Selection of particular translation aids is dependent on vehicle inter-
faces, translational distances, and mass transport requirements.
Section 4.0 presents a transfer mode analysis as to the applicability
of each major transfer category. The results of this analysis are
summarized in Figure ll-1, showing the utilization percentage of each
transfer mode for both planned and unscheduled tasks.
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FIGURE 11--1. SELECTED TRANSFER MODES
The selection criteria listed in Table ll-B was utilized in arriving
at the above transfer mode utilization.
=
MANUAL MODE
EVA TASKS WITHIN CLOSED PAYLOAD BAY: EVA TASKS WITHIN
OPEN PAYLOAD BAY IN WHICH CREWMAN TRANSPORTS LESS THAN
I00 POUNDS OF MASS.
MANIPULATOR - ASSISTED MODE
EVA TASKS WITHIN OPEN PAYLOAD BAY IN WHICH CREWMAN
TRANSPORTS MORE THAN I00 POUNDS OF MASS; EVA TASKS OUT-
SIDE PAYLOAD BAY BUT WITHIN THE MANIPULATOR REACH
ENVELOPE.
MANUAL PLUS MANIPULATOR - ASSISTED MODE
EVA TASKS ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE ORBITER OR PAYLOAD AND
BEYOND REACH OF THE MANIPULATOR.
SELF-POWERED MODE
TO BE USED IF THERE ARE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVES.
TABLE 11--3. TRANSFER MODE SELECTION
II-2
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As can be seen from this analysis, all planned and unscheduled trans-
lational tasks are scoped for either manu_l or manipulator transfer
modes; self-powered devices are not required. However, certain con-
tingency tasks, namely astronaut rescue from a disabled Shuttle,
might require powered translation and thus such a mode must be con-
sidered for this requirement.
The following sections present details of the various manual, manipula-
tor and powered translation aids as well as pertinent considerations
regarding each concept.
ll.1 MamualTranslation
Results from both the Gemini and Apollo programs as well as from
zero-g aircraft testing have indicated that manual translation tech-
niques are effective for astronaut maneuvering around spacecraft
surfaces. Concepts studies in the manual locomotion category are
!
!
HANDHOLDS
HANDRAILS
ASTROGRID SHOES
MAGNETIC SHOES
VELCRO SHOES
SOARING
TABLE 11--4. MANUAL TRANSLATION CONCEPTS
Based on an initial evaluation (reference Appendix F ), handholds
and handrails were selected for the Shuttle EVA manual translation
requirements, This selection was made primarily because of the
advantages associated with these concepts as listed in Table 11-5.
These advantages are offset somewhat by the disadvantages associated
with handholds and handrails and listed in Table 11o6.
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ii.i Manual Translation - Continued
REQUIRES NO ELECTRICAL POWER
LIGHT WEIGHT
SIMPLE
FLIGHT QUALIFIED
DURABLE
RELIABLE
READILY MADE TETHER ATTACH POINTS
MAINTENANCE FREE
APPLICABLE AT ALL LEVELS OF GRAVITY
POSITIVE CONTROL
TABLE 11--5. MANUAL TRANSLATION ADVANTAGES
REQUIRES USE OF ONE OR BOTH HANDS
DIFFICULT TO MANAGE LARGE PACKAGES
TIRING - ESPECIALLY TO WRISTS
STRUCTURAL INTERFACE WITH VEHICLE - SHOULD BE
INCORPORATED IN VEHICLE DESIGN
LIMITED TO VEHICLE SURFACE TRANSLATION
TABLE 11--6. MANUAL TRANSLATION DISADVANTAGES
II-4
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As shown in Figure ll-2, handholds and handrails can be either recessed
or protruding from the surface.
A
FLUSH MOUN__
SURFACE MOUNTED
FIGURE 11--2. HANDRAILS AND HANDHOLDS
]_]..2
For mobility, the recessed type have an advantage in that they do not
present "elbow knockers". However, the protruding type offer better
restraint.
Handholds can be portable or permanent depending on application and
vehicle interface requirements. Portable devices offer an advantage
over permanent installations in that they are only attached during
translations and, therefore, do not cause potential aerodynamic and
heating problems during the entire mission. They also avoid
"cluttering-up" the vehicle surface with permanent protrusions.
Inherently, however, portable devices have a disadvantage in that they
must be carried by the astronaut over the course of his translation
and result in slower transfers. Selection between permanent or pro-
truding devices is, therefore, a trade-off between the vehicle inter,
face and ease of translation. Frequently traveled routes are probably
most amenable to permanent type devices, whereas seldom used paths can
sacrifice translation ease for the vehicle interface gains offered by L
the portable devices.
In addition to handholds and handrails, soaring must also be con-
sidered as a possible manual translation technique for Shuttle EVA's.
The applicability of such a technique for contingency astronaut rescue
operations is the main advantage of this translation mode.
Manipulator-Assisted
Inclusion of an astronaut carrying platform on the end of the Shuttle
attached manipulator as shown in Figure ll-3, is a viable
11-5
Hamilton U
O_Vt_ON OF UNITED AII_CRAF'r COA_='OAAT_'_
Standard I:le
SP 01T73
ll.2 (Continued)
FIGURE 1t--3. MANIPULATOR ASSISTED TRANSLATION
astronaut translation device. __e platform could be considered another
end effector for the manipulator just like any other special end
effector for specific applications. It could be removed or added as
necessary.
This manipulator approach affords the capability of translations over
a radius of BO-60 feet (length of manipulator) either along the vehicle
surface or away from the vehicle. This ability to maneuver the
astronaut away from the vehicle surface presents a significant
advantage over manual aids which are limited to vehicle surface loco-
motion only. Another advantage that manipulator translation has over
manual translation lies in the fact that it does not interface with
the vehicle surface. Such a concept precludes the need for cluttering
the vehicle surface with handholds and handrails within the range of
the manipulator.
Incorporation of worksite provisions (lights, tools, work restraints,
etc.) on the carrying platform as well as grapplers to secure this
platform to the worksite converts it into a portable work base as
shown in Figure ll-4. This approach precludes the necessity of pro-
viding separate work provisions at each expected worksite. Rather, a
single work base can serve all expected worksites within its range.
Dual controls (one at the platform, one at the Shuttle control station)
would be required for manipulator assisted translation with the pre-
ferred mode being at the platform. This gives the EVA astronaut
control over his own translation and provides for a better view of the
translation path and ultimate target. Control frpm the Shuttle would
serve as a back-up and emergency provision for return of an incapacita-
ted crewman.
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FIGURE 11--4. MANIPULATOR ASSISTED TRANSLATION/WORKSiTE
__e most significant problem to date concerning the manipulator is
the arm dynamics associated with handling large masses. The mani-
pulator boom undergoes large amplitude, low frequency vibrations
when trying to stop translations. This results from the payload
momentum coupled with the relatively flimsy manipulator boom and
presents a potential hazard to an astronaut utilizing the manipula-
tor as a translation aid. Manipulator boom dynamics with an attached
platform, crewman and equipment should be analyzed for assessment of
this potential hazard.
Pertinent advantages and disadvantages associated with manipulator
assisted translation are listed in Table ll-7.
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
PROVIDE FOR TRANSLATIONS ARM DYNAMICS PROBLEMS
AWAY FROM VEHICLE SURFACE
DOES NOT REQUIRE SIGNIFI- COMPLICATES MANIPULATOR
CANT VEHICLE INTERFACE CONTROL DESIGN
RELATIVELY LITTLE ENERGY LIMITED RANGE (30 - 60
EXPENDITURE DURING TRANS- FEET)
CATION
COULD PROVIDE WORK BASE
REDUCES NUMBER OF PREPARED
WORKSITES
COULD HANDLE SOME MANI-
PULATOR TASKS WITH ON-
SITE VIEWING
PROVIDES PLATFORM FOR
CARRYING CARGO
EXCELLENT FOR GENERAL
VEHICLE INSPECTION TASKS
DOES NOI REQUIRE TETHER
TABLE 11--7. MANIPULATOR ASSISTED TRANSLATION
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Manipulator Ass isted/F_nual
Manipulator assisted/manual translation consists of utilizing the
manipulator for translation to the end of its range followed by manual
translation beyond the range of the manipulator. Such a concept
possesses the manipulator's translation advantages over the manual
technique (reference Section 11-2) and at the same time is not limited
by manipulator 's range.
The manual translation technique selected following the manipulator
translation is again handholds and handrails. The reason for their
selection has previously been presented in Section ll.1.
Self-Powered Devices
Self-powered maneuvering devices offer a more extensive translation
range than the manual and manipulator mechanisms discussed previously.
They are not limited to the vehicle surface such as manual aids nor
are they dependent on the reach envelope of the manipulator. As such,
their applicability lies mainly in the maneuvers away from the vehicle
and to vehicle surface areas where it is impractical to locate manual
devices due either to the length of travel or limited translation
occurrences along a path. Three basic powered maneuvering systems,
listed in Table ll-8, have been investigated as translation aids for
the Shuttle EV missions in the event a specific need was defined.
HAND HELD
BACK MOUNTED
PLATFORM
TABLE 11--8. POWERED MANEUVERING SYSTEMS
Based on an initial evaluation, Appendix F , a back-mounted device
was selected as the best approach for Shuttle EVA's as determined by
performance requirements and a task analysis. This selection is
essentially predicated on the fact thata back-mounted unit affords
better stability and control than a handheld device and is more
compatible with the task requirements than a self powered platform.
Stability and control problems associated with the (HHMU) Hand Held
Maneuvering Unit stem primarily from the fact th{t the forces from
the thrusters are directed by hand motions and are thus not always
through the c.g. of the astronaut.
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Thus, unwanted rotations, pitches and yaws are continually experienced
and they require a considerable effort and expenditure of fuel to
stabilize. The fixed thruster location on a back-mounted unit assures
thrusts through the c.g. by designing for such.
The powered platform provides an excellent means of astronaut transla-
tion and a Manned Work Platform (MWP) is scheduled for a flight experi-
ment in 1981. An artists concept of the MWP is shown in Figure ll-5.
FIGURE 11--5. MANNED WORK PLATFORM
Selection of such a concept for the contingency rescue task is
impractical as it is too heavy and expensive and more amenable to
long-range translation. The relative simplicity and low cost of a
back-mounted unit coupled with the limited contingency task range
requirement (about 500 lb-sec total impulse) makes the back-mounted
unit more attractive than the powered platform.
Appendix F presents preliminary design considerations for a back-
mounted propulsion unit. In general, the Shuttle requirements can be
satisfied by a 6 Degree of Freedom (DOF) system with automatic
attitude hold and proportional rate command capable of about 500 lb-
sec total impulse. In this range, a cold gas propulsion system affords
the simplest approach although it is somewhat heavier (lower specific
impulse) than a hydrazine system. The cold gas advantages in donning,
doffing, checking, servicing and storing the unit inside the Shuttle
cabin or airlock make up for the low specific impulse of the cold gas.
Advantages and disadvantages associated with the utilization of a
back-mounted propulsion system are presented in Table 11-9.
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ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
STABLE MOUNTED ON BODY
RELATIVELY EASY TO RANGE LIMITED TO ABOUT
OPERATE 500 FEET
RELATIVELY LIGHT
MINIMAL VEHICLE
INTERFACE
TIES UP HANDS IF THEY
ARE USED FOR CONTROL
OPERATION
SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT TO
DON
11.5
TABLE 11--9. BACK MOUNTED PROPULSION SYSTEM
Conclusions
Four basic translation aids have been presented: manual, manipulator-
assisted, manipulator-assisted/manual, and self-powered. As can be
seen from this presentation, each concept has applicability for the
Shuttle EVA task performance.
Manual devices, the best candidates being handholds and handrails,
are best suited for short, often-used translations with limited cargo
carrying requirements. These devices are attractive because they are
simple, reliable and do not require maintenance. However, their
employment must be selective to aboid "cluttering up" the vehicle
surface. The fact that the vehicle structure must support these
devices also limits their use to locations where such support is
available.
The manipulator-assisted concept utilizing an astronaut carrying plat-
form at the end of the manipulator provides an excellent locomotion
device capable of covering all points within the range of the manipula-
tor boom. The addition of worksite provisions to this platform
converts it into a portable work station and eliminates the need for
manual vehicle mounted devices over its coverage area and allows for
translations away from the vehicle surface--not available with manual
devices.
The manipulator-assisted/manual concept provides all the advantages of
the manipulator-assisted system and adds handrails to extend the range
beyond the point of maximum travel of the manipulator.
Self-powered maneuvering devices offer the widest_range of locomotion
of all those studied. Their inherent maintenance requirements and the
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fact that they are less reliable than the other concepts limits their
usage application to areas where the other devices cannot reach or
where the length of reach is impractical for manual aids. The signifi-
cant advantage over and above range capabilities lies in the fact that
vehicle interfacing requirements are minimal.
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12.0 WORKSITE PROVISIONS
A worksite is defined as any location where special EVA work
tasks must be performed. Two general classes of worksites are
applicable to the Shuttle: unprepared and prepared. Unprepared
sites refer to the location where a crewman terminates transfer
activities to perform an EVA task. The location of the unpre-
pared worksite may or may not be predetermined; if not, it is
selected by the crewman during the EVA. A prepared worksite
constitutes one in which location and operations are established
during the Shuttle/payload design phase.
The types of provisions required to perform worksite operations
are listed in Table 12-1. Detailed selection of particular
provisions is dependent upon the task definition and analysis.
Once the task has been defined and the limiting constraints and
ware systems and procedural options can be integrated to provide
adequate worksite provisions. The following sections present
criteria involved in the selection of controls and displays,
lighting, tools and restraints for Shuttle worksites, and
presenta a work platform concept.
CONTROLS ANDDISPLAYS
LIGHTING
TOOLS
RESTRAINTS
TABLE 12--1. WORKSITE PROVISIONS
12.1 Controls and Displays
Controls and displays are required at EVworksites to monitor
and operate various systems and equipment as required for parti-
cular tasks. The selection of controls and displays is dependent
on the specific tasks to be accomplished at each worksite and
the designation of particular controls and displays is not pos-
sible at this juncture. Instead, general underlying considera-
tions regarding controls and displays are presented.
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12.1 Controls and Displays - Continued
The ability of the astronaut to see a display and operate a con-
trol is the most critical requirement irrespective of the dif-
ferent controls and displays required at each site. Once the
specific control and display requirements have been specified,
a detailed equipment layout is required to determine location
and orientation, size, type, illumination and labeling. Con-
siderations involved in these determinations are: type of
site, astronaut orientation, operating characteristics, rela-
tion of controls to displays and astronaut mobility. Table 12-2
lists these considerations and presents detailed options regard,
ing each_
CONSIDERATIONS OPTIONS
TYPE OF SITE
ASTRONAUT ORIENTATION
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
UNCONFINED
SEMI-CONFINED
CONFINED
LIMBS
WHOLE BODY (CLEARANCES,
PROTRUSIO_IS)
BODY AXIS PARALLEL TO HAIN
AXIS OF SITE
BODY AXIS PERPENDICULAR TO MAIN
AXIS OF SITE
BODY AXIS OFFSET FROM MAIN AXIS
OF SITE
TYPE OF OPERATION
BUTTON
ROTATING IIANDLE
FLIP HANDLE
ASTRONAUT ACTIVATOR
FOOT
HAND
LEr:GTH OF TIME
CONTINUOUS/ON-OFF
RELATION OF CONTROLS TO DISPLAYS CONTROL TO A DISPLAY READING
NO RELATION
ASTRONAUT MOBILITY MOTIONS REQUIRED IN WORKSlTE
WHOLE BODY
ROTATION
TRANSLATION
LATERAL
FRONT-BACK
UP-DOWN
TWISTING
L IMBS
DIRECTION OF MOTION
RANGE OF MOTION
EXTENT OF MOTION
[REQUENCY OF _OTIONS
TABLE 12--2. WORKSITE CONSIDERATIONS
i]
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12.2 Lighting
During the course of a single orbit, the Space Shuttle EV
worksites will be subjected to natural illumination of varied
brightness and intensity depending upon their location relative
to the sun, earth and moon. Figure 12-1 presents various
natural illumination environments that might be encountered at
an EV worksite.
_ MOON
ORBITER
SUNLIGHT, MOONLIGHT
AND EARTHSHINE
I I
I,. .......... J
MP, f_N
_ ORBITER
A LBETO:: _ //
" _r_ I STARLIGHT
- _ i I
m m mm m A
FIGLIRE 12--1. VARIED NATURAL ILLUMINATION
Approximately three-quarters of the Shuttle orbit is illuminated
by the sun and light side of the earth and moon, either singu-
larly or in various combinations. Albedo provides some illu-
mination during the remaining one-quarter orbit. The illumina-
tion in orbit can thus vary from bright direct sunlight to
almost total darkness (with just albedo).
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12.2 Lighting (Continued)
In addition, the relative position of the worksite to the
Orbiter is also significant as for as natural illumination
is concerned. Figure 12-2 shows that the Orbiter can either
block light from the sun, earth and moon causing shadows of
extreme constrast, or reflect this light to the worksite.
SUN
PA t'LOAD
CREWMAN _ ;_:[C_":_
ORBITE .._,,_'_j _
ORBITER REFLECTING ILLUMINATION
TO WORK SITE
PAYLOAD
CrCr Cr
SUN
ORBITER BLOCKING ILLUMINATION
AT WORK SITE
FIGURE 12--2. EFFECT OF SHUTTLE ON WORKSITE
I LLUMINATION
The effect of this varied natural lighting presents a signi,
ficant problem for the EV crewman. Visors must be worn to
protect the eye when working in sunlight, and artificial
lighting must be considered for both night operation illumina-
tion in shadowed areas. The following paragraphs are devoted
to worksite artificial lighting requirements in regards to
types, number, location, illumination, controls and adjustments.
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12.2 .i Lighting Types
Types of lighting fall into two broad classes: permanent
lighting at the worksite and portable lighting carried to the
worksite by the EV astronaut. This portable lighting can be
mounted to the astronaut (wrist, helmet, chest), mounted to
the worksite upon astronaut arrival, or hand held. The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of permanent and portable lighting
as well as the relative merits of different types of portable
lighting are presented in Table 12-3.
PERMAN[NTLY MOUNTED LIGHTING
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
rIOTCARRIED BY EV ASTRnNAUT
TO EACH WOR!'SITE ACTIVITY
ONLY USABLE AT ONE WORK
STATION
VEHICLE IrlTERFACING
SINGLE BASE SYSTEM AVAIL-
ABLE
SHOULD HAVE REMOTE TURN
OFF IF INADVERTANTLY LEFT ON
PORTABLE LIGHTING (WORKSITE MOUNTED)
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
CAN BE FIXED IN PLACE
MINIMAL VEHICLE INTERFACE
ELIMINATES NEED FOR MANY
PERMANENT LIGHTS
MUST BE TRANSPORTED FROM
WORKSITE TO WORKSITE
POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE DURING
TRANSLATION
FIXED BASE LOCATION
PORTABLE LIGHTING (BODY MOUNTED)
ADVANTAGES
NO VEHICLE INTERFACE
MOVABLE BASE BY BODY HOVE-
MENT
ELIMINATES _EED FQR MAI;Y
PERMANENT LIGHTS
DISADVANTAGES
MUST BE TRANSPORTED FROM
WORKSITE TO WORKSITE
POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE DURING
TRArISLATIO!:
INTERFERENCE DURING WORK IS
POSSIBLE
MOVEMENTOCCURS FROM NO_IAL
WORKINGMOTION
PORTABLE LIGHTING HAND HELD)
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
NO VEHICLE INTERFACE TIES UP ONE HAND - POSSIBLY
MOVABLE BASE BY HAND UNACCEPTABLE AT SOME WORKSITES
MOVEMENT POSSIBILITY OF D_AGE DURING
ELIMINATES NEED FOR MANY TRANSLATION
PERMANENT LIGHTS MUST BE HELD STEA]Y
TABLE 12--3. LIGHTING CONCEPTS-ADVANTAGES
AND DI SADVANTAGES
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12.2 .i
12.2.2
12.2.3
12.2. h
Lighting Types - Continued
The selection between portable and permanent lighting is
primarily dependent on the tasks associated with each work-
site. Those worksites which are frequently utilized should
probably be equipped with permanent lighting to preclude the
necessity of constantly carrying lighting provisions to them.
Portable lighting is most advantageous for limited usage sites
with the particular selection of a portable device primarily
dependent on task requirements. Long duration occupancies
as well as those worksites requiring fixed (motion free)
illumination are probably best suited to site mounted lighting.
Short duration sites and sites requiring mobile bases are best
suited for body or hand held lighting provisions.
Number of Lishts
The number of lights required is dependent on the worksite and
must take into account the physical design, tasks and natural
lighting available.
Location of Lights and Field of View
This parameter is again primarily dependent on the physical
characteristics of the worksite, the tasks to be performed and
the natural lighting available. In addition, however, the
placement of lights must be selected so as to preclude shining
in the astronaut's eyes (both direct and reflected), and the
astronaut's location and orientation is critical in achieving
this requirement.
Illumination
From the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center general specification
(SC-L-0002) regarding spacecraft lighting requirements, the
EV worksite lighting luminescense requirements are as listed
in Table 12-4.
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12.2.4 Illumination- Continued
LIGHT SHALL BE INCANDESCENT OR ANY OTHER TYPE LAMP MEETING
ILLUMINATION REQUIREMENTS
LUMINOUS INTENSITY (CANDLE POWER) SHALL BE SUFFICIENT TO
ILLUMINATE THE SURFACE OF THE VEHICLE FOR THE CREW TO PER-
FORM THEIR TASK
BRIGHTNESS OF THE TRANSFER ROUTES SHALL BE GREATER THAN
l FOOT LAMBERT
BRIGHTNESS OF WORK STATIONS SHALL BE 5 FEET LAMBERT OR
_DCAT_D
|'.
°
TABLE 12--4. ILLUMINATION REQUIREMENTS
12.2.5
12.2.6
Controls
Lighting controls for on-off operation, intensity selection
and positioning should be readily accessible, operable by a
suited astronaut and adequately labeled. In addition, posi-
tioning control should bear a resemblance to the positioning
motion of the light.
AdJustment s
Significant utilization of a minimal number of lights can be
achieved by providing adjustment capabilities to vary direc-
tion, brightness, field of view and location. Final worksite
design is required to determine the range and types of adjust-
ment necessary for lighting provisions. Worksites which are
large and in which only one particular area is utilized at a
time, are amenable to adjustable lights to limit the number
required. Also, certain tasks and natural lighting effects
which require variance in brightness lend themselves to the
utilization of adjustable intensity lighting.
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12.3 Tools
12.3.1
Tools are required to perform certain tasks at Shuttle work-
sites. This section is concerned with the general require-
ments associated with both the tooling itself and the equip-
ment interfacing this tooling. The primary goal regarding
tooling interfaces is to design replaceable or maintainable
spacecraft equipment which is easily accessible and only re-
quires simple, standardized, commercially available tooling.
This philosophy minimizes both the cost and the number of
different tools required and maximizes working effectiveness.
The following sections summarize the constraints involved in
tooling provisions (worksite, environmental and astronaut)
followed by a presentation of tools previously developed
for space applications.
Worksite Constraints
The most significant worksite constraints concern the room
available and the restraints necessary to use the required
tools. Care must be taken to layout the worksite so as to
provide access to equipment requiring replacement or main-
tenance. Tooling required must then be both commensurate
with this access provided and compatible with the worksite
restraint provisions. Table 12-5 presents a summary of the
restraint categories and the type of working motions most
suitable to each for the selection of the tools and forces
required for operation. A pertinent consideration in tool/
restraint selection lies in the fact that the use of hand
restraints ties up at least one hand and thus tools requiring
the use of two hands are unacceptable when only hand restraints
are provided.
CATEGORY BEST WORKING MOTIONS
HAND RESTRAINT LEFT - RIGHT
TORSO RESTRAINT PUSH - PULL
FOOT RESTRAINT UP - DOWN
TABLE 12--5. WORKSITE RESTRAINTS
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12.3.2
12.3.3
12.3.4
Environmental Constraints
The vacuum, temperature and gravity of EV working operations
must be considered in the design of tools for space main-
tenance. The vacuum environment creates problems with
lubrication of moving parts and cold welding of cutting
edges to the material being worked. In addition, it contri-
butes to the temperature problem because of the absence of
a conductive fluid for cooling. The temperatures of the
equipment being worked on also pose problems of heat flow
which affects the design of tools and accessories. In
addition, the zero gravity environment radically changes
the force and positional relationships of the maintenance
worker, the worksite and the tools.
Astronaut Mobility Constraints
The effect of a pressurized suit on the astronaut's reach,
visibility, force and dexterity must be considered in de-
signing worksite tools. Studies involving dexterity, espe-
cially pertaining to gloved work with small parts, indicates
potential handling problems. The visibility problems result-
ing from both shadows and bright sunlight were considered in
the preceding section and should be kept in mind when design-
ing tools. Finally, limited force applications available
due to suit constraints as well as astronaut restraint limita-
tions must be considered in tooling designs requiring signi-
ficant forces to operate.
Tools Developed for EVA/IVA Applications
Various tools have been developed for space applications and
it is anticipated that most of the Shuttle space tools re-
quirements will be similar. An overview of the current tool
development technology reveals that the classifications listed
in Table 12-6 encompass all tools that might be utilized on
Shuttle EVA/IVA missions.
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12.3.4 Tools Developed for EVA/IVAApplications (Continued)
BONDING AND ELECTROADHESOR TOOLS
CUTTING TOOLS
HAMMERS
GAS LEAK, PRESSURE DETECTION AND MEASUREMENT TOOLS
ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE TOOLS
TOOL KITS AND SETS
SCREWDRIVING AND TORQUING TOOLS
TUBE CONNECTION TOOLS
WELDERS
12.4
TABLE 12_6. EVA/IVA TOOLS
Restraints
Restraint provisions for both the EV astronaut and his
equipment are necessary for task performance at EV work-
sites. Body restraints are generally classified according
to personal attachment points (hand, foot, torso) with the
selection of a particular restraint dependent upon work-
site interfaces and task requirements. Section lO.O
(Restraints) presents a summary of body restraints that
have previously been either qualified or investigated
for space usage. Also included in this summary are
advantages and disadvantages associated with each con-
cept.
Section lO.O (Restraints) also presents equipment tethering
restraint devices; most of which are the same as body re-
straint concepts.
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12.5 Work Platform Concept
12.5.1 General
For the astronaut engaged in extravehicular activity (EVA)
from an orbiting spacecraft, there are many advantages to
working from a stable, maneuverable platform rather than
being free floating and relying upon vehicle protuberances
for restraints and handholds. Results of the EVA/IVA task
identification and analysis effort indicated that a work
platform located at the end of the manipulator boom is a
viable candidate to provide crewman translation and to permit
the EVA crewman to service, maintain or repair payloads and
to assist in the conduct of experiments.
Trade-off studies were performed on various concepts for
the following major areas of work platform design:
a. The interfaces between the work platform and the
manipulator boom.
b. The interfaces between the work platform and the
worksite.
c. The interfaces between the work platform of the
crewman.
The following guidelines were used as the basis for the study
of platform concepts:
a. Platform shall interface with the boom defined by
MSC Internal note 72-EW-B.
b. The platform shall not be required to dock with a
free flying payload.
The work platform shall provide for camera, TV,
lighting, mechanical and electrical tool stowage
and use, payload servicingequipment stowage and
use; crewman restraint to the platform, platform
docking and restraint to the payload work site and
controls which will enable the crewman on the plat-
form to control the movement of the platform.
do The work platform shall not restrict manipulator
movement.
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12.5 Work Platform Concept (Continued)
e.
f.
g.
ht
i.
Platform design shall permit the EVA crewman to
board, or leave the platform at any time it is in
any stationary operational mode.
Communications are provided by the EVA life support
system.
All mechanical and elactr_cal _uterfaces-between
the platform and the boom are assumed to be accom-
plished with one multiple function connector.
Docking and platform restraint system shall not
require electrical power.
Platform crewman restraints shall not interfere
with the crewman life support system.
J. The platform shall be of both minimum weight and
volume in both usage and stowage modes.
k. The maximum torque to be exerted by the crewman
on any connection or disconnection at the work
site is 20 foot-pounds.
IQ Two manipulator control levers are necessary to
achieve control of the number of degrees of
freedom.
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12.5 Work Platform Concept (Continued)
An artist sketch of the complete work platform installed on
the Shuttle attached manipulator system is shown in
Figure 12-3. The work platform consists of three major
areas; the basic structure, the control console and the
docking system.
INTERCHANGEABLE TOOL
MODULES (TWO)
CONTROLS BALL - IN - SOCKET
CKING LEG DOCKING LEGS
(TWO)
T_ _(_'_ __j_/_ _ ELECTRO-MECHANICAL
• _;;;;___..._.2_ INTERFACE BRACKET
/ - CONSOLE '
l_j_'_-/_ SAMS CONFIGURATION
RE
CARGORACK/7 \\_J _ _ TVCAMERA_
SAFETY_ / ___ M_I __
_WLERT ---/ SE DJUSTABL
INDICATOR.___ _ TELESCOPING CONSOLE _ / _,
PANEL SUPPORT LEGS FLOOD _GHT _ 7
FIGURE 12--3. WORK PLATFORM CONCEPT
12.5.2 Work Platform Structure
The basic work platform structure consists of the following:
a.
Floor - The floor is fabricated from perforated
plate to minimize weight. The floor would be de-
signed to support the extravehicular crewman and
the cargo stowage system. The total size of the
floor is approximately 48 inches by 18 inches.
This size provides for two distinct work stations
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12.5.2 Work Platform Structure (Continued)
a. and thus permits the crewman a greater work range
without moving the platform than would be possible
if the floor were sized for a single standing posi-
tion.
be Foot Restraints - The foot restraints are perman-
ently attached to the floor. Two pairs of restraints
are provided, one for each platform work position.
Ce Support Legs - Since the interconnection between the
work platform and the manipulator is at the console,
the two tubular support legs attach the floor and
cargo stowage system to the console. The supports
are telescoping to yield a reduction in stowed volume
of the assembled work platform. In addition, the
interconnection between the floor and the supports
is a locking swivel Joint, which permits folding to
give an even greater reduction in stowed volume.
do Car6o Stowa6e System - The cargo rack is located on
the opposite end of the work platform from the manip-
ulator interface. Being located at the crewman's
left will present no handling problems and should
help to prevent any accidental bumping of the various
controls during cargo transfer. In the retracted
position, the base of the cargo rack fits under the
platform floor and the outboard upright fits flush
against the left side of the platform.
ee Manipulator/Platform Interface - The interface be-
tween the work platform and the manipulator consists
of both a mechanical and an electrical connection.
The mechanical locking system must secure the plat-
form to the manipulator, must be easily actuated by
the crewman for assembling and disassembling the
platform to the manipulator and must withstand an
imposed force of at least B0 pounds applied in any
direction. The electrical interconnection will re-
quire approximately 150 pins to handle all of the
necessary maneuvering controls and the power supply
for the lighting system and power tolls. A side
mount concept was selected for the work platform to
manipulator interface, primarily because it repre-
sents the more readily accessible system and can more
readily use the manipulator's flood-lighting and
television camera.
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12.5.3 Control Console
The work platform control console, shown in more detail in
Figure 12-4, consists of a structural metallic box which
acts as the primary load carrying structure of the work
platform. Mounted on the console are the following:
ao Maneuvering Control - The controls for maneuvering
the manipulator are of the "Joystick" type and are
within comfortable reach and peripheral vision and
are also completely clear of the work area.
b* Indicator Panel - The indicator panel is located at
the top right end of the console and consists of
switches for power to the flood and spot lights and
the manipulator and indicator lights to show if power
to these systems is on or off, In addition, there
would be an indicator to verify that the intercon-
nection between the manipulator and the work platform
had been made securely.
.1 i%
MA.EOVE.,.O ICONT.OL,. ,CATO. i!
• I I I P°wEROUT-LET_
l L_-_-_--j _%SAFETY TETHER
_- ATTACHMENT
COLUMN
CREWMAN SIDE
TOOL DRAWERS INSERTION TOOL
r_ _---_. /,.__ ___.yDOCKING LEG LOCK
__DOCK I NG LEG
RESTRAINT CABLE
OUTLET
WORKSITE SIDE
FIGURE 12--4. CONTROL CONSOLE
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12.5.3 Control Console (Continued)
C. Power Outlet - The outlet for supplying electricity to
power operated tools is located on the right side
immediately below the indicator panel. This location
is in accordance with the clustering of controls on
the right for crewman convenience and for simplicity
of wire routing. The outlet and the mating tool con-
nector would be of the quick disconnect type and
designed for one-handed operation. A switch to con-
trol the power supply to the outlet could be provided
on the indicator panel to preclude connecting or
disconnecting a hot line.
d. Tool Modules - There are two modules which are simply
draw,red, interchangeable tool chests.
e. Lighting - Flexible arm floodlights are mounted on the
ends of the console. Stowage of the lighting arms
during platform translation and vehicle stowage would
be along the support legs.
f. Winch - The winch is manually operated with ratchet
locking, an overriding clutch mechanism and a quick
release. The handle folds flush with the control
console for stowage while not in use. The winch is
mounted so that rotation in the vertical plane is
required rather than in a horizontal plane since
vertical motion is more readily counteracted by the
foot restraints. The cable feed hole is on the work-
site side of the console and is a non-fraying, omni-
directional cable guide. This guide is located as
close as possible to the theoretical apex of the
tripod formed by the three docking legs.
ge Safety Tether - Just below the power outlet on the
right hand-side of the control console is a crewman
safety tether. This tether is attached to the crew-
man at all times he is on the work platform. In nor-
mal operation, no forces are counteracted by the
tether nor does it exhibit any constant tug upon the
crewman. It is intended as a purely emergency
measure, although this tether may be used as a third
restraint point if it is decided to supplement the
foot restraint system.
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12.5.4 Dockin_ System
The docking system secures the work platform to the worksite
and consists of the docking legs, ball/socket locks, and an
insertion tool. An artist's sketch of the docking system is
shown in Figure 12-5.
FIXED SECTION
/
RETRAC IABLE SECTION /_x"-'_
/ --_ ,WORKSlTE
 TT,C. ENT O,NT- /
FIXED LEG'
POINT
LEGS
FIGURE 12--5. DOCKING SYSTEM
Of the three legs which form a tripod for docking restraint,
two are adjustable and one has a fixed length and position.
The two adjustable tripod legs are made up of two concentric
tubes to give a maximum extended length of 4.0 feet. Contact
between the leg and the vehicle is made by a spherical metal
ball with a textured surface. This provides a non-slip contact
at estimated interface pressure forces of five pounds. Lock-
ing of the movable leg is achieved by a handle actuated collet
sleeve on the fixed leg. At the other end of the fixed leg
is another textured ball which is installed in a socket on
the platform. Upon reaching the worksite, the crewman moves
each leg from its stowed position and sets the length by mov-
ing the inner tube to the approximate point of contact with
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12.5.4 Docking System (Continued)
the worksite surface. The leg length is then locked in
position with the collet lock. The legs are then rotated
to contact with the vehicle and, when all legs are in posi-
tion, the socket locking mechanism is set, thereby firmly
holding the legs in place.
The restraint cable insertion tool is a simple, ball-lock
device. The tool consists of a rod attached to the end
of the restraint cable. At the end of the rod is a spher-
ical ball. To dock the work platform to the worksite, the
ball is inserted into the top of a keyhole shaped opening
in the worksite and is then pushed into the leg of the
opening. The use of a ball ensures balanced force compon-
ents once the cable is made taut.
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13.0 EMERGENCY IV
13.1 General
In the Space Shuttle Program as in all manned spaceflight
programs, the safety of the crew is of prime importance.
Crew safety is ensured by providing emergency crew support
capability. Experience gained during previous manned space-
flights such as Gemini VIII and Apollo 13 provides ample
evidence of the need to provide protection for contingen-
cies. The baseline orbiter systems are designed to be
"fail operational - fail safe" which allows the crew to
safely abort following two malfunctions of any given system.
There are, however, other failure conditions where the base-
line orbiter cannot provide crew support to insure a safe
return of the crew to earth.
in this section, other failure modes which could affect the
safety of the crew are identified along with the procedures
which can be followed by the crew for a safe return. Based
on the failure modes, the procedural and mission options
available, Emergency IV requirements are formulated and
equipment concepts are identified.
The Orbiter spacecraft is currently required to carry equip-
ment and consumables for use during such emergencies. Each
flight carries contingency consumables as required to support
a crew of four (4) men for a period of 96 hours. These con-
sumables are used in conjunction with the EC/LSS to satisfy
contingency requirements. A portable breathing systemfor
each crewman is also on each flight to be used in the event
that the cabin atmosphere becomes contaminated with smoke or
other toxic gases. The breathing system contains a ten (10)
minute supply of oxygen which can be recharged from the space-
Craft 900 psia 02 supply system. However, the spacecraft
baseline requirements do not allow for crew support in a
depressurized cabin.
The Orbiter has the capability of rescuing the crew of another
Orbiter following failure conditions which prohibit a safe
de-orbit and landing. A docking module is carried when dock-
ing is a planned operation of that particular flight. Rescue
of an Orbiter which has an attached docking module can be
accomplished by means of direct docking of the two Orbiters
followed by intravehicular crew transfer to the rescuing
Orbiter. The rescue of an Orbiter which does not have an
attached docking module require other methods of rescuing
the crew which will be identified and assessed.
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13.2 Emer6enc [ IV Modes Identification and Effect
A North American Rockwell Study, (Safety in Earth Orbit Study)
identified the credible emergencies listed below chich were
used in this study to assist in the identification of emergency
IV modes.
• Loss of Cabin Pressure
• Fire
• Toxic Gases in Cabin
• Explosion
Loss of cabin pressure can result from a collision between the
Orbiter and another space vehicle or space debris, meteoroid
penetration, hatch or window failure or puncture of Orbiter
pressure shell due to improper handling of equipment within
the Orbiter. Loss of cabin pressure requires that the crew
obtain pressure protection through pressure suit operation or
seek refuge in the airlock, Sortie Lab, or a pressurizable
module specifically carried for this purpose.
A fire in the Orbiter cabin or an attached payload such as a
Sortie Lab has the affect of contaminating the atmosphere with
products of combustion including carbon dioxide and carbon
monoxide. The occurrence of a fire requires that the crew be
provided with an acceptable breathing oxygen supply or enter
an enclosed compartment which isolates the crew from the con-
taminated atmosphere.
Toxic gases within the cabin or Sortie Lab can result from
spillage of experiment related materials which can contaminate
the cabin environment. For this case, the crew requires pro-
tection similar to that required subsequent to a fire.
An explosion occurring in the payload bay or cabin can result
in loss of cabin pressure, fire and toxic gases in the cabin
and/or structural damage to the Orbiter which maybe too
extensive for the Orbiter to de-orbit and land. Crew protec-
tion subsequent to an explosion is similar to that of a
depressurized cabin and/or a fire.
Failure of an airlock hatch to open could trap a crewman within
a Sortie Lab or servicing module unless a redundant escape
route is available. It appears to be more desireable to leave
both airlock hatches open while pressurized payloads are manned
to avoid the possibility of trapping a crewman and to eliminate
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13.2 Emer6ency IV Modes Identification and Effect - Continued
the cost and weight impacts of redundant escape routes or
long term EC/LSS equipments.
Failure of the airlock external hatch to close or the in-
ternal hatch to open requires that the cabin be depressur-
ize_ to permit EVA crew ingress. This failure mode requires
that all personnel on board have pressure suits since the
airlock is not available to the cabin personnel and access
to a Sortie Lab is blocked by the failed airlock.
Figure 13-1 summarizes the effect of each failure mode.
The failure modes of loss of cabin pressure, and explosion
can result in a depressurized cabin condition. Similarly,
the failure modes of fire, toxic gases, and explosion can
_+__ _h_ _ Q_m__
FAILURE MODE
i
LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE
EXPLOSION
FIRE
TOXIC GASES
FAILURE EFFECT
DEPRESSURIZED CABIN
CONTAMINATED CABIN
ATMOSPHERE
FIGURE 13--1. FAILURE MODES EFFECT
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13.3 Emergency IV Procedures and Mission Options
In this section, the crew procedures and mission options
available following an emergency mode are identified and
discussed.
Figure 13-2 summarizes the procedures which the crew must
implement following the occurrence of a failure.
I EMERGENCY IIV MODES 1
t
II IMMEDIATE
SURVIVAL
PROCEDURES
I CREW "!STATUSCHECK
.1
I FAILURE ANALYSIS
&
CORRECTIVE ACTION
__CONTINUEMISSION I
-_ ABORT I
R ESCUE I
.__I_.IION - BOARDSURVIVAL
EV SURVIVALI
ESCAPE & I
DE - ORBIT I
. .I!ABO"Til
RESCUE i
FIGURE 13--2. CREW PROCEDURES AND MISSION OPTIONS
a) Immediate Survival Procedures - The objective of these
procedures is to obtain crewmen protection for sufficient
duration to allow the crew to take corrective action, es-
tablish emergency operating modes and to eliminate the
failure mode where possible. The procedures include don-
ning of pressure suits or breathing systems, and isolation
of crewmen in compartments such as the airlock or Sortie
Lab.
After equipment donning at least two crewmen must have
the freedom to move about the cabin to perform various
tasks associated with crew status check, failure analysis
and corrective action.
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13.3
_ersency IV Procedures and Mission Options - Continued
b) Crew Status Check - A crew status check is performed to
verify that all crewmen have obtained the required pro-
tection. As part of these procedures any crewmen injured
as a result of the failure would be located, attended to
and/or rescued from aanger0us areas such as a contaminated
Sortie Lab environment.
c) Failure Analysis - The objective of these procedures is
to identify the source, cause, or location of the failure
such that corrective action can be taken. For example,
as part of these procedures, a fire in an avionics bay
would be identified and located.
d) Corrective Action - The purpose of these proceaures is to
_±±_±,_= _,= failure condition or ±_ progression mud t_
establish proper spacecraft systems configuration for con-
tinued operation or survivability.
The mission options following occurrence of a failure mode are
also shown in Figure 13-2. The following paragraphs discuss
these options and give examples.
a) Continue Mission - This option is available when the
failure condition does not significantly affect the Orbiter
or its payload and allows completion of the flight. A fire
which has been isolated to a Sortie Lab but did not affect
equipment operation allows continuation of the mission after
an atmosphere change out through an airlock/Sortie Lab de-
pressurization and repressurization.
b) Abort - A mission abort is required if the failure con-
dition affects spacecraft systems or ita payload such that
the mission objectives cannot be achieved. For this case,
the cabin environment is not affected, thereby eliminating
the need for additional survival equipment. For example,
the Sortie Lab fire previously discussed has destroyed the
experiment equipment such that the mission objective cannot
be met.
c) Rescue - Rescue is required when the failure condition does
not allow the Orbiter to safely de-orbit ard land, although
the Orbiter cabin is habitible. Examples of this option are
failure to undock from an LST or Space Station following a
revisit or an explosion in the payload bay that affects the
structural integrity of the spacecraft.
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13.3 Emergency IV Procedures and Mission Options - Continued
d) On-Board Survival - On-board survival is required if the
failure affects the Orbiter such that its life support
functions are not available thereby requiring other
means of providing life support for the crew. For
example, a collision during a docking maneuver results
in cabin depressurization, the crew then must obtain
pressure protection in the airlock, Sortie Lab or pressure
suits. Depending on the extent of damage, the crew may
either de-orbit and land or await rescue by another Orbiter.
As part of the rescue, the stranded crew must transfer to
the rescue vehicle.
e) Escape and EV Survival - Escape and EV survival is required
if the damage due to a failure is too extensive for on-
board survival. The crew evacuates the Orbiter and remains
in a "lifeboat" until a rescue can be affected. For example,
an explosion damages all Orbiter systems such that on-board
survival is not possible. The crew enters a separable crew
compartment(s) with life support capabilities to await a
rescue.
f) Escape and De-orbit - This option is similar to escape and
EV survival except the life boat has de-orbit re-entry
capability.
Each of the above options are reviewed to determine their appli-
cability to the Shuttle Program. The options requiring escape
with EV survival or de-orbit are not considered applicable be-
cause these options are preceded by a massive failure of the
Orbiter such as an explosion. It is highly probable that such
a failure would also result in failure of the life boat or re-
entry vehicle. In addition, the "life boat" concepts impose
excessive cost, weight and volume impacts on all flights; an
application which has an extremely low probability of usage.
Review of the crew procedures and options shows that the
following phases require special support considerations for
the crew:
a) Immediate survival
b) On-board survival during mission aborts and while
awaiting a rescue.
c) Crew transfer to complete a rescue.
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13.3 Emergency IV Procedures and Mission Options - Continued
Each of these phases are reviewed in detail to establish
requirements,to identify potential support options and to
assess potential equipment concepts.
Groundrules established for conduct of the study are listed
in Table 13-1. The availability of vehicle subsystems are
highly probable because of the fail operational-fail safe
criteria of the Orbiter subsystem design. A four man crew
is specified since most flights are for payload deployment
which does not require additional crewmen. A tumbling space-
craft is also highly unlikely because of the fail operational -
fail safe criteria. Secondly a study performed by North
American Rockwell (Safety in Earth Orbit) identifies two
viable concepts for vehicle stabilization as part of a
_L_uu_c--uu--_il_uu_ _escue.
VEHICLE SUPPORT SYSTEM OF 02 , POWER AND COOLING
ARE AVAILABLE
FOUR (4) CREWMEN ARE ON BOARD
A FAILED ORBITER WILL NOT BE TUMBLING DURING A
CREW TRANSFER PHASE
TABLE 13--1. EMERGENCY IV GROUNDRULES
13.4 Short-Term Survival Phase
As discussed earlier, the short-term survival phase provides
crew support during crew status checks, failure analysis,
performance of corrective action and initiating the on-board
survival operating modes. Upon receipt of a warning or indica-
tion of cabin contamination or pressure loss, all crew members
must obtain breathing and pressure protection as rapidly as
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13.4 Short-Term Survival Phase - Continued
possible. In compliance with this need, a requirement of one
(1) minute is established as a reasonable design objective for
a trained crewman to accomplish one of the following:
a) Don a breathing system and initiate operation.
b) Don a pressure suit and activate pressure control of a
supporting system.
c) Enter an isolatable compartment and secure a hatch. This
option is not available to all of the crew since cabin
occupancy is required by at least two crewmen to perform
the tasks discussed below.
At least two of the crewmen must have the freedom to move about
the cabinvehicle wearing breathing systems or pressure suits
to perform all or some of the tasks listed below:
Extinguish Fire
Provide Protective Equipment for Injured Personnel
Stow Equipment Prior to Initiating an Abort
Inspect Damage
Coordinate Corrective Action with Ground Personnel
Initiate On-Board Survival
The time required to perform the tasks involving complete free-
dom of movement is established at one (1) hour during which two
of the crewmen may extinguish fire, stow equipment or care for
any injured personnel. Following this one hour period,
protection for an additional three hours is required for the
crew to coordinate all activities with ground and initiate
on-board survival operating modes. This time period allows
for two orbits during which ground coordination takes place.
Table 13-2 summarizes the short-term survival requirements
which are to be satisfied under contaminated or depressurized
cabin conditions.
13-8
Hamilton U
DIVISION OF UNITE[3 A_RCr_AFT CORPOnATK)N
Standard I::1®
SP 01T73
13.4 Short-Term Survival Phase - Continued
DONNING TIME 1 MINUTE MAXIMUM
DURATION 4 HOURS MAXIMUM (WITH
3 HOURS OF VEHICLE
SUPPORT)
INDEPENDENT OPERA-
TIONAL TIME
METABOLIC RATE
C02 CONTROL
1 HOURMAXIMUM
800 BTU/HR AVERAGE
7.6 MM HGMAXIMUM
PRESSURE CONTROL 8.0 TO 14.7 PSIA
C02 PARTIAL PRESSURE 3.1 TO 14.7 PSIA
THERMAL CONTROL THERMAL STORAGE LESS THAN
300 BTU
TABLE 13--2. SHORT TERM SURVIVAL REQUIREMENTS
13.4.1 Contaminated Cabin Conditions
A breathing system is the preferred system for short-term
survival since it provides for breathing protection, can be
donned and activated quickly and can be portable. Figure
13-3 schematically defines the baseline Orbiter breathing system
which is on-board for each crewman. This system provides ten
(lO) minutes of independent operation and can be operated or
recharged from the vehicle 900 psia 02 supply for extended
operation. The primary disadvantage of this sytem is its
high oxygen usage rate which results in depletion of the Orbiter
contingency 02 supply (50 pounds) in approximately six (6)
hours as indicated by Figure 13-4. Although this approach
satisfies the short-term survival requirements, the high
oxygen usage rate is not desireable because:
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13.4.1 Contaminated Cabin Conditions - Continued
02
BOTTLE
FIGURE 13--3. SHUTTLE BASELINE BREATHING SYSTEM
5°ttTEC0NTINGECY040•
 3ot/20 NO. OF MEN: 4METABOLIC RATE: 800 BTU/HR
CABIN PRESSURE: 14.7 PSIA
lOo1
o ,'o 2'o
USEAGE TIME - HRS
FIGURE 13--4. BASELINE BREATHING SYSTEM
OXYGEN USAGE
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13.4.1 Contaminated Cabin Conditions - Continued
a)
b)
Additional oxygen would be required to satisfy on-board
survival requirements.
Oxygen exhausted from the system increases the cabin
oxygen concentration which should be avoided while trying
to extinguish a fire.
c) The in flow of oxygen results in continuous operation of
cabin relief valves.
A modification of the baseline breathing system is shown in
Figure 13-5 which converts the sytem to a re-breather type to
significantly reduce the 02 usage rate. Table 13-3 compares the
performance capabilities of the baseline system with and without
the modification.
f_(MASK
FIGURE 13--5. MODIFIED BASELINE BREATHING SYSTEM
13-II
UHamilton ...._......................
Standard Pl®
SP 01T73
13.k.l Contaminated Cabin Conditions - Continued
lw .
TYPE
BASELINE SYSTEM
OPEN LOOP
MODIFIED BASE-
LINE SYSTEM
RE-BREATHER
DURATION lO MINUTES ONE HOUR
02 USAGE RATE 2.0 LBS/HR 0.14 LBS/HR
L
WEIGHT * l.O LBS INCREASE
* WEIGHT IS INCLUDED IN SHUTTLE BASELINE
TABLE 13--3. BREATHING SYSTEM CONCEPT COMPARISONS
Note that breathing protection can be increased from ten (lO)
minutes to one hour with less than a one pound increase in
system weight which is mostly due to Li0H and canister. The
02 bottle and regulator are unchanged. Figure 13-6 compares
oxygen usage of the baseline system with and without the
modification.
Extended operation for the additional three (3) hours can be
achieved by _nbilical operation from the spacecraft 02 supply.
For CO2 control, several options are available including:
;201 /
_|/ OFM_,, .....
/ METABOLIC PJ_TE: 800 BTU/HR
0V_V l I
o lo 2o ;o ;o 5'o & _o _o
USEAGETIME-,RS
FIGURE 13--6. BREATHING SYSTEM OXYGEN USAGE
COM PAR1 SON
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1B. .l Contaminated Cabin Conditions - Continued
a) Replace breathing system cartridges at one hour intervals.
b) Design breathing system cartridge for four (4) hours
of operation.
c) Add an adapter which permits use of PLSS or Shuttle EC/LSS
Li0H cartridges.
It must be pointed out that the re-breather type system
introduces a humidity problem when used in conjunction with a
face mask. Visor fogging is an unacceptable condition while
performing the various tasks associated with the short term
survival phase. The potential solutions to the visor fogging
problem include:
a) Anti-fog Sprays
b) Inlet 02 Cooling with Phase Change Materials Including Ice
c) Inlet 02 Cooling with Vehicle Coolant
d) Use of Dessicants
Further analysis and test is required to determine the extent
of visor fogging and to select the proper concept.
1B.4.2
From review of the short term survival phase under contaminated
cabin conditions, the following conclusions are reached:
a) A breathing system is required
b) 02 usage of the breathing system should be minimized.
c) Additional study and test is required for breathing
system optimization.
Depressurized Cabin Conditions
Short term survival in the event that cabin pressure is lost
requires that the crew obtain pressure protection as soon as
possible. Since pressure suits are required for all personnel
on board the perferred approach is for the crew to don their
pressure suits and activate the supporting equipment. The
type of equipment required for this phase is similar to the
on-board survival phase which is discussed paragraph 13.5.2.
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13.5 On-Board Survival Phase
During the on-board survival phase, crew support is required
until a mission abort or a rescue is successfully completed.
The time required to de-orbit and land under abort condition
depends upon the spacecraft orbit, available landing sites
and the activities in progress at the time of the failure.
Yor this study, it was assumed that KSC and the Western Test
Range are the only landing sites available and that the failure
occurs with the Orbiter in a polar orbit and located over the
Western Test Range. Based on these conditions, a requirement
of ten (10) hours was established for crew support during
mission abort conditions.
The capability for the crew to consume food and water is con-
sidered desireable but not mandatory for the safety of the
crew.
The most important aspect of the mission abort crew procedures
are those required for Orbiter de-orbit, re-entry and landing.
Therefore, all critical spacecraft controls and displays should
be operable and visible with the flight crew wearing either
pressure suits or breathing masks.
The time required to accomplish a rescue depends primarily
upon the status of rescueing spacecraft. Since it could take
several days to prepare another Orbiter for launch, the study
assumed that the rescue could be accomplished within a four
(4) day period since each Orbiter carries four days of con-
tingency consumabl_to support a crew of four (4) men.
The capability to administer food and water to the crew is
essential during the four day period. Similarly a capability
is required for the management of waste products during opera-
tion in a depressurized and a contaminated cabin atmosphere.
Table 13-4 summarizes the on-board survival requirements which
commence at the time of failure and end at completion of mission
abort or transfer of the crew to a rescue vehicle.
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13.5 On-Board Survival Phase - Continued
DURATION
MISSION ABORT
RESCUE MISSION
lO HOURS MAXIMUM
96 HOURS MAXIMUM
LIFE SUPPORT
METABOLIC RATE
PRESSURE CONTROL
500 BTU/HR AVERAGE
BREATHING SYSTEM
PRESSURE SUiT
02 PARTIAL PRESSURE
C02CONTROL
THERMAL CONTROL
3.5 TO 14.7 PSIA
3.5 TO 8.4 PSiA
3.2 PSIA MINIMUM
7.6 MM HG MAXIMUM
300 BTU/MAX IMUM
HEAT STORAGE
OTHER
FOOD AND WATER ADMINISTRATION
WASTE MANAGEMENT PROVISION
BREATHING SYSTEM OR PRESSURE SUIT OPERATION OR
CONTROLS
TABLE 13--4. ON BOARD SURVIVAL REQUIREMENTS
Figure 13-7 identifies the potential locations for on-board
survival as being the cabin or an isolateable compartment
such as the airlock or a Sortie Lab. As mentioned previously,
at least two crewmen (i.e. Pilot and Co-Pilot) must remain in the
cabin for spacecraft control during de-orbit and landing. Crew
support in the Sortie Lab is not recommended because it is not
available on all flights. Air Lock support which may not be
available due to the failure condition, also requires duplica-
tion of cabin facilities including crew restraints for de-orbit
and landing, food, water, waste management and life support
equipment. Therefore, the cabin area is the recommended loca-
tion for on-board survival of the crew.
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13.5 On-Board Survival Phase - Continued
L_ COMPARTMENT I
ISOLATION
=AIR LOCK
ON -BOARD • SORTIE LAB
SURV'VA--.---.--Lt
• CONTAMINATEDCABIN_ "_ II CABIN II
• DEPRESSURIZED
CABIN -CARRY - ON
•VEHICLE
INTEGRATED
• AVAILABILITY?
C • CREW CAPACITY?
• SUPPORT SYSTEMS - NONE
I eAVAILABLE
• CREW CAPACITY - 2 TO 10
• SUPPORT SYSTEMS
-CONTROLS
-COMMUNICATIONS
-CREW RESTRAINTS
-FOOD & WATER
-OXYGEN
-LiOH
FIGURE 13--7. ON BOARD SURVIVAL LOCATIONS
13.5.1 Contaminated Cabin On-Board Survival
Figure 13-8 identifies the options available for lon_ term
crew support in a contaminated cabin. The options are
as follows:
a) Breathing system operation: The crew remains on the
breathing system for up to 96 hours.
b) Suited operation: After completion of short term survival
operations, the crew dons pressure suits which serve
as a barrier between the crewman and the contaminated
environment.
c) Cabin Depressurization: The cabin is depressurized and the
crew utilize the equipment for depressurized cabin support.
d) Shirt-Sleeve: After the crew is suited, the cabin is
depressurized and then repressurized to clear the contami-
nated environment which then permits return to shirtsleeve
operation
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13.5.1 Contaminated Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
I CONTAMINATED ICABIN
I BREATHINGSYSTEM
OPERATION
CABIN ___
DUMP
t
ABORT I
RESCUE I
• t
CABIN REPRESS L_ _
ISHIRTSLEEVE OPERA][ION /
FIGURE 13--8. CONTAMINATED CABIN LIFE SUPPORT OPTIONS
Figure 13-9 identifies the potential problems which may be
encountered with each of the available options.
I CONTAMINATED I
CABIN I
LEAKAGE , BREATHING
02 TOXICITY SYSTEM
[ I SUITED I02 TOXICITY I -- OPERATION
I
I AV'ON'CSI_l CAB,N
[
___ I DuMP I_ IPERFORMANCE!- I U
02 & N2 I CABIN PRESS
QUANTITY I SH RTSLEEVE OPERATION I
ABORT
RESCUE I
FIGURE 13--9. CONTAMINATED CABIN LIFE SUPPORT
OPTIONS ASSESSMENT
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13.5.1
13.5.2
Contaminated Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
With long term mask operation, problems of oxygen toxicity
and mask leakage could be encountered. Pure oxygen breath-
ing system operation at 14.7 psia is limited to approximately
four (4) hours (per Guidelines established for this study).
Potential solutions include the use of a two-gas breathing
system or reduction of cabin pressure to approximately 5 psia
to allow continued operation. Leakage of contaminants into
the breathing system is possible due to beard growth and
intake of food and drink. Potential solutions of mask leakage
include the use of a neck seal and/or a positive pressure
breathing system.
The suited operation mode eliminates the mask leakage problem
but requires a two-gas pressure control system or reduced
cabin pressure to avoid oxygen toxicity problems.
The depressurized cabin option alleviates the oxygen toxicity
problem since an 8 psia suit operating pressure allows 30
hours of operation before onset of oxygen toxicity. This
capability can satisfy the mission abort requirements but two-
gas systems or reduced operating pressures are required for
rescue missions. In addition, complete cabin depressuriza-
tion could result in freeze-up of the EC/LSS heat exchanger and
in loss of avionics cooling. A potential solution to these
problem areas is to limit the cabin depressurization to 0.5 to
1.O psia with the avionics equipment powered down during the
depressurization. Further analysis and possibly tests are re-
quired to establish the minimum acceptable pressure level.
The final option provides for crew operation in a shirt sleeve
mode following cabin depressurization to the minimum acceptable
level, nitrogen purge and repressurization to an acceptable
level for life support. This option allows for maximum utili-
zation of Orbiter facilities with the crew in the shirt sleeve
operating mode. Implementation of this optionrequires the
capability to depressurize the cabin and possibly the addition
of some nitrogen and oxygen depending on the level of cabin
depressurization, amount of nitrogen purge and the final cabin
pressure level.
Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival
As concluded earlier, pressure suits should be provided for all
on board personnel for support of depressurized cabin condi-
tions. This section identifies potential suit support equip-
ment and reviews the advantages and disadvantages of candidate
concepts.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival _ Continued
An assessment of the Orbiter capability to perform under
depressurized cabin conditions shows the following poten-
tial problem areas:
- Avionic equipment cooling
- Collapsing cabin pressure during re-entry
- Condensing heat exchanger freeze-up
The avionics equipment is normally cooled by either cold
plate or by a continuous flow of air. Depressurized cabin
conditions may result in loss of all avionics equipment
which relies on gas cooling. To allow for Orbiter opera-
tions for mission aborts and rescues, it is recommended
that all avionics equipment required for de-orbit, re-entry,
landing, rendezvous and Shuttle-to-Shuttle docking be cold
plated.
During re-entry, under depressurized cabin conditions, the
ambient pressure rises at a higher rate than the cabin
pressure due to the EC/LSS in-flow restriction of 150 lbs/
hour. This condition may result in a significant collapsing
load imposed on the Orbiter cabin, which should be fully
assessed to determine if the collapsing load is excessive
for the cabin and, if so, to select a concept to alleviate
the condition. Concepts should include:
Addition of cabin in-flow values to allow equal-
ization of cabin pressure with atmosphere pressure.
Modification of cabin in-flow restrictions to
assure safe structural loadings
- Addition of cabin structure
The coolant within the condensing heat exchanger of the
EC/LSS may freeze due to the rapid boiling of the conden-
sate upon exposure to vacuum. Potential solutions are
discussed later in this section.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
Table 13-5 identifies the suit support equipment types which
could be used.
VEHICLE INTEGRATED EQUIPMENT
-SUIT LOOP
CARRY - ON EQUIPMENT
-MINI- EC/LSS
-PLSS
-ELSS
TABLE 13--5. SUIT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TYPES
The vehicle integrated equipment concepts are similar to the
Apollo Command Module and Lunar Module concepts where common
EC/LSS equipment is used for environmental control of both the
cabin and suit loops.
The carry-on equipment concepts include use of suit support
isolated from the cabin environmental control equipment.
Use of the PLSS for suit support in a depressurized cabin
is an example of this approach.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
Figure 13-10 is a schematic of the Shuttle EC/LSS which
has been simplified through the elimination of redundant
water loop fluid lines and heat exchanger passages.
,[
TEMP CONTROL'-.
FILTER If _
"'x%
F_Y _ LiOH ASS'Y
POTABLE
WATER -_-_
_CONDENSATE
VENT
_JJL_ UBLIMATOR
t
WATER
WATER H/X(_CHILLER)
AVIONICS
.--L_ BAYS
r" .... I I- ....... 1
_--]ll_ _
_, :_: ',_
_o,:;_ _: .',_
"_"-_" COLD
WALL PLATE
1
FREON
LOOP
FIGURE 13--10. SHUTTLE EC/LSS SCHEMATIC
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin 0n-Board Survival - Continued
In Figure 13-11 a suit loop is added to the EC/LSS to
utilize the system fans, Li0H and heat exchanger.
FILTER H/X (
CONDENSATE
LiOH ASSY
FIGURE 13--11. SUIT LOOP SCHEMATIC--BASIC
Two pressure actuated isolation valves are added to isolate
the suit loop from the cabin environment. The umbilicals
must be of sufficient length to allow freedom of crewman
movement to perform the tasks identified for short-term
survival.
Further review of the system reveals that the EC/LSS fans
are not compatible for suit loop support since the axial fans
are designed for high flow (approximately 200 cfm) and low pres-
sure rise operation. They do not have sufficient pressure
rise to support the suit loop conditions.
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13.5.2 De_ressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
Fan design for support of the suit loop mode results in
low efficiency operation during the normal operating mode.
To minimize vehicle penalties during normal operation, a
suit loop centrifugal fan is added as shown in Figure 13-12.
FILTER
t ONE
LiOH ASSY
FIGURE 13--12. SUIT LOOP SCHEMATIC--FAN ADDITION
The check valve at the outlet of the suit loop fan prevent
back flow of cabin air during normal modes. During the
96 hour rescue missions, it will be necessary to replace
Li0H cartridges. Figure 13-13 adds LiOH cartridge isolation
valves which permit cartridge change out without loss of
suit loop pressure.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
The suit loop system of Figure 13-13, with the addition of
a pressure control subsystem (not shown for clarity), has
the capability of long-term support of suited operation.
FILTER
TEMP
FAN ASSY
H/X
LiOH ASSY
)ENSATE
FIGURE 13--13. SUIT LOOP SCHEMATIC--LIOH ISOLATION
The pressure control subsystem requires regulators capable
of maintaining suit pressure at 8.0 psia.
The entire EC/LSS systemwith the integrated suit loop must
now be reviewed to ensure compliance with the fail opera-
tional - fail safe criteria.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
Figure 13-14 shows the addition of parallel suit loop
isolation valves required in the event that one of the
suit loop isolation valves should fail in the closed
position.
FILTER
CONDENSATE
"\
'LiOH ASSY
FIGURE 13--14. SUIT LOOP SCHEMATIC--PARALLEL
i SOLATION VALVES
Without this redundancy such a failure would result in loss
of cabin ventilation cooling, C02 control and b_midity
control.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
If any of the four (4) suit loop isolation valves fail to
close, the system does not satisfy the fail safe criteria.
Therefore, four (4) more suit loop isolation valves are
added as shown in Figure 13-15.
TEMP
FAN ASSY )ENSATE
FILTER H/X (
LiOH ASSY
FIGURE 13--15. SUIT LOOP SCHEMATIC--REDUNDANT
! SOLATION VALVE S
In order to fully comply with the fail operational - fail
safe criteria, it may also be necessary to add similar
valving arrangements for the LiOH cartridge isolation
valves and to the pressure control subsystem.
Although the suit loop concept can be designed to support
suited operation, it yields a complex system which could
significantly impact the reliability of the EC/LSS during
normal operating modes.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
The carry-on equipment concepts utilize a "mini-EC/LSS"
or the PLSS to provide support of suited operation as
shown in Figure 13-16.
O2
POWER VENT//L,OH ' \L,OH
/%J C-'L pnWl:lq _ _/ _ _ __JSUBLIMATOR
WATER• FREONLOOP
/VATER H/X(_ }_=J POTABLE CHILLER
TEMPCONTROL"_ WATER _---_ _ 1
1_ ILTER if" _ ._-CONDENSATE AVIONICS
_ I1'_:c_--_:,c_,
II'II LiOH ASS'Y PUMP ; II;EI_]_ A_:__L_J_ AFAN ASS'Y ,.u.,
_, 2_ ___' 'H',_
_.u L.L, CO LD
WALL PLATE
FIGURE 13--16. CARRY ON CONCEPT SCHEMATIC
The schematic shown in Figure 13-16 is intended to show
concept rather than a selected approach or equipment
assignments.
The concepts utilize consumables available in the cabin
consisting of 900 psia 02, power supplies and contingency
LiOH cartridges. Cooling is achieved by adding a heat
exchanger down-stream of the freon-water interchanger which
provides an independent coolant loop to the carry-on units.
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13.5.2 D e_ressurized Cabin 0n-Board Survival - Continued
Fail operational - fail safe criteria is satisfied by
utilizing redundant heat exchanger passages and pumps
designed so that each one is capable of handling the total
load. Pressure control is achieved by an oxygen regulator
capable of controlling pressure at 8.0 psia for short-term
survival and 5.0 psia for periods in excess Of 30 hours to
avoid oxygen toxicity problems.
If the cabin depressurization freezes the condensing heat
exchanger such that the coolant within the unit also
freezes, all cooling to the carry-on units and the avionics
bay is lost. Figure 13-17 shows two potential options for
system operation following freeze up of the heat exchanger.
iOH
POTAB LE
TEMP CONTROL--,. WATER
FILTER _CONDENSATE
H/Xq
OPTION 1
TO FREON
LOOP
VENT
SUBLIMATOR
WATER'
WATER
CHILLER
AVIONICS
BAYS
r ....... 1
FREON
LOOP
FAN ASS'Y
LiOH ASS'Y
OPTION 2
HEAT EXCHANGER
BY-- PASS
COLD COLD
WALL PLATE
AIR
HIX
FIGURE 13--17. HEAT EXCHANGER FREEZE UP OPTIONS
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
One option is to locate the heat exchanger carry-on equip-
ment in the freon loop which ensure crewman cooling but no
avionics cooling. The second option is to add a bypass
around the blocked condensing heat exchanger to provide
cooling of the crewman _nd avionics equipment. However,
the fail operational - fail safe criteria may require a
significant quantity of bypass valves (a minimum of two (2)
valves are required). It appears that the heat exchanger
bypass is the better of the two options which should be
confirmed by additional study.
Figure 13-18 schematically defines a carry-on "mini-EC/LSS"
capable of supporting two (2) suited crewmen. The Li0H
canisters contain sufficient cartridges to support the two
(2) crewmen for 96 hours.
/SUIT ISOLATION VALVES_
02 SUPPLY POWER COOLING
VEHICLE SUPPORT SYSTEM
FIGURE 13--18. MINI EC/LSS SCHEMATIC
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival- Continued
A concept for PLSS usage is shown in Figure 13-19 which
employs a control module located between the PLSS/ELSS.
CONTROLMODULE_
\ _ LELSSC,) F-n] ==
--T--- -] '
02 SUPPLY
VEHICLE
POWER SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
COOLING
EC/LSS
LiOH
ADAPTER
FIGURE 13--19. PLSS EMERGENCY IV SUPPORT
In this concept, an adapter is usedto allow usage of the
EC/LSS contingency cartridges in the PLSS. Cartridge change-
out, if required is accomplished by closing the control
module valve to isolate the PLSS from the suit. The ELSS
and a lowpurge is then activated to provide pressure and C0 2
control while the Li0H cartridge is changed. PLSS usage has the
following advantagesfor support of emergency suited operations:
a. Two (2) are available on all flights.
b. It is a portable unit for use while performing short-term
survival tasks.
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13.5.2 Depressurized Cabin 0n-Board Survival - Continued
Full advantage of PLSS utilization could be realized by
supporting two (2) crewmen on one PLSS in a buddy system
approach as was employed for emergency lunar surface oper-
ation during the Apollo program. However, the Orbiter crew
would be required to wear liquid cooling garments at all
times in order to provide adequate crewman cooling unless
a significant penalty is imposed on the PLSS to provide for
gas cooling of two crewmen.
The addition of the vehicle water cooling subsystem allows
for other uses, including crewman cooling during EVA prep-
aration or while performing short-term experiment related
tasks within a sortie lab which does not have an active
temperature control system.
Based on a subjective evaluation of the parameters identified
in Figure 13-20, the carry-on equipment concept appears to be
the superior approach. However, additional study is required
to quantify these parameters.
COST
WEIGHT
VOLUME
POWER
FLEXIBILITY
OPERABILITY
RELIABILITY
MAINTENANCE
CARRY-ON
SYSTEM
FIGURE 13--20. SUIT SUPPORT SYSTEM SELECTION
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13.5.2
13.6
Depressurized Cabin On-Board Survival - Continued
The carry-on approach is believed to have lower cost, weight
and volume than the integrated suit loop in addition to the
following advantages:
a. Improved overall flexibility and capability since the
equipment can be used for various other applications.
b. The amount of equipment carried on each flight can be
tailored to specific flight needs (two men versus four
men, for example).
c. Minimum changes are imposed on the basic EC/LSS to main-
tain its high reliability.
d* Equipment servicing can be performed off the vehicle
thereby minimizing interference with vehicle servicing
and maintenance operations.
Crew Transfer Phase
Completion of a rescue mission is achieved upon successful
transfer of the crew from the failed Orbiter to the rescue-
ing vehicle. The potential options for accomplishing the
transfer is illustrated in Figure 13-21.
I CR EWT ANSFER
IV TRANSFER I
• D/M ON - BOARD
• D/M ON - ORBIT
ATTACHMENT
• PAY LOAD
TRANSFER
EV TRANSFER I
• VACUUM IV
TRANSFER
• FREE SPACE
• MANIPULATOR
FIGURE 13--21. CREW TRANSFER OPTIONS
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13.6 Crew Transfer Phase - Continued
Based on the selected options, the crew transfer require-
ments of Table 13-6 are established.
TIME FOR TRANSFER 1 HOUR
METABOLIC RATE 800 BTU/HR/MAN
b
CO2 CONTROL 15 MM Hg MAX
PRESSURE CONTROL 8.5 PSIA MAX
02 PARTIAL PRESSURE 3,1 PSIA MIN
THERMAL CONTROL 300 BTU MAX HEAT STORAGE
TABLE 13--6. CREW TRANSFER REQUIREMENTS
The duration of transfer is based on a review of crew pro,
cedures including pressurization and repressurization of both
airlocks and manual translation along the manipulator while
carrying an injured crewman. A contingency factor of two (2)
is applied to account for operations which cannot be identi-
fied at this time.
13-33
Hamilton ...... U
O_ UMTED A*AC_AFT CO_POFtATK)_
Standard I:1®
SP 01T73
13.6 Crew Transfer Phase - Continued
Table 13-7 identifies potential equipment concepts for
crew support during the crew transfer.
• P LSS
ONE CREWMAN PER UNIT
- TWO CREWMEN PER UNIT
• MINI - EC/LSS
ONE CREWMAN PER UNIT
- TWO CREWMEN PER UNIT
• ELSS
TABLE 13--7. CREW TRANSFER EQUIPMENT CONCEPTS
Use of the ELSS or the "mini-EC/LSS" will not satisfy the
duration requirement without significant weight and volume
penalties which are too great for this application which has
such a low probability of occurrence. Use of the basic
PLSS is recommended because it has ample capacity, a com-
munications capability, a backup system, and at least two (2)
units are available on each flight. The rescue vehicle
could bring the additional PLSS's as required for transfer
of the entire crew.
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13.6 Crew Transfer Phase - Continued
Intravehicular (IV) transfer is possible if both vehicles
have operable docking modules (D/M) which permit normal
docking and crew transfer. If the failed vehicle does not
have a docking module on board, it is conceivable that the
rescue vehicle carry an extra docking module for on-orbit
attachment to the failed vehicle through use of manipulators
and EV crewmen. Another potential option is for the crew
to enter an attached sortie lab having an integral life
support system and transfer with the payload to the rescue
vehicleby means of the manipulator. EV crewmen could _e
employed for payload detachment and attachment of the pay-
load to the vehicles.
Extravehicular transfer concepts include free space transfer
utilizing a propulsion system or by means of the manipulator
end effector or by manual translation along the manipulatorl
boom.
Of the options available, EV transfer is the recommended
approach for establishing crew transfer requirements. The
basis of this selection is as follows:
a. Sortie labs and docking modules are available on a few
percentage of the flight.
b. IV transfer from a depressurized cabin or a contaminated
cabin requires similar equipment as EV transfer since
the docking module must be depressurized.
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13.7 Emer6enc [ IV Summar_ Conclusions
Based on the results of the emergency IV study effort, the
following conclusions are reached.
a.
The Orbiter crew should be provided with equipment for
protection from a depressurized and contaminated cabin
condition.
b*
This requires that all personnel on b0ardhave
breathing systems and pressure suits with appropriate
support equipment.
The support equipment should provide for up to 96 hours
of on-board survival.
C. The Orbiter should have the capability for cabin de-
pressurization and nitrogen purge adequate to remove
cabin contaminates.
d. The capability should be provided for administering
food and water to a crewman in a pressurized suit and
for the transfer of urine from a _ressurized suit.
e. The Orbiter crew restraints and flight controls used
for de-orbit and landing should be compatible with
pressure suit operations.
f. The PLSS should be used for crew transfer during a
Shuttle-to-Shuttle rescue.
g*
Airlock hatches should remain open when an attached
payload is manned unless a redundant escape route is
available or long-term life support equipment'is avail-
able within the payload.
ho The Orbiter avionics required for mission abort and
Shuttle-to-Shuttle rescue should be operational during
depressurized cabin conditions.
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DEVELOPMENT FLIGHTS
General
The initial Shuttle flights involve greater risks than later
flights as they are used to verify the structural and func-
tional integrity of the orbiter for the first time following
qualification under simulated use conditions. The Emergency
IV findings and recommendations of section 13.0 apply to the
development flights also. In addition, it is recommended
that the Crew fly with the pressure suits donned during the
powered portions of the flights and with the suits donned
less helmet and gloves during manipulator operations.
Implementation of this recommendation will provide maxi-
mum crew protection as it provides redundant and independent
failure modes. This approach also results in a system having
a known capability as opposed to a cabin system which is
sized to accomodate an arbitrary maximum leakage following
a malfunction.
In this section, the options available for crew support
during suited flights are identified, the requirements are
established and equipment concepts are recommended.
Crew Rescue Options
T_e first manned vertical fligh t is currently scheduled for
March l, 1978. During this flight, there may be no Shuttle
vehicles capable of affecting a Shuttle-to-Shuttle rescue if
the need should arise. For these early flights, the follow-
ing options exist:
a. Carry an Apollo CSM as an escape and de-orbit vehicle.
b. Carry personal re-entry systems (cocoons).
C.
de
Ready an Apollo CSM and launch vehicle and maintain
in standby status during the Shuttle development
flights.
Reschedule the early flights such that a rescue
Shuttle and launch facilities can be a-Tailable.
e. Take the risk.
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Crew Rescue Options (Continued)
Selection of the most desirable option requires more data
than is currently available including systems development
and qualification data, horizontal and unmanned vertical
test performance and the cost impacts associated with each
option. It is apparent that the requirements for crew support
should include sufficiently flexibility such that it does not
constrain selection of any of the rescue options at a later
date.
Crew Support Requirements
The requirements for crew support during suited development
flights are:
a. Provide crew protection in a depressurized cabin or
contaminated cabin for up to 96 hours.
b. Provide crewmen cooling while wearing a pressure
suit (helmet and gloves off) in an environmentally
controlled cabin.
The requirement for depressurized or contaminated cabin
protection reflects the results of the Emergency IV effort
discussed in Section 13.0 of this report. Support of suited
crewmen in an environmentally controlled cabin is not a
capability of the baseline Orbiter nor is it a requirement
imposed on the equipment concepts discussed in Section 13.0.
Since the crew may be required to wear pressure suits during
critical mission phases, crewman cooling under these condi-
tions is to be required.
Crew Support Concepts
The Emergency IV (Section 13.0) portion of this study identi-
fied two potential concepts for providing up to 96 hours of
crew protection in a depressurized or contaminated cabin
environment. These concepts were:
a. Integrated suit loop or carry-on equipment.
b. Breathing systems.
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14.4 Crew Support Concepts (Continued)
The integrated suit loop shown schematically in Figure 14-1
has the capability of providing crew support for up to 96
hours.
FILTER H/X
CONDENSATE
FIGURE 14--1. VEHICLE INTEGRATED SUIT LOOP
However, to satisfy the requirements for crewman cooling in a
Pressure suit under normal cabin conditions, additional impacts
are imposed on the EC/LSS system. These impacts include:
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Crew Support Concepts (Continued)
a. 'Fne addition of a flow restrictor in the vehicle
cabin duct to force flow to the pressure suit.
This restriction may significantly reduce the amount
of cabin ventilation and avionics cooling. It also
increases EC/LSS fan power consumption and may affect
the response of the system such that high humidity
and C0 2 levels exist in the cabin.
b. Degraded cabin ventilation, in addition to that
caused by the restrictor, due to simultaneous
operation of the cabin and suit loop fans. The
suit loop fan, having a greater pressure rise cap-
ability than the cabin fans, could back pressure
the cabin fans such that a low flow condition exists
with a simultaneous high power consumption.
The above impacts can be avoided by using the suit ventilator
(modified to add a pressure actuate isolation valve as shown in
Figure 14-B) to provide to crewman cooling while suited with
helmet and gloves off. The suit loop would then be used solely
for support of depressurized cabin conditions.
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Crew Support Concepts (Continued)
The Emergency IV concept shown in Figure 14-2 represents a
carry-on equipment approach for crew support during the suited
flight modes. The concept, discussed in detail in Section
13.0, utilizes a vehicle cooling system to support carry-on
equipment such as the PLSS or a "Mini-ECS".
POoWHER VENT
// u_' "_ ,_ __=__,J.s__0.
WATER
FREON
LOOP
NATER H/X_ ]_J POTABLE CHILLER
TEMPCONTROL",_ WATER _---= _) 1I g, _
IlL_ILTER If _ ._;_-_COND ENSATE AVIONICS
[_ml _ I!]1 II H/x(F _ r-BAyS--, II
....:_: :__7 I1_ r_, ,_=_,
IFII LiOH ASS'Y __ _ _==_(_[_e_ AFAN ASS'Y uu= , _ IR
COLD/---- _ ...... J H/XCOLD
WALL PLATE
FIGURE 14--2. CARRY ON EQUIPMENT
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Figure 14-B shows the PLSS concept with the addition of the
suit ventilator to provide crewman cooling by forcing cabin
air through the suit during the suited operational modes.
An isolation valve is added to the inlet to the suit ventila-
tor which closes immediately in the event of a rapid cabin
decompression. This valve is the only modification required
over that recommended for support of Emergency IV modes.
Secondly, this concept utilizes the suit ventilator which
is required for operational Shuttle flights.
ISOLATION VALV___
PLSS
FIGURE 14--3. SUITED OPERATION--PLSS SUPPORT
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Crew Support Concepts (Continued)
Figure 14-4 shows the use of the "Mini'ECS" to support suited
development flights as well as depressurized cabin operation.
For suited development flights, an isolation valve is added
at the fan inlet to provide for an inflow of cabin air which
is forced through the suit for crewman cooling. As in the
PLSS concept, this pressure actuated valve clcses to protect
the arewman in the event of a rapid cabin decompression.
FIGURE 14--4. SUITED OPERATION-'MIH! ECS SUPPORT
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Crew Support Concepts (Continued)
A review of the concepts for support of development flights
can be summarized as follows:
a. The integrated suit loop can satisfy the 96 hours
of emergency operation but should not be used to
provide cooling of a suited crewman in an environ-
mentally controlled cabin.
be The carry-on "Mini-ECS" can be used to support the
96 hours of emergency operation and the suited
modes with the addition of a pressure actuated
isolation valve.
C. The PLSS concept can be used to support the 96 hours
of crew support but requires the use of the suit
ventilator for cooling of a suited crewman, in an
environmentally controlled cabin.
Summary
This study has identified several equipment concepts which
could be used to support the crewmen during suited development
flights. Final selection of the equipment require more detailed
trade studies and should be conducted in conjunction with the
additional Emergency IV studies recommended in section 13.0 of
this report.
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VEHICLE INTERFACES
General
The interfaces between the EVA system and the spacecraft are
key considerations in establishing an operational space sys-
tem such as the Space Shuttle. Well defined interface re-
quirements serve to simplify EVA crewman and Orbiter crewmen
operations, minimizes EVA system and Orbiter system complexity,
weight, and volume and increase the flexibility of the Space
Shuttle Program. Throughout the study, interface coordination
was maintained with the Orbiter contractor, North American
Rockwell. This coordination provided continuous updating of
crew compartment configuration and supporting vehicle system
requirements and capabilities.
This section summarizes the effort performed to establish the
interface requirements for EVA/IVA equipment preparation,
stowage, and servicing during the Space Shuttle flights.
The task analysis portion of this study (Section 4.0) shows
that the Orbiter should provide for a maximum of 32 manhours
of EVA expendables and six (6) airlock depressurizations/
repressurizations. These requirements serve as a baseline
for establishing the vehicle interface requirements.
As indicated by Figure 15-1, the vehicle interfaces are
identified by review of:
a) The vehicle configuration and capabilities
b) The EVA system configuration and needs
c) The tasks, support system and sequences for EVA
preparation
d) The equipment considerations for support of Emergency
IV modes.
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General - Continued
• EVA PREPSUPPORT SYSTEMS
• STOWAGE REO'TS
• COMMUNICATIONS &
MONITORING
• AIRLOCK
• MOBILITY AIDS
FIGURE 15--1. VEHICLE INTERFACES
Vehicle Considerations
The Orbiter configuration as of December, 1972, is shown in
Figure 15-2 which consists of the cabin, airlock and payload
bay. These areas are potential locations where interfaces
with the EVA system could exist. The cabin, consisting of
an upper and lower level, is pressurized to 14.7 psia air
with active temperature, humidity and CO 2 control. From the
upper level, flight operations are performed including both
vertical and horizontal flight operations. The Orbit Station
is located at the aft portion of the upper level where the
crewman controls manipulator operations. The lower level
contains provisions for passengers, food preparation, waste
management, avionics equipment and the airlock. The airlock
allows crew members to transfer from the cabin to the attached
payload or to perform EVA tasks without affecting the cabin
environment. The payload bay is baselined to be 15 feet in
diameter by 60 feet ling. Two doors cover half of the payload
bay circumference during all mission phases except orbital
operations which require that the doors be open to expose the
radiators which are also deployable.
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15 .i.i Vehicle Considerations - Continued
FLIGHT DECK\ _ ,_mlm
CABIN_ _ _-_
\I_L_J 7/x\Y/x\7_L\
",U..L..,,..T_.,_R--_..._I[---WASTEMA'NAGEMENT & EClLSS_
_--____--_=:_: _ EQUIPMENT _
ORBIT STATION
 MANIIULATOR7
 YLOADO,"DI ETE. 
PAYLOAD BAY
_I_LO_
/DOCKING MODULE
_HATDH 40"_
PAYLOAD BAY
FIGURE 15--2. ORBITER CONFIGURATION
15.1.2
A docking module is carried on missions requiring docking to
payloads for on orbit servicing such as LST revisit missions.
The docking module is attached to the airlock to allow crew
and equipment transfer between the payload and the cabin.
EVA S_stem
The EVA system shown in Figure 15-3 identifies several items
and functions with potential interfaces with the vehicle.
Although most of the items identified are stowage interfaces,
definition of functional interface requirements such as com-
munications and recharging systems are essential for establishing
the basic vehicle design requirements.
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15.1.2 EVA System - Continued
HELMET
RF
COMMUNICATIONS
EV
VISORS
PRESSURE
SUIT
LiOH
CARTRIDGES
P LSS/E LSS
I_ BATTERY
GLOVES
URINE TRANSFER
RECHARGE
• 02
• H20
• POWER
LIQUID
COOLING
GARMENT
FIGURE 15--3. EVA SYSTEM
15.2 EVA Preparation Support Systems
EVA preparation includes all crew activities to prepare the
equipment for an EVA and, upon completion, to prepare for a
subsequent EVA. During these activities, the majority of EVA
system-to-vehicle interfaces are apparent including stowage
locations, donning/doffing locations, supporting vehicle sys-
tem usage during EVA system check-out andrecharge. To ensure
complete identification of these interfaces, the crewman opera-
tions performed for EVA preparation were broken into sequences
and then analyzed individually to identify the EVA equipment
and vehicle equipment involved with each sequence and the per-
ferred locations of conduct of the activity. Table 15-1 is a
sample of the approach taken for analysis of the activities
from equipment donning through egress for conduct of an EVA.
15-4
I',,,
l---
l.-..-
C_
r_
C_
SIS_k-I'_'NV NOl.l.V_Vd3_ld YA':I "L--_L _SY.L
"_301_I_ 3H± NI 03UINb3_ SI INIVUIS3_ _0 39VMOIS AUV_OdH31 '3_OJ3_3HI "_30]_IV
3HI NI 03NNOG 3_V £NB NIBV3 3HI _I 03MOIS 38 15NN S3AO19 QNV 13H13H 3HI '3ldNVX3 _0_ "N315AS VA3 3HI NI
Al133_lO 033Vld QNV 39VMOIS WO_ O]AOH3_ 3B ±ONNV3 H3IHM SN31I _0_ 03033N 3_v SNOISIhO_d 39VMOIS A_OdN31
BO SINIV_IS3_ 1N3_IN03 "NOllV_Vd3Ud VA3 9NI_NO INIVBIS3_ NV_M3_3 3OQ13NI OSlV 5NOISIAO_d l_OddNS 3731H3A :L 310N
i
l.(3
i
l-'-'
i
;0
8
a.
m
nd
,H
0
t.)
I
S31NNIH E
$31nNIH
S31NNIH g
s31nNIW E
SW3.LSAS W/I
ONV "HH03 313
"IH3A/W3/SAS VA3
JO 33NV_O_83d
$_31
-SAS 9NIN_VM
SAVld
"SIO 7VNSIA
:N_HI NOI1
-VB3dO W31SAS
33NVI_O.:I
-_3(:1 IO_I.LN03
lVk_3Hl SSld
9NIN_VM 803
(N/I VIA)
IN3_n3
OVOI 17n3
39VllOA
OVO7 llN_
NOIIV_3dO dk_d
ONV NV_ SSld
31Yd931NI 3_NS
-S3_d W3£SAS
qO_LN03
Z03 SSld
IOBIN03
3_nss3Bd SSld
lO_lN03
"dW31 SSqd
-_N3 A_311VB
SS3_d AlddAS ZO
39_110A A_tILVB
9NIN_VM
3_nsS3_d line
AVI3U
AVldSlO N/Z
30_EN03 3WNIOA
NOIIV'd3dO
NOIlV_3dO W/l
"H_)3 A_I_3A
5S3B93
W31SAS
9N11003 OINOII
373[H3A WO_
NOII:)3NN03SIO
9NIN3dO
H31VH lVN_31X3
NOI..VDI_I_3A
SNIV..S H31SAS
SNOIiV_3dO
SIO_J.N03 SSld
1N3N
-ISN['OV _OSIA
W31SA_;BNS 70_1
-NO0 1Vk_3Hl
SS7(I 31VQIDV
_307_IV!
3ZItNSS3_d30
F3LVH IVN
-_31NI N3OI_IV
N307 ONV 3S073'
S70UlNO3
NV30NV dmd
SSld 31V_3dO
9NIN_VM
ZC3 A31B3A
S39VE ZO OV3_
SIO_IN03
"dW31 _ ZO
SSld 31VB3dO
_CIVIILN3A
1INS
133NNODSIO
31VN13V
ONV 9N17003
Olnbl7 313
-IH3A 133NN03
3ALVA
39_nd 133NN03
NO0 _ 39VMO±S
HO_J S3AOI9
ONV S_OSIA A3
'13W13H 3AON3_
BNIN#VM
3_ASS3_d
IINS A31_3A
39VllOA
A_31_V8 QNV
AlddNS _00V3_
SlO_lN03
"1_03 31V_3dO
LN3HAOld
-30 VNN31NV
S_13/SSld
9NI_IM 110S
01 133NN03
_31B_V3
"NW03 NO(]
1INS 3_NSS3_d
01 SIV3illBMn
03IVI3DSSV ONV
SSId 133NN03
N3Ol_IV
_301HIV
N3OI_IV
NO NIBV3
_301_IV
BO NIBV3
3NON
3NON
3NON
3NON
SIO_IN03
S3HOIVH
NDOIBIV
l 310N 33S
N31SAS
9N17003
olnbll
3731H3A
l 310N 33S
SH31SAS
W/l "WW03
3131H3A
33NVISISSV
NVHM3_3 _0
NOIIVIS 9NIN
-NO0 SSld
l 310N 33S
S31BNIH Z
S31NNIH 5
S31NNIW _1
3133dW03
01 3WI1
031VHIIS3
33N_O3_3d _01
-V'_93_ 0 SSl3
A$11NVQb
AlddNS °0 5533
NOIIVU3dO
_OIVIILN3A
3NON
_H$Ild_3V
S133H3
33V90V3B
3ALVA
330-111HS 5S33
3S013 _3NV N3dO
39VMO1S
W3_3 SSI3
/SS],_ 3AON3_
_OZVIIII_3A IINS
dO NOIIV_3dO
ONV NO[133NN03
1INS
3Bnss3_A 01
SIN3N;Jvg_30NN
30 NOIlD3N
-NO3 "IVN_3INI
NO3
ONV 39VMOIS
WO_:l "dlNb3
VA3 3AOW3_
NO0
ONV 39VM01S
WOH:I "dlNb3
VA3 3AOH3H
S_SV.. M3_3
NIBV3
33NVI_O3_3d
NIBV3
NIBV3 :
..... _ ii,
SNOIIV_3dO
6'0_ SNOIIV301
3"DIH3A 03_33_3d
_33H3
_II_931NI 3ans
-S3_d 3_0338
ONV 39VM01S
WO_3 1VAOW3_
_31_V 03k_O_
-B3d 3B AVH
3NON
NOIldO
M3_3 SI A,SSV
N011333103
3NIBN dO 3SN
ld33X3 - 3NON
3  iao3 
_0 S39NVH3
1VllN310d
t 310N 33S
33NVISISSV
NVHM3_3
_0 NOI1
-VlS 9NINNO0
9NINNO0
_313V NOIIV
"711N3A 1INS
L 310N 33S
L 310N 33S
03_in03_
SNOISIAO_d
lUOddnS
H31SAS
VA3 _
3BIIN3
N31SAS
VA3
3_IIN3
llnS
3_NSS3_d
_3I_V3
SNOIIV3
-INNHW03
SSl3
/SSld
SS13
ISSld
SSl3
tSSld
SN01133S
B3MOI
ONV _3d
-dN 1INS
3_NSS3_d
1N3_V9
9NIl003
OIN_I7
AIBW3SSV
NOI1331
-I03 3NI_N
03AIOANI
IN3NdIQO3
VA3
NOIIVZI_NS
-S3Bd30
_30l_IV
_33H3
AIIB931NI
3_ASS3Bd
_33H3
SNOIIV3
-INNNN03
9NINNO0
SSI3
/SSI_
1nO
-_33H3
SSI3
9NINNO0
1INS
3unss3Bd
9NINNO0
IN3W
-_Vg_3ONN
33N3NO35
: _ _ __ i NI L_i_
Hamilton ....... o, U
UNI.TED AtRc_Ir/AF'T CONPOAATION
Standard I::1®
SP 01T73
15.2 EVA Preparation Support Systems - Continued
As a result of this review, the perferred locations for per-
forming the various activities are identified as shown in
Figure 15-4. Donning of equipment in the cabin rather than
theairlock is recommended for the following reasons:
a) Emergency IV considerations recommended suit and PLSS
stowage in the cabin.
b) minimizes the size and weight of the basic airlock.
c) Provides maximum donning and doffing volume for the crew.
d) Airlock stowage restricts the passageway during shirt
sleeve crew and equipment transfer between the payloads
and cabin.
e) Equipment donning in vicinity of equipment stowage loca-
tions minimizes the need for interim stowage facilities
and equipment handling.
FIGURE 15--4. PRE EVA PREPARATION
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15.2 EVA Preparation Support Systems - Continued
Figure 15-5 represents an estimate of the time required
for two men to prepare for EVA.
33
MINUTES
FIGURE 15--5. EVA PREPARATION TIMELINE
A similiarreview of post EVA operations further identifies
the perferred locations for equipment shut-down, doffing and
recharge operations as indicated by Figure 15-6.
FIGURE 15"-6. POST EVA PREPARATION
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15.2 EVA Preparation Support Systems - Continued
The EVA PreParation analysis also serves to identify the sup-
portingfunctions required as part of EVA preparation. Figure
15-7 identifies the type of support functions and when its
use isrequired during the EVA preparation sequences.
FIGURE 15--7. EVA PREPARATION SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
The following support functions are required:
a) Suit Ventilator - Provides suit ventilation for crewman
cooling after pressure suit donning. The ventilator re-
mains on until liquid cooling is initiated as part
of the pressure integrity check sequence.
b) RF Hardline - Provides an RF link between the EVA crewman
and the vehicle communications systems while the crewman
is in the airlock. It may be found, as in Apollo, that an
RF link exists without the hardline. However, equipment
tests are required for verification.
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15.2.1
EVA Preparation Support Systems - Continued
c) Liquid Cooling System - Provides crewman cooling during the
pressure integrity check and remains in use until activation
of the PLSS expendable water cooling system.
d) Recharge Equipment - Provides for replenishment of PLSS
expendable water, oxygen and power following each EVA.
e) Condensed Water Collection - Provides for transfer of
condensed water from the PLSS to vehicle systems.
The requirements of each of the above functions are specified
in the following paragraphs.
Suit Ventilator
The suit ventilator recommended for use on Shuttle is shown in
Figure 15-8 which basically consists of a fan with an interface
umbilicals for the suit and the vehicle power source. The suit
umbilical is short umbilical whose length allows mounting of the
ventilator to the suit. The power cable is of sufficient length
to allow the ventilator/vehicle electrical connection to be made
in the airlock and provide suit ventilation after suit donning
in the cabin area. This concept was selected after comparison
of the following concepts.
a) A wall mounted ventilator assembly which is connected to
two (2) suits by long gas umbilicals.
b) Two ventilators (one for each suit) with short gas umbilicals
and long electrical cords.
c) One ventilator assembly with a long electrical cord and con-
nected to two suits by moderate length gas umbilicals.
d) A wall mounted ventilator which is connected to a hard mounted
distribution duct. The suits are connected to the duct by
short flexible umbilicals.
e) Two wall mounted ventilators connected to each suit by long
gas umbilicals.
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15.2.1 Suit Ventilator - Continued
115 VAC-_.
REQUIREMENTS; FAN_
• FLOW RATE: 10ACFM _FILTER
• PRESSURE RISE: 20 IN OF H20
• POWER CONSUMPTION: 70 WATTS MAX
OTHER POTENTIAL USES
• SUIT DRYER
• SUITED DEVELOPMENT FLIGHTS
• EMERGENCY IV
• VACUUM CLEANER
• SUPPLEMENTAL COOLING FOR EXPERIMENTS
FIGURE 15--8. SUIT VENTILATOR
The power source of 400 vac is recommended over the 28 vdc
supply to minimize fan weight, volume and cost.
The suit ventilator also has the capability to perform other
functions as indicated by Figure 15-7. Following an EVA, the
unit can be used to dry the pressure suit and LCG by forcing
cabin conditioned air through the pressure suit. Under worst
case conditions of suit dampness, and cabin humidity, a maxi-
mum of 6 1/2 hours is required for suit drying.
Other potential uses include suit ventilation during suited
development flight and during Emergency IV modes in conjunction
with other support equipment.
During the Apollo Program a need for a vacuum cleaner was
identified to remove dust from each crewman upon ingress from
the lunar surface. For Shuttle, the suit ventilator could be
used for removing dust and lint particles from crewmen prior
to entering payloads such as an LST servicing module which have
cleanliness requirements more stringent than those of the cabin.
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15.2.2
Suit Ventilator - Continued
For Sortie missions, the unit could be used to provide air
circulation within Sortie Labs which do not have EC/LSS
capabilities. Secondly, the unit could be used to provide
supplemental air cooling of experiment related electronic
packages.
RF Hardline
As previously indicated by Figure 15-_, the communications
check takes place in the airlock. The RF communciations from
the EVA system may be shielded from Orbiter antenae by the
metallic enclosure of the airlock as indicated by Figure 15-9.
REQUIREMENTS
• PROVIDE RF COMMUNICATIONS
LINK BETWEEN AIRLOCK
& VEHICLE COMM. SYSTEM
AIR
___ VEHICLE
COMM
SYSTEM
FIGURE 15--9. RF HARDLINE
Communications between EVA crewmen in the airlock and Orbiter
or Ground Personnel is assured by means of an RF hardline which
provides a direct link to the vehicle communciations system.
This requirement does not impose significant penalties to the
Orbiter since similiar provisions are required for support of
payloads.
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15.2.2
15.2.3
RF Hardline - Continued
It is pointed out that a similiar provision was baseline for
the Lunar Module but equipment tests verified that an RF link
was available through direct radiation rather than by the
hardline. It is recommended that the hardline be baseline
for the Orbiter.
Cooling System
The _nergency IV effort, discussed in Section 13.0, concluded
that the incorportion of a cooling system for use with carry-
on support equipment is a viable candidate for crew support
under depressurized cabin conditions. A similiar cooling sys-
tem is highly desireable for crewman and equipment cooling
during EVA preparation activities. As part of the p_e_m]re
integrity check, the crewman is fully enclosed in the suit
with the PLSS fan operating for C02 removal.
None of the heat generated by the man (600 btu/hr), Li0H
(165 btu/hr), or fan (130 btu) is dissipated until the PLSS
thermal control system is activated. The use of the liquid
cooling system provides crewman and equipment cooling and
minimizes total system heat load during the PLSS start-up.
Since the liquid cooling system is can be used for Emergency
IV and for EVA preparation, it is recommended that it be
included inthe Orbiter baseline. Figure 15-10 summarizes the
performance requirements for the cooling system under operating
modes of EVA preparation and Emergency IV. AiRLOCK 1
REQUIREMENTS EVA EMERG
PREP IV
.,,,LO,O
FLOW RATE
(EACH PUMP) 240 LBS/HR 240 LBS/HR
PRESSURE 5.0 PSI 5.0 PSI
RISE
TEMPERATURE 55 60 ° F 55 60° F
OTHER POTENTIAL USES
• EMERGENCY IV
• SUITED DEVELOPMENT TO
FLIGHTS AIRLOCK&
• SUPPLEMENTAL CABIN
COOLING
• IV SERVICING
L_ _ VEHICLE
,_ II _ WATER
"_-_ COOLING
FIGURE 15--10. COOLING SYSTEM
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15.2.3
15.2.4
15.2.4.i
Cooling System - Continued
Another potential use of the cooling system is for IV servicing
of the unpressurized LST concept. Heat removal by the umbili-
cal prevents the condensation of water vapor on the interior
surfaces of the LST.
Recharge Equipment
The results of the task analysis portion of the study con-
cluded that the Orbiter should provide a maximum of 32 man-
hours of EVA support and six (6) airlock depressurizations/
repressurizations. These findings coupled with the need to
minimize vehicle weight and volume penalties are primary con-
siderations for establishing the expendable quantities and
condition and the recharge methods.
The study considered the use of a recharge station where the
PLSS would be placed during refurbishment of all expendab3es.
After consideration of EVA preparation, Emergency IV, and
stowage requirements, it is recommended that recharge of
the PLSS's be performed in the PLSS stowage location. This
recommendation is based on the following:
a) Minimizes vehicle interfaces. A separate dedicated re-
charge station requires duplication of vehicle support
structure with associated weight and volume penalties.
b) Minimizes equipment handling. An integrated stowage/
recharge station requires less equipment handling than
required for a separate recharge station.
Based on the above recommendation, the following requirements
should be imposed on the Orbiter.
a)
b)
The PLSS stowage/recharge station should allow for complete
PLSS servicing including replacement of Li0H cartridges and
batteries, removal of condensed water, and recharge of
oxygen, water and battery while the PLSS remains in the
stowage/recharge station.
The Orbiter should be capable of simultaneous servicing
of both PLSS's.
Water Rechar6e
Table 15-2 @ummarizes the expendable water required to support
the EVA requirements.
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15.2.4.1 Water Recharge - Continued
COOLING REQUIREMENTS FOR EVA OPERATIONS
A. METABOLIC COOLING I000 BTU/HR
B. BEAT LF_J_K 300 BTU/HR
C. LIOH COOLING 276 BTU/HR
D. ELECTRICAL (60 WATTS) 204 BTU/HR
TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER MAN-HOUR
WATER REQUIRED PER MAN-HOUR
TOTAL WATER FOR 32MAN-HOURS
1780 BTU/HR
1.73 LBS
55.4 LBS
COOLING REQUIREMENT RESULTING FROM PRE-EGRESS CHECK-OUT
A. FAN HEAT (I0 WATT HOURS) 34 BTU
B. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM HEAT (6 WATT HOURS) 20 BTU
TOTAL PER MAN PER CHFCK-OUT
TOTAL WATER PER MAN PER CHECK-OUT
TOTAL FOR SIX (6) CHECK-OUTS*
54 BTU
0.05 LBS
0.50 LBS
TOTAL WATER REQUIRED
55.4 LBS + 0.50 LBS = 55.9 LBS
* ASSUMES DUAL EVA AND PLSS'S ARE FULLY CHARGED
PRIOR TO LAUNCH.
TABLE 15--2. WATER REQUIRED TO SUPPORT EVA
Figure 15-11 schematically defines the recharge system and
associated requirements. The vehicle portion of the schematic
is representative of the Orbiter baseline system. The water
temperatures and pressures are specified to ensure compatibility
with the vehicle. The PLSS may require de-aeration of the
expendable water depending on the type of expendable water
PLSS subsystem employed. A flash evaporator system may require
no de-aeration whereas a water boiler may require removal of
a high percentage of dissolved gases. Detail requirements for
the de-aerator (if required) can be established after selec-
tion of the PLSS heat rejection device.
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15.2.4.1 Water Recharge - Continued
VEHICLE r
j PLSS
FROMSOBL! ATOR C ----C--PRES%RE
I
REQUIREMENTS
• QUANTITY
MAXIMUM PER RECHARGE 8.06 LBS
MAXIMUM PER FLIGHT 55.9 LBS
• SUPPLY PRESSURE 33 PSIA
• SUPPLY TEMPERATURE 35 TO 100°F
• QUALITY PER NASA SPEC - PF-SPEC-1
CONTAINING:
DISSOLVED N2 @ 33 PSIA
SILVER IONS 50 PPB
FIGURE 15--1 1. WATER RECHARGE
15.2.4.2 Oxygen Recharge
Table 15-3 summarizes the oxygen quantities required from the
Orbiter to satisfy the EVA support requirements.
OXYGEN REQUIRED FOR EVA OPERATION
A. METABOLIC CONSUMPTION
B. SYSTEM LEAKAGE
TOTAL OXYGEN PER MAN-HOUR
TOTAL OXYGEN FOR 32 MAN-HOURS
0.175 LBS/HR
0.0175 LBS/HR
0.1925 LBS
6.16 LBS
0.035 LBS
0.090 LBS
0.058 LBS
0.058 LBS
OXYGEN REQUIRED FOR PRE-EGRESS OPERATIONS
A. METABOLIC DURING PRE-EGRESS CHECK-OU.T
B. LEAKAGE CHECK
C. H20 RESERVOIR PRESSURIZATION
TOTAL PER MAN PER CHECK-OUT .183 LBS
TOTAL FOR SIX (6) CHECK-OUTS* 1.83 LBS
TOTALOXYGEN REQUIRED
6.16 LBS 4 1.83 LBS = 7_99 LBS
.
* ASSUMES DUAL EVA'S AND PLSS'S ARE FULLY CHARGED
PRIOR TO LAUNCH.
TABLE 15--3. OXYGEN REQUIRED TO SUPPORT EVA
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15.2.4.2
15.2.4.3
Oxygen Rechar6e - Continued
The PLSS subsystem studies (Section 7.0) concludes that
900 psia is the perferred 02 recharge pressure since it
minimizes vehicle weight and volume penalties with an
acceptable volume penalty to the PLSS. Figure 15-12
is a schematic representation of the oxygen recharge sys-
tem which requires no changes to the baseline Orbiter 02
supply subsystem.
I CABIN
I L_J=PRESSUR E
I r--r CONTROL
tl I SUBSYSTEM
FREON T
PLSS
)
_--IP
REQUIREMENTS
• QUANTITY
MAXIMUM PER RECHARGE 1.04 LBS
MAXIMUM PER FLIGHT 7.99LBS
• PRESSURE 900 + 20 PSlA
• TEMPERATURE 80OF MAX
• QUALITY MI L-O-27210B
FIGURE 15--12. OXYGEN RECHARGE
Batterer Rechar6e
Table 15-4 summarizes the power to be supplied by the vehicle
for PLSS battery recharges.
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15.2.4.3 Batte_ Rechar6e - Continued
POWER REQUIRED FOR EVA OPERATION
A. TOTAL PER MAN-HOUR
B, TQTAL FOR 32 MAN-HOURS
POWER REQUIRED FOR PRE-EGRESS OPERATIONS
A, TOTAL PER MAN PER CHECK-OUT 16 WATT HOURS
B. TOTAL FOR SIX (6) CHECK-OUTS* 160 WATT HOURS
60 WATTS
1920 WATT HOURS
TOTAL POWER REQUIRED
1920 WATT HOURS + 160 WATT HOURS 2080 WATT HOURS
* ASSUMES DUAL EVA'S AND PLSS'S FULLY
CHARGED PRIOR TO LAUNCH.
TABLE 15--4. POWER REQUIRED TO SUPPORT EVA
Figure 15-3 is a schematic representation oi" a 0a_tery
charger. It uses the constant current recharge method
which is the perferred method for recharge of silver zinc
batteries.
.___ CONSTANT
28 VDC CURRENT
SUPPLY CONTROL
I FULLCHARGEC T - OFF
REQUIREMENTS
• POWER
- MAXIMUM PER RECHARGE
- MAXIMUM PER FLIGHT
• CHARGING TIME
• CHARGING METHOD
• CUT - OFF VOLTAGE
VO LTAG E
SENSING
CIRCUIT
260"W - HOURS
2080 W - HOURS
16 HOUR MAX/BATTERY
CONSTANT CURRENT
18 - 24 VDC
FIGURE 15--13. BATTERY RECHARGE
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15.2.4.3
15.2.5
Battery Rechar6e - Continued
Completion of recharge is signified by a rapid increase of
battery voltage which is used for battery charger cut-off.
Since the optimum battery voltage is within the range of 13.5
to 18 volts, the cut-off voltage will range between 18.0 and
24 volts.
The weight and volume of a battery recharger are not affected
signifleantly overthe voltage ranges considered.
A charging time of 16 hours is required between EVA's for each
battery. It is expected that the Shuttle flight will normally
only require one EVA per day which is compatible with the 16
hour recharge capability. For those few flights where a
higher EVA frequency is expected two (2) additional batteries
can be stowed on the Orbiter and can be used for EVA while the
other two batteries are being recharged.
LiOH Replacement
The replacement of Li0H cartridges following each EVA is
accomplished by manually removing the cartridge, having an
envelopeas shown in Figure 15-14, and installing a new
cartridge obtained from vehicle stowage.
15.8
L
ESTIMATED WEIGHT 3.0 LBS
FIGURE 15--14. LIOH CARTRIDGE ENVELOPE
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15.2.6 Condensed Water Collection
During EVA operations, humidity control is achieved by con-
densing the excessive water vapor, separating the condensed
water from the suit ventilation flow and then storing the
condensate within the PLSS. As part of PLSS servicing fol-
lowing each EVA, the condensed water must be removea from the
PLSS and delivered to the vehicle. Figure 15-15 shows the
quantities of water to be transfered. It is based on manned
test data obtained from the Apollo Program which used a
system similar to the system recommended for Shuttle EVA.
CONDENSED
WATER STORAGE
QUANTITIES
MAXIMUM PERTRANSFER
MAXIMUM PER FLIGHT
PLSS
1.46 LBS
11.6 LBS
FIGURE 15--15. CONDENSED WATER COLLECTION
15.3 Stowage Requirements
The purpose of this section is to identify the EVA equipment
to be stowed on board the Orbiter. The equipment size, weight
perferred stowage location and any potential stowage constraints
are identified.
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15.3
15.3.1
Stowage Requirements - Continued
Table 15-5 identifies the equipment, quantities and the per-
ferred locations for stowage for the major items of the EVA
system. The locations specified are intended to allow for
crewman donning or usage immediately after removal from
stowage thus minimizing the number of interim stowage pro-
vision and equipment restraints. The following paragraphs
provide further information for stowage of the items listed
in TablelS-5.
OUANTITY PERFERRED
EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION PER FLIGHT LOCATION REMARKS
EVA PRESSURE SUITS 2 CABIN
CABINEMERGENCY IV SUITS
LIQUID COOLING GARMENT CABIN
ONE PER
CRE_IAN
URINE COLLECTION ASSEMBLY 2 CABIN
PRIMARY LIFE SUPPORT 2 CABIN
SYSTEM
2 CABINEMERGENCY LIFE SUP-
PORT SYSTEM
LIOH CARTRIDGES
BATTERIES
THE OUANTITY ASSUMES THAT THE EVA
SUIT IS IIOT L'SED FOR EMERGENCY IV.
SUIT VENTILATOR
PORTABLE LIGHTING UNIT
I0 MAXIMUM CABIN OU#_;TITY VARIES 0!I E#CH FLIGHT. THE
nUAF_TITY SHOULD SUPPORT ALL PLANNED
E'.Q'S PLUS ONE DUAL UNSCHEDULED EVA.
2 MAXIMUM PAYLOAD BAY BATTERY STOWAGE REQUIRED ON THOSE
FLIGHTS WITH LESS THAN 16 HOURS BE-
TWEEN EVA'S.
2 CABIN
2 AIRLOCK
PAYLOAD BAY
AS REQUIRED BY PAYLOAD
MANIPULATOR WORK PLATFORM l
EVA TOOLS
TABLE 15--5.
Pressure Suit Stowase
STOWAGE LI ST
Tables 15-6 and 15-7 lists the items of the EVA pressure suit
and the Emergency IV suit respectively which can be stowed
separately. The helmets and EV visors should be stowed such
that scratch and impact protection is afforded to the visors.
Stowage envelope for the pressure suits is not specified since
the soft flexible garment can be stowed unforlded or folded in
a variety of configurations. The helmet can be s_owe_ wz_nin
an envelope of 12 in. x 12 in. diameter. Some volume savings
may be realized by stowing the communications carrier within
the helmet and the EV visors attached to the helmet.
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15.3.i Pressure Suit Stowage- Continued
ITEM WT STOWAGE
(LBS) VOLUME
• TORSO LIMB ASS'Y
UPPER TORSO
LOWER TORSO
ITMG
ELEC HARNESS
RELIEF VALVE
PURGE VALVE
• GLOVES
• HELMET
• EV VISOR
46.7
3.0
6.0 FT 3
WITHIN
SUIT
2.7 1700 IN 3
5.7 36001N 3
• HEADSET & MIKE 1.6 WITHIN
HELMET
TOTAL 65.0
TABLE 15--6. EVA/IVA SUIT
WT STOWAGE
ITEM (LBS) VOLUME
• TORSO LIMB ASS'Y
UPPER TORSO
LOWER TORSO
ELECTRICAL HARNESS
RELIEF VALVE
PURGE VALVE
12.8 2.0 FT 3
WITHIN
• GLOVES 2.4 SUIT
WITHIN
• HEADSET & MIKE 1.6 HELMET
TOTAL 19.0
TABLE 15--7. EMERGENCY IV SUIT
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15.3.2 Undergarment Stowage
Envelopes and weights of the Liquid Cooling Garment (LCG) and
the Urine Collection Assembly are defined in Table 15-8.
ITEM WEIGHT VOLUME
i
LIQUID COOLINGGAR-
MENT 4.6 LBS 440 CU. IN.
URINE COLLECTION
ASSEMBLY 0.7 LBS 48 CU. IN.
TABLE 15--8. UNDERGARMENTS STOWAGE
15.3.3
The LCG stowage location should preclude exposure of the
garment to cold walls which could result in freezing of the
contained water.
Life Support Systems St0wa6e
Study results indicate that integration of the PLSS and ELSS
into a single package is the preferred approach for minimizing
the weight and volume penalties to the EVA system and the
vehicle. Secondly, this approach minimizes equipment handling
during EVA preparation and ground operations. Table 15-9
defines the weights and stowage envelope for an integrated
PLSS/ELSS and for separately packaged units. The values
represent fully charged units with umbilicals and support
harnesses for suit attacbnnent.
The primary environmental constraint for stowage or these items
isto preclude freezing of the contained water. As discussed
previously, the stowage station should also allow for recharge
of the units while stowed and it can also be used as a donning
station.
15-23
SP 01T73
Hamilton
Standard
U
OlV_ _ _IT[O AIRCRAFT C_AT_N
t:1®
15.3.3 Life Support Systems Stowa6e - Continued
'I"6"
PLSS ENVELOPE
ELSS ENVELOPE
18"
STOWAGE VOLUME - 776 IN 3
WEIGHT - 25 LBS
_19½"_
18
i
L ...... J
23"
J
_12Y/'_
UMBILICA
STOWAGE_ J 7" J .RCU
t [;I
STOWAGE VOLUME ....... 3771 IN 3
WEIGHT ................. 79 LBS
INTEGRATED PLSS/ELSS
I ; ; "i
I I
I f",_.
, , J_"_RCU
i____j
25.2""
- :--.OMS,L,CA,STOWAGE
..... .I I
I '_-'
, _ - _2 1/2"
_19 1/2"_
10 1/4"'
.....f---'---'--V 1
, t8s/4I
Jttt
7 1/4'"
STOWAGE VOLUME
WEIGHT
t
4146 IN3
96 LBS
TABLE 15--9. LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS STOWAGE
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15.3.4 LiOH Cartridse and Battery Stowase
The stowage weights and envelopes for the PLSS Li0H cart-
ridge and batteries are specified in Table 15-10. The
battery stowage is required only on flights with less than 16
hours betweenEVA's which is the maximum time required to
completely recharge the PLSS batteries.
, ,
WEIGHT VOLUME
ITEM LBS CU. IN.
LIOH CARTRIDGE 3.0 SEE FIGURE 15-14
8.8 !85_ATT_DV
TABLE 15--10. L.,OH CARTRIDGE AND BATTERY STOWAGE
15.3.5 Suit Ventilator Stowage
Table 15-ii defines the weight and stowage volume of the
suit ventilator including a power cable 23 feet in length
to allow crewm,an movement about the lower cabin and airlock.
STOWAGE VOLUME: 1350 IN3
WEIGHT: 7 LBS
115 VAC-_-_-
FA_FILTE R
TABLE 15--1 1. SUIT VENTILATOR STOWAGE
15-25
Hamilton U
Olvls_ OF _._*TEO AIRCRAFT COR_AT_
Standard I:1®
SP Ol T73
15.3.6
15.3.7
15.4
Manipulator Work Platform
The Orbiter should provide for stowage of a work platform for
crewman restraint and translation while performing EVA tasks.
It is estimated that the manipulator work platform discus-
sed in Section 12.0 can be stowed within an envelope of
20" x 8" x 48" and will weigh less than 60 pounds. However,
additional design effort is required to establish firm stow-
age requirements.
EVA Tools
The tools required for EVA crewman use may be stowed in
the cabin, payload, payload bay or on the exterior of the
payload. The weights and volumes of these items may vary
significantly on each flight depending on the payload require-
ments. Therefore, tool definition and stowage requirements
should be specified as part of payload definitions.
Communications and Monitorin 6
As indicated by Figure 15-16, the Orbiter should have the
capability to:
a) Receive and transmit RF two-way voice communications
between two EVA crewmen and Orbiter personnel
b) Relay EVA crewmen voice communications between ground
and other spacecraft personnel
c) Transmit any alerts initiated by ground or vehicle
personnel to the EVA crewmen.
These requirements impose negligible impacts to the Orbiter
since payload requirements establish the above communications
capability.
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15._ Communications and Monitorin5 - Continued
•
FIGURE 15--16o COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
• RELAY
EVA_GROUND
EVA_OTHER SPACECRAFT
• PAGING/ALERT
GROUND_EVA
ORBITER CREW_EVA
Figure 15-17 identifies the vehicle requirements for
support of EVA telemetry data. The telemetry require-
ments provide the following capability:
a) Receive approximately ten (i0) parameters of tele-
metry data from each of two EVA crewmen simutaneously.
b) Relay telemetry data to ground
c) Store telemetry data
d) Provide for the simultaneous display of telemetry data
from _ach crewman
e) Provide caution and warning indications when tele-
metered parameters exceed pre-established limits.
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15.4 Communications and Monitorin6 - Continued
PARAMETER CREWMAN EVA
_1 :_ 2 #1
SUIT PRESS 8.10 eo 8.08 eo Y_t__ A _:_R/_ET/_E_
VOLTS 17.3eo 17.0eo
AMPS 3.2 co 3.1 eo
: : ,o = @o p
====-- = @O ==== @O
: : .o : -o E
: : eo = eo 2
= = @O = @O
0 2 PRESS 120 o, 350 ,o " I
• RECEIVE T/M DATA FROM VEHICLE /_
TWO CREWMEN COMMUNICATIONS
-- EVA-.'-ORBITER J
• RELAY
EVA_GROUND
• DISPLAY
-- T/M PARAMETERS _ ....
• CAUTION & WARNING
,
F|GURE 15--17. TELEMETRY REQUIREMENTS
Again, the Orbiter payload telemetry requirements provides
basic capability for the Orbiter to satisfy the EVA tele-
metry requirements. Although this requirement is not con-
sidered mandatory, it should be utilized to provide maximum
system flexibility as discussed in Section 7.0 of this report.
The operational frequencies of the EVA system were not de-
fined as part of this study. Consideration must be given to
all space systems including satellites, free-flyer, space
stations as well as the Orbiter Communications requirement
to establish non-interferring frequency assignments. It is
anticipated that the frequencies used for the Shuttle EVA/IVA
system will be similiar to those employed for the Apollo EVA
system.
The Orbiter Antenna system should ensure line-of-site communi-
cation with an EVA crewman at all times while performing
tasks including payload maintenance and conduct of experiments.
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15.5 Airlock Requirement
The requirements for the airlock are summarized in Table
15-12.
SIZE - ACCOMMODATE TWO
95TH PERCENTILE CREWMEN
DECOMPRESS/RECOMPR ESS RAT ES
:e: DEcOMPRESSiON RATE: 1,0 PSI/SEC MAX
• RECOMPRESSION RATE: 0.1 PSI/SEC MAX
CONTROLS
• DECOMPRESS/RECOMPRESS RATES
• HATCH LOCK/UNLOCK
DISPLAYS
• AIR LOCK ABS. PRESSURE
• HATCH LOCK/UNLOCK INDICATORS
• HATCH -_P INDICATORS
HATCHES
• INGRE_b_/EGRE$S BY
95TH PERCENTILE CREWMAN
• OPERABLE FROM BOTH SIDES
" LIGHTING
• 5 FOOT LAMBERTS MIN.
MOBILITY AIDS
• FOOT RESTRAINTS
• HAND HOLDS/RAILS
• WAIST TETHER
SUPPORT SYSTEMS
• RF HARDLINE
• LIQUID COOLING SYSTEM
• VENTILATOR POWER SOURCE
TABLE 15--12. AIRLOCK REQUIREMENTS
The baseline airlock size is 63 inches in diameter by 83
inches long. Tests conducted at NASA/MSC indicate that this
size is adequate for use by two large suited crewmen pro-
vided that no large cargo packages are present. The results
of the task analysis indicates that relatively small packages,
i.e., film cassettes, are to be transfered through the airlock
with the EVA crewmen. The baseline hatch sizes of 40 inches
diameter and _0 inches by _6 inches is also aaequate Z'or
crew and equipment transfer.
The recompression rate is based on the physiolocial limits
of the crewman. The decompression rate is based on the
standard used by the U.S. Air Force in training personnel
for rapid decompression exposure.
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15.5 Airlock Requirements - Continued
The EVA crewman should have complete control of airlock
operation including the initiation of depressurization and
repressurization. The locking, unlocking, opening and
closing of all airlock hatches should be possible from
either the interior or exterior of the airlock.
During airlock operations, the EVA crewmen should have
visual access of the displays listed in Table 15-12 to
verify the airlock pressure level and hatch status.
The lighting and mobility aids are required to support
EVA operations as well as shirt sleeve operating modes.
These provisions may be combined to allow a single restraint
capable of supporting all modes of airlock operations. For
example, the Skylab foot restraints can be used for both
shirt sleeve and suited operations.
The support systems for RF hardline, liquid cooling and a
power outlet for the suit ventilator were discussed in
Section 15.2.
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15.6 Summary
The following vehicle interface requirements are recommended
for support of EVA/IVA operations:
a) The orbiter should be capable of supporting a maximum of
thirty-two (32) man-hours of EVA and six (6) airlock
depressurizations/repressurizations.
b) Orbiter support provisions are required in the lower cabin
for EVA/IVA equipment stowage, donning, doffing and re-
charge. This should be accomplished in common stowage/re-
charge/donning stations and should provide for simultaneous
servicing as opposed to sequential servicing.
c) A ll5 vac power source is required in the lower cabin and
airlock for ventilator operation.
d) A liquid cooling capability is recommended for support of
EVA preparation and _nergency IV.
e) The airlock should have a RF hardline.
f) The Orbiter Communications System should be capable of
transmitting, receiving and relaying voice communications
between EVA crewmen, the Orbiter, Ground and other Shuttle
related manned space vehicles.
The Orbiter should be capable of receiving, relaying,
storing and displaying telemetry data from two (2) EVA
crewmen simultaneously.
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